Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.
For the record, in the Critique of Pure Reason (that Popper often quotes)
Kant supports the maxim but does not use 'sunt' but 'esse': "rudiments or
principles must not be unnecessarily multiplied (entia praeter necessitatem
non esse multiplicanda)" and further argues that the razor is a REGULATIVE
idea of pure reason which underlies scientists' theorizing about nature (He
wasn't thinking necessarily Einstein).
Do Ockham and Kant equivocate on 'necessity'? Or do they equivocate on
'præter' -- sometimes translated as 'without' but sometimes as 'beyond' --
which confuses Geary? ("I can understand, "I take my tea without sugar", but
"I
take my tea beyond sugar" sounds implicatural").
In a message dated 10/11/2015 6:57:21 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"Should we paying attention to anyone either PEI or PGE [Pre-Era of
Implicature or Pre-Grice Era]?"
Well, some have called non-Griceians the "anti-Grice", so it may be argued
that there is no such thing as a PGE, since the anti-Grice should fall
within the PGE ('unless she doesn't!').
Sidonius used 'implicatura' before Grice, but I won't say, before the
Griceian era (BGE), because that would offend Sidonius (or Grice).
McEvoy continues:
"Elsewhere I have explained why "conceptual analysis", gradual or not, is
a huge intellectual hoax. But as to the conclusion - that it depends what we
mean by necessity - I would add this depends not on any conceptual
analysis but on the substance of our views on "necessity and its role in
explanation". The additional words - "its role in explanation" - are most
important."
Yes. Granted. I would argue that if Ockham did NOT add those crucial terms
was because he WAS over-using his razor ("Do not multiply explanatory
clauses if they can be IMPLICATED."). Granted, this relies on having to prove
that Ockham WANTED to _implicate_ what he did not say.
McEvoy goes on:
"We should distinguish between different kinds of case and how the Razor
applies in terms of what is to be explained. If we have an explanation in
the sciences that does not need ghosts, and which would not be made more
satisfactory by the introduction of ghosts, then we can use the Razor to say we
need not introduce ghosts even though, conceivably, we could."
I think this was dealt by Hollis in his contribution to a conference on
"Rationality and Relativism". The idea that a ghost-explanation (vide "The
Witches of Salem," as we approach Halowe'en') is anti-Ockham seems
anti-Griceian in view that back in the days ghosts were thought of as _real_,
and that
'psyche' is sometimes translated as 'ghost' (as in Ryle, "The ghost in the
machine"). In the C. of E., one of the points of the Trinity (hence the
triangular shape of cucumber sandwiches) is referred to as the "holy ghost",
which most theologians consider necessary. R. Atkinson found the notion
sufficiently entrenched in the English intelligentsia to feel that he had to
made fun of it in "Four weddings and a funeral", when he refers, via a
lapsus linguae, to the 'holy ghost' as the 'holy goat', to the congregation's
amusement.
McEvoy:
"But in other areas, like metaphysics, the problem is that our explanations
are not scientifically testable, and we do not have scientific standards
of what is satisfactory from which to judge what entities are necessary to
explanation. In metaphysics, the Razor's application is therefore much more
debatable. This is particularly so if we reject a cosmology of "There's
nothing new under the sun" for a cosmology where the universe has a creative
character where new entities emerge; and where not only is their existence
irremovable by a Razor but the explanation of their emergence is not
reducible to what pre-existed, and thus the Razor also does not help in
explanatory terms."
It may be argued, with Jason Stanley, that
i. There's nothing new under the sun.
triggers a 'contextual' implicature. Stanley is the inventor of
contextualism, a latter sort of Griceianism. Specifically, Stanley wants (i)
indexed
as:
ii. There's nothing new _to me_ under the sun.
As Stanley notes, "what's new for me may be old for you", and he brings in
for further consideration:
iii. Everything old is new again.
Applying (iii) to (i) yields
iv. There's nothing OLD under the sun.
Stanley concludes, via reductio ad absurdum, that "the sun has nothing to
do with it, anyway". He judges that in the original manuscript ("no þingg
neuw undr þe sunne"), "sunne" could well be "son", which is, as he says, a
different animal.
McEvoy continues:
"The dangers in this last kind of case is that the Razor may be applied in
ways that give us a false sense that we have explained what is there when
we have really opted to explain it away (this, for example, is the marked
tendency of physicalism in relation to 'mental events')."
The keyword here seems to be ELIMINATIONISM, alla Churchlands. And it may
be argued that Ockham was guilty of explaining universalia by eliminating
them. The good thing is that he didn't care!
McEvoy:
"In this last kind of case, the Razor becomes the enemy of proper
explanation whereas in the right kind of case it is the friend of proper
explanation. It should be emphasised that "explanation" is not to be identified
with
"conceptual analysis" and is not dependent on it - the opposite views are
just philosophers' make-believe."
Well, 'explain' is a tricky verb. We usually appeal to 'reasons': some are
'justificatory', and some are 'explanatory'. So, it may be argued that
'explanatory' applies to 'reason' and it's best treated as an adjective, rather
than as a grand abstract noun ('explanation') or attending verb ("to
explain"). But we should be reminded of what Humpty Dumpty said about
adjectives:
"Words have a temper, you know, some of them — particularly verbs: they're
the proudest — adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs —
however, I can manage the whole lot of them!"
(For Austin, "explain" posed a paradox in that "I explain that the earth is
flat" is NOT performative as "name" -- "I name this ship the Queen
Elizabeth II" -- is).
How is an explanatory reason different from a justificatory reason?
i. Justificatory reason:
-- Canonical form in terms of 'premise' and 'conclusion'. P ->X ->C
-- non-factive.
-- the premise justifies the conclusion.
-- mass
-- relative: P is a reason for x to C
ii. Explanatory reason:
-- Canonical form in terms of 'premise' and 'conclusion'. P -> C
-- factive.
-- the premise EXPLAINS the conclusion.
-- count.
-- non-relative
But of course, to explain 'explain' we may go beyond Ockham.
Grice proposes “x reasons (informally) from A to B just in case
i. x thinks that A and
ii. x intends that, in thinking B, he should be thinking something which
would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument the premises of which
are a supplementation of A.
This seems Ockhamian enough and broad enough to cover both 'explanatory
reason' and 'justificatory reason', but we have to grant that reasoning, while
it may sometimes involve constructing an argument, this is not always so,
because one is reasoning from the premises of that argument.
In other words: the argument is often deemed an "explanatory" argument,
even if one is reasoning from the CONCLUSION of that "explanatory" argument
to a conclusion that is a premise of the argument.
Whether Ockham would find this a 'necessity' is yet a further problem. Lots
of people have found lots of things necessities, my favourite being
DeSylva*.
Cheers,
Speranza
You’re the cream in my coffee, you’re the salt in my stew;
You will always be my NECESSITY, I’d be lost without you.
You’re the starch in my collar, you’re the lace in my shoe;
You will always be my NECESSITY, I’d be lost without you.
You’re the sail of my love boat, you’re the captain and crew;
You will always be my NECESSITY, I’d be lost without you.
---------------- DESYLVA
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