Indeed. I'm currently, studying, incidentally, the category of "Relatio", as referred to by Aristotle: Cat. 1. ousia 2. poiotes 3. posotes 4. 'relatio' Kant's Table of Categories 1. quantitas 2. qualitas 3. relatio 4. manner. The "relatio" involves two relata. For one relatum relates to another relatum. According to Aristotle and Kant, everything is interrelated to everything. For Grice, not so. Grice's example: A: Mrs. Schlinker is an old windbag. B: The weather has been delightful for this time of the year, hasn't it. (WoW, ii -- googlebooks) Grice's gloss: B's reply fails to _relate_ to A's remark. The implicature being that A has committed a _gaffe_. Grice's critics noted that at a deeper level B's utterance does relate to (or dovetail with) A's utterance. But Grice's 'relatio' relates to the explicature, not to the implicature. Etc. Cheers, J. L. Speranza for the Grice Club, etc. In a message dated 1/1/2010 3:40:24 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, torgeir_fjeld@xxxxxxxx writes: Merry new year. Donal wrote: What Popper might say is this: a "mobile army of metaphors" - along with many other armies and non-armies, and mobile and immobile stuff - _might play a role_ in the search for truth: but _they do not constitute truth_ (and only relatavist legerdemain might convince you otherwise). Truth is the correspondence (of a proposition) to the facts [a la Tarski]. May we infere that all those writing from de Saussure onwards are to be regarded relatavist?