[lit-ideas] Trained Watching
- From: "Mike Geary" <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 22:44:19 -0500
If I were a trained philosopher, I'd know what 'know' means. Or at least I'd
know what philosopher's mean when they say "know" and I could then try to mean
what they mean by 'know'. If I were a trained philosopher, I'd know what
'mean' means to philosophers. If I only had been trained.
"The dress of a woman of Lhasa,
In it's place,
Is an invisible element of that place
Made visible."
Many, many moons ago, in response to some long lost philosophical thread, I
quoted these lines from Wallace Stevens to our dear Gricean groupie from
Guilford who spurned them as essentialist claptrap, arrant nonsense and
pish-posh. Hrrmph, I thought. I bring them to the surface again, because I
think that once again they bear on the topic at hand. The "invisible element
of that place made visible" is not some transcendent idea that is "True
Reality", rather it is that set of assumptions about life within a culture that
are so fundamental that they are accepted without question, that shape the
culture but are invisible to questioning. Only those outside the culture can
see those fundamentals reflected in the dress.
In the same vein, I wonder -- though I don't know what that word means, having
no training in it -- how the dress of our language is an invisible determinate
of who we are.
Mike Geary
Memphis
----- Original Message -----
From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 9:51 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Do ideas exist before being articulated?
Sorry -- since I'm copying these posts, I sometimes unintentionally change
the subject-matter, as I don't have the reply function when working online.
McCreery did not like my name-dropping of functionalism, behaviourism, and
mentalism.
So let's have a close reading of the post initiating this thread:
>Pondering the conversation about what goes on before we speak, I note
>that two possibilities are in play.
>1. Classical--We possess ideas of which we are partly or wholly
>unaware until they are spoken. Cf. Plato, Leibniz (rebutting Locke),
>Chomsky, Freud.
>2. Modern--Ideas only emerge as we speak them. What goes on inside us
>is a confluence of pre-linguistic processes that crystallize at the
>moment we speak. Cf. Vico, Minsky,Klein a good deal of current
>research in such fields as psychology and political science that
>indicates that processes conventionally described as "emotional"
>proceed those described as "rational," which turn out, more often than
>not, to be after the fact rationalizations of decisions already made.
Well, the whole issue would require some clarification. 'idea' itself, as you
know, is Plato's neologism. It's derived from "vid-" and hence to perception,
as in 'visual'. He meant 'vision of the mind', but the 'mental side' to it is
notably not demonstrated. For that reason, Hume preferred to talk of
'impression' and leave 'idea' as something like 'an impression of an
impression'.
Now, the interface of this perceptual content should be with the behavioural
output -- very much, if you don't like Watson, a la Skinner in his "Verbal
Behaviour". The expression of a perception in a flow of signals meant to be
shared with other creatures or not.
The point about 'sharing' is important. Wager may find something funny and
laugh "Ha!", or even say aloud "This is funny" -- so the articulation of his
joy is not addressee-directed, it seems.
Grice has studied cases where what is a 'natural' response (like a
spontaneous laughter) can become a manipulated symbol. One can simulate tears,
for example, or even verbally express, "I'm AWFULLY sorry" without really
_meaning_ it.
The point I was trying to make by talking of functionalism, versus mentalism
and behaviourism, is that there is a philosophical alternative. For mentalists,
there must be something in the 'black box' (the rules and representations that
Chomsky talks about, to which he even ascribe innate properties). For the
behaviourists _and_ the functionalists, it's just a _black box_. The
behaviourists think they can do without the black box at all; the
functionalists argue that the box is needed as a 'theoretical construct' that
provides a bridge between the perceptual input (the idea if you will) and the
behavioural output (the discourse).
Questions of temporality seem pretty secondary. As you say, it's mostly ex
post facto phenomena anyway. Note that with a verb like "meaning", it's rare to
express:
What have you been doing lately (this afternoon)?
Oh, I have been meaning that Descartes was possibly right, after all.
"Meaning" is not like "thinking" -- To say that you have spent the evening
"thinking that perhaps Descares was possibly right" need not any behavioural
correlate. You could be thinking that while playing golf, for example. In any
case, that thought would only be developed once your mate asks, you, "What do
you mean, 'possibly right after all'. And then you start to philosophize and
verbalise, and discourse, and you keep perceiving your addressee's reactions,
and you keep self-hearing what you are saying to help express your view in a
clearer way, which is not what I'm doing right now!
Good night!
JL
St. Michael Hall,
Calle 58, No. 611,
La Plata B1900 BPY
Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Tel. 54 221 425 7817
Fax 54 221 425 9205
http://www.stmichaels.com.ar
jls@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
http://www.netverk/~jls.htm
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