[lit-ideas] Re: Popper's 'Philosophy of Mind' IV: The Role of World 3 - Contd.
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 14:57:49 +0000 (GMT)
________________________________
From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
"Popper’s
concluding point in this dialogue may be understand as a variant of his point
that we can only understand certain behaviour if we treat as autonomous and
‘real’ the World 3 “objects” which that behaviour appears to be concerned".
This might have better read (corrections in italics):-
Popper’s
concluding point in this dialogue may be understood as a variant of his point
that we can only understand certain behaviour if we treat as autonomous and
‘real’ the World 3 “objects” with which that behaviour appears to be concerned.
Donal
Not for nothing a fallibilist
London
________________________________
The last post, which began by introducing Popper's "Revised Form" of an
argument by Haldane, left at:-
It is a key part of this argument that Popper wants to
indicate “The Reality of World 3” and, in the TSAIB section P2:11 so titled, he
writes:- “Many World 3 objects
exist in the form of material bodies, and belong in a sense to both World 1 and
World 3. Examples are sculptures, paintings, and books, whether devoted to a
scientific subject or to literature. A book is a physical object, and it
therefore belongs to World 1; but what makes it a significant product of the
human mind is its content: that which
remains invariant in the various copies and editions. And this content belongs
to World 3”. The irreducibility of this World 3 content to its World 1
embodiment
may be indicated by showing how that ‘invariant content’ can be embodied in
numerous different World 1 ways: a proposition (like “All swans are white”) may
have the same invariant World 3 content irrespective of myriad physical
differences in how it is spoken or written. A further important argument for
this irreducibility is that logical relations between propositions cannot be
reduced to their physical relations or even explained as a physical relation:
for these logical relations pertain only to propositions in their invariant
World 3 content and not to propositions in their varying physical forms. [This
is so important a point that we might emphasise that any claim that ‘two
propositions contradict because of their physical/World 1 characteristics’
amounts to a ‘category mistake’, in that contradiction between propositions
only arises when we are considering
propositions as World 3 entities, never when considering them as merely World 1
entities]. We might
equally emphasise that the human ‘disposition to acquire a language’ concerns
‘language’ as a general World 3 entity or construction
(for naming, asserting, describing, arguing etc.), and it is not merely a
disposition to acquire a specific World 1 form of language (such as English or
Mandarin):- in other words, our disposition to acquire a language is a World 2
disposition or ‘openness’ to ‘grasp’ World 3 content – and not a disposition to
‘learned behaviour’ in a
way that might be accounted for purely in terms of World 1.
_____________________
Popper wishes to emphasise that there cannot be “an adequate
theory – psychological, or behavioural, or sociological, or historical – of the
behaviour of scientists which does not take full account of the World 3 status
of science” [p.41]; and as against “a behaviourist”, who may say we need only
look at the relevant behaviour of scientists in order to understand science,
Popper insists “that if we do not admit problems and theories as the objects of
study and of criticism, then we shall never understand the behaviour of
scientists” [p.40] – where their status as “objects of study and criticism” is
their World 3 status. As these “objects” affect the development of science, and
as “the influence of scientific theories on World 1 is obvious”, this
is enough to establish “the reality of the objects of World 3” [p.41].
The next section, P2:12, discusses “Unembodied World 3
Objects” – or what might also be called World 3.3 “objects”, where the World 3
content itself exists only in World 3. This is in contradistinction to World 3.1
“objects”, which are World 3 “objects” or contents that are embodied in World
1, and which thus exist within World 1; or World 3.2 “objects”, which are World
3 “objects” or contents that are the subject of World 2 [or 'mental'] activity,
and
which thus exist within World 2. For Popper, the importance of World 3.3
“objects” is that,
if they exist, “then it cannot be a true doctrine that our grasp or
understanding of a World 3 object always depends upon our sensual contact with
its material embodiment; for example, upon our reading a statement of a theory
in a book” [p.43].
Further to this point is Popper’s own "thesis", discussed at
P2:13, about “Grasping a World 3 Object”. Very briefly, Popper’s thesis is that
we “grasp” these objects by ‘making and matching’, though what we “grasp” and
‘make and match’ are crucially abstract,
and these processes are attempts at understanding abstract World 3 content:-
just as the World 3
content of a proposition is crucially abstract even when that abstract content
is embodied in World 1 [it is only this abstract content, and nothing itself
merely
physical, that may stand in logical relations to other abstract World 3
content]. So when we read "a statement... in a book'' it is not the sensual
contact with its material embodiment that gives rise to understanding [for this
'perceptual' level of grasping the World 1 characteristics of the statement may
be the same for two persons only one of whom understands how to decode that
World 1statement for its World 3 content, the other not understanding the
language]; it is grasping or decoding the World 3 content of the World 1 book
that constitutes understanding, and this is not a sensual or perceptual
activity in the sense in which we have sensual or perceptual experience of
World 1 "objects". The content of a theory is abstract, even if it is content
that is ‘embodied’
[e.g. in a book] or ‘thought’. For say
the theory is ‘false’; its being ‘false’ is a characteristic of its abstract
content not of its physical embodiment. Equally, if we destroy an embodied
version of the theory, say by burning the book in which it is written, we do
not thereby destroy the World 3 content of the theory or destroy its ‘falsity’
as content. That World 3 content is ‘invariant’; and, if it is false, it is
therefore always false.
