[lit-ideas] Remilitarization of the Rhineland
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "Lit-Ideas" <Lit-Ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2008 12:04:17 -0800
The Treaty of Versailles demilitarized the Rhineland. The French would
thereby have a buffer if Germany once again became aggressive. The
remilitarization of the Rhineland was absolutely necessary to Hitler's
aggressive plans. He moved troops back into the Rhineland in March of 1936,
a very weak force, only 22,000 men and 14,000 local police. France had a
much larger force at the ready, but lacked the will to use it. So to, the
British, even though they often said that their front line was the Rhine and
not the North Atlantic.
Hitler perpetrated a colossal bluff and it worked. Kagan writes that the
common people in Britain and France didn't know what was at stake. "Their
leaders had given them no help in understanding these things over the years
nor did they in 1936."
Hitler knew he was taking a huge gamble. He later said, "a retreat on our
part would have spelled collapse. . . . The forty-eight hours after the
march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-wracking in my life. If the
French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw
with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal
would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance."
On page 361 (op. cit.) Kagan writes, "The consequences of the
remilitarization of the Rhineland were enormous. Hitler emerged much
strengthened internally, and Germany's power and influence were greatly
increased. His evident success raised the dictator's popularity with the
German people to new heights. The American ambassador to London wrote that
'an overwhelming majority of Germans would support any venture which Hitler
might undertake.' . . . As he sped home from a triumphant tour of the
Rhineland, Hitler 'turned to his cronies in the special train and once again
express his relief at the limpness of the Western powers: 'Am I glad! Good
Lord, am I glad it's gone so smoothly. Sure enough the world belongs to the
brave man. He's the one God helps.' The inaction of the French and British
emboldened him to proceed with his aggressive plans. He was now convinced
that France would not attack without British support and that Britain would
not fight to prevent Germany from taking Austria or Czechoslovakia."
". . . France's inaction, moreover encouraged Belgium to break off its
alliance, made in the 1920s with France, and to move to neutrality, which
left a critical gap at the end of the Maginot Line . . . It helped persuade
Mussolini to conclude the 'Rome-Berlin Axis' in October 1936, an agreement
between the dictators that further complicated France's strategic problems.
It also entailed withdrawal of Italian protection from Austria, a
prerequisite for Hitler's annexation of Austria. After March 1936, 'there
could be no doubt, with the disappearance of the demilitarized Rhineland,
Europe had lost her last guarantee against German aggression.'"
The root problem according to Kagan wasn't that France and Britain failed to
act, it was the long years of reliving the "terrible memories of the last
war and the frightening horrors . . . projected for the next, disguised and
made respectable by revisionist interpretations of the causes of the last
war and the unfairness of the treaties that concluded it, led to a refusal
to face unpleasant realities and to think strategically, to maintain a
system of defense and the will to use it would be adequate to deter
aggression and preserve the peace.
"For all the truth in such a line of thought, however, it is still correct
to think of March 1936 as a lost opportunity, a last missed chance to stop
Hitler before he became a deadly menace. The great misfortune of the
Western powers was that they lacked leaders at this moment of crisis wise
enough to understand the situation and strong enough to move against the
current. Even had the French chosen to use their 'sledgehammer' after a
slow and full mobilization, there can be no question of their ability to
drive the German troops out of the Rhineland. But no one in their weak
interim government had the will, the persuasive ability, or the power to
order such an action. British encouragement or even support could have had
a powerful effect, but the members of the Baldwin government . . . were not
willing to take the step. . . there is no 'way of knowing what might have
been the effect if public opinion had been given a strong lead by the
government, both during and after the crisis.' But Baldwin and his
colleagues were men of their time and place, averting their eyes from
unpleasant realities, paralyzed into inaction and hoping for the best."
Comment: This is a tough one to apply to modern times. How could you guard
against doing something like that again? Where do you start? I could say,
never allow yourself to be depressed or give in to defeatism, never give in
to pacifistic tendencies, and never disarm, but would that be enough? We
have to add, never choose the wrong leaders. How do you avoid at least some
of those things. If you're depressed, you can't just stop being depressed -
necessarily, and I'm speaking of a climate of depression that was prevalent
in a nation. The climate of opinion was negative and defeatist in 1936.
The will of not only the Baldwin government but the people at large in both
France and Britain was not up to dealing with Hitler, and so they didn't.
Lawrence Helm
San Jacinto
Other related posts:
- » [lit-ideas] Remilitarization of the Rhineland
