[lit-ideas] Re: The Order of Aurality
- From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2012 19:39:59 -0800
Donal:
First, I will indicate that they* are not necessarily linked:- for
there is no obvious inconsistency in (a) upholding a form of PLA that
asserts there cannot be a 'private language' in the sense of a
language whose 'rules' are only 'privately' known and applied and
regulated by, say, one 'private' individual, and (b) upholding the
view that any language [which is 'public' rather than 'private',
consistent with (a)] can only be understood by someone who shares a
similar 'form of life' to the 'form of life' which underpins the
meanings of that language.
*i.e., 'forms of life,' and the 'private language argument.'
A note: one of the arguments against the possibility of a 'private
language' is that such a language would have no rules. Rules (like word
meanings) are founded on agreement,
and in a language that only one person /could/ understand, the
possibility of agreement as to whether or not a rule has been followed
could not arise.
In other words, to say any language must be 'public' rather than
'private' (in the terms of the PLA) is not necessarily to say that
"any language is...open to understanding by any language user." For
there may be two sets of language-users whose distinct 'forms of life'
are so different that neither can understand the others' language, and
the PLA does not obviously deny this. The PLA is not directed against
the idea that some languages may not be understood by users of some
other kind of language but against the idea that the 'rules' for
applying any given language correctly could be simply a matter of
'private' individual fiat.
Yes. §202: 'That's why "following a rule" is a practice. And to think
one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that's why it's not
possible to follow
a rule 'privately'; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would
be the same thing as following it. [cf. 82]' (§82 is too long for me to
type out right now.)
The 'private language argument' runs from §243 to §315. Its gist is at
§246, which is best read as a dialogue between Wittgenstein and his
imaginary
interlocutor
We might perhaps admit that "For Wittgenstein, any language is, in
principle, open to understanding by any language user who shares a
sufficiently similar 'form of life'" but not that, without that 'form
of life' qualification, "For Wittgenstein, any language is, in
principle, open to understanding by any language user (irrespective of
whether their kind of language and 'form of life' bear any similarity
to the language in question)".
I don't understand the sentence in quotes. It seems just mistaken. The
reason it's mistaken is epitomized at 327 in 'Philosophy of
Psychology---A Fragment,' [Hacker and
Schulte's revised translation of the /Investigations/]: 'If a lion could
talk, we wouldn't be able to understand it.'
In fact, I suggest the phrase "in principle" may be dispensed with
here as otiose, and "open to understanding" is misleading here: for,
though we might say that the PLA tells us that any given language must
be "open to understanding" by some others, it does not necessarily
imply that it must be "open to understanding" byall others who use a
language of any kind, where this would include any creature with any
kind of 'form of life' that uses any kind of language .
Right. See above.
While I think I understand the drift of Phil's points, I suggest they
mistakenly conflate the role of 'form of life' and the PLA. In short,
it is unclear to me how the so-called PLA imples that "any language
is, in principle, open to understanding by any language user" without
any 'form of life' qualification, as it seems to me that such a 'form
of life' qualification would not make any language 'private' in the
way the PLA denies.
True. It would seem that the Diarist, as he's sometimes, is either
(somehow) divorced from any form of life---which seems prima facie
absurd--- or he's writing in a code,
which by definition would be translatable into a common language.
Robert Paul
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