When we turn to Popper’s imagined dialogue between an
interactionist and a physicalist, what we find is that the physicalist is, in
effect, trying to explain World 3 content entirely in World 1 terms. Popper’s
concluding point in this dialogue may be understand as a variant of his point
that we can only understand certain behaviour if we treat as autonomous and
‘real’ the World 3 “objects” which that behaviour appears to be concerned [as
opposed
to the physicalist/behaviourist view that these “objects” may be explained away
as physiological or behavioural dispositions, so that we might act as if there
are such “objects” but really there are only such dispositions to act]. In the
dialogue, Popper focuses on the role of logic and on the notion of the
“validity of an inference”. The “Physicalist” in the dialogue [whose
arguments could also be reworked by a behaviourist] wishes to deny the claim,
which is central to Popper's argument here,
that an appeal to the “validity of an
inference” is an appeal to “World 3 objects, such as standards of validity”
[p.77].
Eventually the “Interactionist”
asks:- “Are [the great majority of logicians] so disposed [to accept such
standards] because the principles are valid, or are the principles valid
because logicians are disposed to accept them?” The Physicalist answers: “A
tricky question. The obvious answer to it,
and at any rate your answer, would seem to be ‘logicians are disposed to accept
logical standards because these standards are valid’. But this would admit the
existence of non-corporeal and thus abstract standards or principles whose
existence I deny. No, I have to give a different reply…: the standards exist,
so far as they exist, as states or dispositions of the brains of people:
states, or dispositions, which make people accept proper standards.” The
Physicalist then claims these states or
dispositions are explained by their having “been selected by natural selection.”
The Interactionist points out that as
this selection involves ‘error elimination’ it involves appeal to World 3
standards or principles such as “an
inference is valid if and only if no counter-example to this inference exists”;
“[a]nd although the emergence of World 3 can be, partly, explained by natural
selection, that is to say, by its usefulness, the principles of valid
inference, and their applications, which belong to World 3, cannot all be
explained in this way. They are partly the unintended autonomous results of the
making of World 3” [p.78].
The Interactionist then brings out that these standards are not physical
[p.79]: “The property of
a brain mechanism or a computer mechanism which makes it work according to the
standards of logic is not a purely physical property, although I am very ready
to admit that it is in some sense connected with, or based upon, physical
properties. For two computers may physically differ as much as you like, yet
they both operate according to the same standards of logic. And vice versa;
they may differ physically
as little as you may specify, yet this difference may be so amplified that the
one may operate according to the standards of logic, but not the other. This
seems to show that the standards of logic are not physical properties.” Yet the
Physicalist does not see why these
standards cannot be “defined in purely physical terms. We simply build a
logical computer, which is a physical object. Then we define the relations
between its input and its output as the standards of logic. In this way we have
defined a standard of logic in purely physical terms.” The Interactionist
replies that the computer may malfunction, or its
programme may contain logical errors, so that its behaviour deviates from
correct logical standards, and this shows these standards cannot be defined in
terms of the computer’s behaviour. But there is a deeper problem with the
Physicalist’s attempt to explain logical
standards, like the validity of an inference, in terms of their “usefulness”
[as 'selected by natural selection']. The problem is that “a valid inference
always transmits truth, but not always usefulness”, as is shown by the fact that
“a valid conclusion drawn from some highly informative and useful theory may be
just a tautology like ‘1 = 1’, which is not informative and therefore no longer
useful.”
This leads to the crux of the problem, for why can’t the Physicalist answer
that it is not “every
particular valid inference that is useful but the whole system of valid
inferences”? For Popper’s Interactionist “[I]t is indeed true enough that it is
the system – logic – which is useful. But the problem for the physicalist is
that
it is just this that he cannot admit; for the point at issue between him and
the interactionist is precisely whether such things as logic (which is an
abstract system) exist (over and above particular ways of linguistic
behaviour). The interactionist here takes the commonsensical view that
valid inference is useful* – and this, indeed, is one of the reasons why he
admits its reality. The physicalist is prevented from accepting this position.”
[TSAIB pp.80-1].
This amounts to a "Revised Form" of Haldane's argument as it also indicates
that the kind of materialism defended by the physicalist cannot be squared with
a rational position in the sense of one that accepts the correctness of logical
standards on their own terms [rather than a position that treats logical
standards as merely appearing correct because they are useful, and being useful
only because they are "selected by natural selection"]. It is not that logical
standards cannot be combined with physical specifications [as Haldane wrongly
suggested] for a computer may exemplify such a combination, but that no
physical specification is adequate to capture the validity of a logical
standard on its own terms.
*In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that here Popper does
not mean that valid inference is always useful
but that it may be useful, and that the whole system of logic (of which
particular
valid inferences are parts) is useful because it helps in the detection of
errors. The point is that the reality of logic as a whole system, with its
World 3 standards and principles, cannot be admitted or explained by the
physicalist, who therefore cannot even explain what it is about logic that
makes it useful [its role in the detection and elimination of errors]. For to
say logic is ‘useful’ because it leads to ‘useful’ behaviours uses a
circularity in its use of ‘useful’; and to explain logic being ‘useful’ given
its role in error-elimination depends on a notion of logical validity that is
independent of whether it is adopted as behaviour or not.
Donal
London
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