If we concede the authors are right and there is a "neural mechanism" that
facilitates dishonesty, then a question arises whether this "neural mechanism"
has been selected for by 'natural selection' because it is adaptive.
A groundbreaking (if flawed and uneven book) on this topic has been written by
a leading naturalist and thinker about 'natural selection', Robert Trivers.
Part of his view is to explain how deception and self-deception can be both
adaptive and maladaptive (they will endure, and perhaps proliferate, provided
the adaptive aspects are 'selected for' more than the maladaptive are 'selected
against').
One thing to be said about some of these scientists is that they try to face up
to the difficulties within their theoretical framework - contrary to the
picture of scientists as routine-puzzle-solving adherents of a paradigm until
sociological factors cause a permanent 'paradigm-shift' etc., many scientists
try to test the 'paradigm' or theoretical framework to destruction. Of course,
the shifting or overthrow of a large-scale theoretical framework like 'natural
selection' is not likely to happen by a single apparent counter-instance -
especially as the apparent counter-instances might be, with effort, better
explained as instances of the framework in action rather than
counter-instances.
The argument that advantageous mutations would get 'blended out' before they
could overrun the gene-pool (an argument to which Darwin had no adequate
answer) was eventually answered by rediscovering the importance of Mendel's
work and showing that 'genes' work like particles in combination and do not
blend.
The problem of explaining 'altruism' in terms of 'natural selection' has led to
much work showing how 'altrusistic' behaviour (like a parent sacrificing their
life to protect their offspring) can be 'selected for' if its pay-off in
ensuring the survival of similar 'genes' outweighs the loss of those genes
through the sacrifice - and it will only evolve if it is 'selected for' this
way and to the extent there is adequate pay-off.
For Trivers 'lying' should be seen along a spectrum that extends into both the
deception of others and self-deception: an immediate puzzle is that
self-deception would seem to imply a cognitive deficit, and it might be hard to
see how this deficit could be 'selected for' rather than 'selected against' - a
possible answer is that it is 'selected for' because it lessens the cognitive
burden otherwise involved in deceiving others and makes such deception more
effective, and where deceiving others can of course be to an individual's
advantage and thus 'selected for'.
In the early and perhaps best part of the book, Trivers outline how deception
is rife in nature - from the virus that deceives the body that it is a friendly
organism to butterflies that imitate the colours of poisonous species to deter
predators. What happens in nature is a kind of arms-race between 'strategies'
of deception and counter-deception. This provides a wider framework for
understanding human 'lying' in terms of our capacity for deception and
self-deception and one that moves beyond the idea we should see 'lying' as
simply a transgression against a moral imperative - the high capacity for
deception and self-deception is linked to our being highly social animals.
It may well be that this framework helps us better understand why we should
take a firm stand against deception and even self-deception, to the point of
frowning on 'little white lies' - not only because of the 'slippery slope' but
because the slope leads to disasters like unsafe space shuttles, crashed
aeroplanes and ill-judged foreign wars.
There are other problems here too, given that self-deception means the
untruthful may be blind to their untruth - for example, being in a position of
power seems to increase tendencies of self-deception (as well as power-seeking
being a trait of narcissists in the first place). In some ways we should be
surprised the world is not in a worse state than it is - but that may be
largely because counter-deception is very adaptive also.
DL
From: "epostboxx@xxxxxxxx" <epostboxx@xxxxxxxx>
To: Lit-Ideas <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, 26 October 2016, 23:40
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Those 'little white lies' are blacker than one thinks
An article on the study mentioned below appeared in today's internet issue of
the NEW YORK TIMES:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/science/why-big-liars-often-start-out-as-small-ones.html?hpw&rref=science&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region®ion=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well&_r=0
"Why Big Liars Often Start Out as Small Ones"
The article concludes:
“ Dr. Garrett said he hoped that ... that another study could be done to look
at what might stop people from escalating their dishonesty.
“ ‘ How do you stop it? How do you prevent it?’ he asked.
“ But Dr. Ruff said that if the findings from this study held up, the message
seemed clear.
“ ‘ ... we should watch out that we don’t tolerate lies, in order to prevent
people from lying when it really matters,’ he said.”
On 25 Oct 2016, at 10:30, epostboxx@xxxxxxxx wrote:
Immanuel Kant took a very strong stance against lying, for which he was
immediately, and has ever since been, criticized as being ‘unrealistic’.
Arguments against Kant’s deontologically-based position on lying have largely
been utilitarian.. A recent neurological study sweeps the feet out from under
such consequentialist positions, giving empirical evidence that the practice
of uttering even ‘little white lies’ can have deleterious consequences.
From NATURE NEUROSCIENCE (published online 24 October 2016):
http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/nn.4426.pdf
The brain adapts to dishonesty
