[lit-ideas] Re: Paradeigmata
- From: jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2010 17:36:54 EST
In a message dated 1/4/2010 4:48:32 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
rpaul@xxxxxxxx writes:
For Plato, the paradigm of an x is not an x, but an X. But, then, of
course an x is not really even an x, but a mere shadow, copy, pale
imitation of, or clumsy attempt to create, an X. However, somebody in
Aristotle's Metaphysics (I think) wonders what makes an X an X. It is
all downhill from there.
----
Exactly, that's why I found it delightful that you would originally typo:
> Homer (aside to JL), was, for Plato the of a poet.
to later write, if you excuse me the split infinitive:
>A few minutes ago I wrote:
> Homer (aside to JL), was, for Plato the of a poet.
>This should have been
> Homer (aside to JL), was, for Plato, the paradigm of a poet.
For your previous, however, ungrammatical
(1) For Plato, Homer was the of a poet.
was perhaps closer in Platonic spirit to Plato than you "should-have-been"
(counterfactual, modal):
(2) For Plato, Homer was the paradeigma of a poet.
Paul (this is Robert Paul, not G. A. Paul, one of Grice's "playmates" at
the Play Group):
"For Plato, the paradigm of an x is not an x, but an X."
Exactly. Paul is abiding by Grice (WoW Way of Words, googlebooks, ch. vi)'s
distinction between type "X" and token "x". For people like Grice and me
and Bennett ("Meaning-Nominalism", Foundations of Language, ed. Frits
Staal), the token is what gives meaning to the type. For Platonists, it's the
other way round, but Platonists are, to use my friend's expression, basically
_sick_.
"But, then, of
course an x is not really even an x, but a mere shadow, copy, pale
imitation of, or clumsy attempt to create, an X."
For Plato (i.e. the sick-o). For Grice, Bennett, and _me_, X is merely
defined, extensionally, as the "class" of x's -- or xs if you must. This is
best seen in phonetics where a phoneme (in a nominalistic stance) is regarded
as a class of phones. Geary utters 'phones', never phonemes. The phoneme is
the idea of a phone, and an allophone is what Geary utters when he feels
in his 'other' mood (Gk. 'allo', other).
Robert (not G. A.) Paul continues:
"However, somebody in
Aristotle's Metaphysics (I think) wonders what makes an X an X. It is
all downhill from there."
Downhill depends on your point of view. Literally, the city of the plain
(Rome, London, Buenos Ayres) are supposed to be sinful. Athens was _not_ a
city of the plain. So I'm not sure how literal to take 'downhill'. I think
it's rather uphill to try to revise Plato in the right way.
Cambridge tried: hence the so-called (by theirselves) "Cambridge
Platonists" (e.g. Sedworth). On the other hand, in Oxford we's Aristoteleans
(to use
Wager's spelling).
Aristotle referred to this, using the title of a novel by Graham Greene,
"The Third Man".
Plato was trying to be witty when he had Socrates have Diogenes talking to
him:
"I can see an x; but I can't see an X"
"That's because your eyes suck".
In general, what Plato should say is that Homer was a poet. Not the
paradigm of a poet, because then the 'third man' argument holds: we need a way
to
compare Homer (now substantiated as a paradeigma) and the mere poet that
Homer is being a paraideigma for. Uphill.
Cheers,
J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Circle
Bordighera, Imperia
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