[lit-ideas] Richard Nixon, Chair of Moral and Pastoral Theology, Oxford
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2013 00:00:11 -0500 (EST)
"Nixon" would refer to the same person whether or not he had become
President of the United States
In a message dated 1/15/2013 10:33:17 P.M. UTC-02, profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx
writes:
... to explain what "Richard Nixon would refer to the same man whether or
not he had become President" means...
He is referring to the link provided by R. Paul which reads:
"‘Richard Nixon’ would refer to the same man whether or not he had become
President."
Note the use of the quotation marks:
"Richard Nixon" would refer to the same man whether or not he had become
President of the United States".
This is taken of course from Kripke. When Dummett compiled his book on
essays on language, he entitled it "Seas of Language", as per Kripke's genial
quote.
Kripke starts his book on " Naming and Necessity" with the sentence:
Socrates is called 'Socrates'.
Kripke comments:
"Actually, a sentences like the above:
Socrates is called "Socrates"
is a very interesting and one can spend hours talking about their analysis.
I actually did, once, do that. See how high the seas of language can rise.
And at the lowest points too.
The new sentence is as per header, as spotted by Ritchie
"‘Richard Nixon’ would refer to the same man whether or not he had become
President of the United States.
Grice is subtler. He requires an analysis of 'referring' and 'describing'.
The analysis follows the lines by Stephen Schiffer in the "Synthese"
journal:
By uttering "Richard Nixon", Utterer refers to Richard Nixon.
Richard Nixon was a President of the United States.
Conditionally, had Richard Nixon NOT become a president of the United
States, we (or his mother) would still refer to him as Richard Nixon.
Strictly, his rigid name is:
Richard Milhous Nixon
where Milhous is a rigidity (to use Kripke's neologism) from Nixon's
maternal side.
Nixon was inaugurated as president on January 20, 1969, sworn in by his
onetime political rival, Chief Justice Earl Warren. Pat Nixon held the family
Bibles open at Isaiah 2:4, which reads, "They shall beat their swords into
plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks." In his inaugural address,
which received almost uniformly positive reviews, Nixon remarked that "the
greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker" —a phrase
that would later be placed on his gravestone. He spoke about turning partisan
politics into a new age of unity:
In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever of words; from
inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry
rhetoric that fans discontents into hatreds; from bombastic rhetoric that
postures instead of persuading. We cannot learn from one another until we stop
shouting at one another, until we speak quietly enough so that our words can
be heard as well as our voices.
Oddly, Grice refers to Nixon in the John Locke Lectures:
Grice writes:
"Richard Nixon _ought_ to *get* the Oxford Chair of Moral and Pastoral
Theology."
In such an utterance, Grice writes, "Richard Nixon is spoken as being
_both_
(i) the person who is or should be _concerned_ about what is being stated
to be a matter of necessity, but also
(ii) the agent (or patient) whose doings (or sufferings) are of concern."
"Now," Grice observes, this may be a trick, for although, "often the same
person operates (as here) in both roles."
"But sometimes the same person doesn't."
"And where this is so, it is cozy to fall into the idea that
a single REFERENCE to the agent
(or patient)
-- i.e. our (ii) above --
is ALL that is needed, and so that the PERSON-relativisation can be
eliminated."
"But things are not always like thus -- at least in some idiolects".
Suppose your uncle were to utter:
"It is necessary to Joe Garagiola that the American public retains its
interest in baseball."
"The uncle's utterance is different from the one about Nixon Grice opened
his lecture with". "And in this precise respect I was talking about."
Grice then clarifies:
"I propose, then, we distinguish
between
(i) the person _for whom_
something is a reason (or is necessary), and
(ii) the person _about whom_ we are
talking when we say _what_ is necessary, or
what there is a reason for."
And that's still not final. "Moreover," he adds, "it seems plausible to
suggest that,
if (or when) NO ONE IS EXPLICITLY
or IMPLICITLY referred to as a person
for whom
something is necessary (or as called
for by reason),
then
we are justified to assume that
the reason or the necessity
of what I shall call a GENERAL type.
-- A "public" or "objective", type,
rather than a "private" or "subjective"
type."
"The outcome of the aforegoing suggestion yields an interesting consequence
for those who have been interested enough to follow me this far."
"For, the suggested treatment would represent it
as of GENERAL concern,
now, that Richard Nixon [the President of the United States]
apply for the mentioned chair, which is quite
inappropriate to say the least, at least to my dear old friend, Thomas
Nagel -- if I understood him correctly as I browsed through his engaging, _The
Possibility of Altruism_."("Aspects of Reason", p. 63).
Cheers
Speranza
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