McEvoy, who seems to enjoy ‘except’ phrases, was mentioning “Galen Strawson” –
“except Galen Strawson, of course.” (McEvoy’s actual phrase uses ‘except’ as a
verb: “Galen Strawson excepted of course.” (Which is different from, “Galen
Strawson excepted, of course.” “Of course” being short for “off the course,” if
you mustn’t.
Which got me thinking about a dream, and H. P. G., an Oxonian philosopher.
Unlike Galen Strawson, H. P. G.’s father was, possibly, NOT a philosopher
(“What’s a philosopher?,” asks Socrates). H. P. G. defines his father as a
“dreadful businessman but a fine musician.” But H. P. G. adds that, if he
learned to argue, it was from his father, who was a Non-Conformist. It’s not
like Herbert G. – for that was his name – liked to _argue_ *per se* -- but it
so happened that his spouse had brought a Catholic aunt to the household in
Harborne, and dinner discussions of a theological nature were not infrequent.
In any case, it is different with Galen. In this interview below – excerpted –
the interviewer keeps referring to P. F. Strawson and how Galen Strawson’s
theories compare. Allow me to quote an excerpt:
Q: Let’s talk about the objective attitude for a moment. Your father, Sir Peter
F. Strawson, in a famous essay that continues to haunts anyone philosophizing
on free will today, claims that when you adopt an, er, “objective” attitude
towards another human being, you lose some essential features of inter-personal
relationships. [This possibly Strawson got from H. P. G., his tutor at St.
John’s, who was into co-operation as an inter-personal relationship evident in
conversation). You will start to see this person as an object of social policy,
a subject for “treatment”—some Orwellian scenarios come to [my] mind—but you
can no longer see them fully as, er, a “person.” But if we’re going to accept
the belief that there is no free will, no deep moral responsibility, it seems
we shall have to take the objective attitude towards all people, including
those closest to us. Are the implications [or if you must, implicatures] of
this as cold and bleak as your father seems to suggest?
G. S.: Well, I do not think so. I disagree that regularly taking the
“objective” attitude to someone means giving up on treating them fully as a
“person.” In fact, I happen to think that it is *essential* to the _closest_
human relations [For the record, Sir Peter and H. P. G’s conversations were so
implicit – since they were so close – that no third party _would_ understand
it. Strawson’s wife recalls that H. P. G., too, would call (telephone) late at
night, about this or that philosophical problem; and sometimes it could be
_pretty_ late! – but I disgress] I think that it is rather a beautiful
capability that we have. It is deeply involved in compassion and love. I do not
think love is blind. I think love sees all the faults and does not mind. It
brings the point of view of the universe into our lives, where it is, as far as
I can see, welcome. The point of view of the universe can be part of care,
caring.
Q: In your essay, you give one of the most effective critiques I have seen of
your father’s essay. What’s it like to have a public philosophical disagreement
with your father? Has he come around to your point of view or does he just call
you a schmuck?
G. S.: Well, it is rather pretty hard to imagine the word “schmuck” issuing
from my father’s mouth [but I guess I can catch your implicature]. Perhaps if
you got him drunk, passed him a pot of Smucker’s jam and asked him what it was.
But seriously, actually, I haven’t got the slightest idea of what he thinks
about this. I think my father *might* concede the point about the “objective”
attitude and remain content with the deep thought behind his essay, the thought
that belief in free will is so deeply built into our natural moral-emotional
attitudes to others that philosophical argument about it is simply moot—“super
moot” [+> as you Americans would say]. Derek Parfit once said to me that he
thought *my* view is closer to the truth than my father’s, but that my father’s
essay is the one that will live on. I think Parfit is right. I don’t think
there is anything Œdipal going on. In general, disagreements are fine — real
substantive disagreements — because either your opponent is wrong, in which
case it is no problem, or your opponent is right, in which case it is *also* no
problem because what’s right is right, and what can you do? Plus it’s nice to
get things right. What is at issue, always, is the truth.”
The Gr- Collection at Bancroft contains LOADS of Sir Peter’s contributions with
H. P. G. on stuff like categories (‘the Banbury conversations,’ as some call
them) and stuff.
And stuff.
Cheers,
Speranza
