Thanks to J. Wager for his comments: >it seems to me that Kant takes "judgment" as having two >spheres: One in sensible phenomena [theoretisch] and one >in actions [praktisch] >To "will" something for Kant was to act deliberately, that >is, to think about one's actions and then do them. I'm not sure about the "and then do them", but I agree that, to use Grice's example in "Intention and Uncertainty" (PBA), we can meaningfully say: The professor was willing to scratch his head. -- unless we have _seen_ the professor _attempting_ to scratch his head -- even if failing. >One can "think" without judging, ... but as soon as one >unites a concept with either a sensible or a deliberate >content, it's a judgment. It would seem then that Kant is prisoner to the Aristotelian categories of subject-predicate. Strangely, one of the recent cliches in the English language are things like: "Think Kant" "Think homophobia" "Think Capitol" etc. etc. where the utterer is directing the addressee to _think_ about a concept (entertaining it) but merely _implicating_ (never saying) under what guise one is supposed to think such a concept. All very confusing, and more so in German. Cheers, I'm reading Aristophanes and he has Sokrates as leading the Thinkery, but can't yet find what the Greek for that is. I see that he called the comedy "Clouds" because that's where philosophers are said to have their heads in. Cheers, JL JL ************************************** See what's new at http://www.aol.com