Well, I am not sure how W. would know that "a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of jokes" since it doesn't look like he tried it. I found a couple of vaguely funny quotes though: The real question of life after death isn't whether or not it exists, but even if it does what problem this really solves. I don't know why we are here, but I'm pretty sure that it is not in order to enjoy ourselves. Make sure that your religion is a matter between you and God only. It is one of the chief skills of the philosopher not to occupy himself with questions which do not concern him. On Thursday, February 20, 2014 4:52 AM, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx> wrote: Donal wrote While Wittgenstein is serious in what he writes, that does not foreclose his work having something akin to a sense of humour. My view accepts what Chris illustrates with his anecdote from Russell - that the younger Wittgenstein was almost entirely devoid of humour, as is his Tractatus (apparently he was the only one in the family who did not fall about laughing on hearing that Paul, the concert pianist brother, had lost an arm in the First World War). But while there is nothing playful about the Tractatus, there is something playful (or possibly playful) in aspects of Investigations. *Norman Malcolm writes, in Ludwig Wittgenstein—a Memoir *A curious thing, which I observed innumerable times, was that when Wittgenstein invented an example during his lectures in order to illustrate a point, he himself would grin at the absurdity of what he had imagined. But if any member of the class were to chuckle, his expression would change to severity and he would exclaim in reproof, ‘No, no; I’m serious!’ … *It is worth noting that Wittgenstein once said that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of jokes (without being facetious). … *When in very good spirits he would jest in a delightful manner. This took the form of deliberately absurd or extravagant remarks uttered in a tone, and with a mien, of affected seriousness. On one walk, he ‘gave’ to me each tree that we passed, with the reservation that I was not to cut it down or do anything to it, or prevent its previous owners from doing anything to it; with those reservations it was henceforth mine. Once when we were walking across Jesus Green, at night, he pointed to Cassiopeia and said that it was a ‘W’ and that it meant Wittgenstein. I said that I thought it was an ‘M’ written upside down and that it meant Malcolm. He gravely assured me that I was wrong. [pp. 29, 32] Robert Paul