[lit-ideas] Re: On Copenhagening the German Fleet
- From: "Mike Geary" <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2008 17:58:39 -0600
On Copenhagening the German FleetLH:
>>Before posting this I took a look at my inbox and found a posting from Geary.
>> He left the title "Problem solving and war," and then wrote on something
>>entirely different - something he'd rather talk about than the subject. Can
>>he relate it back to Mitchum's speech at the end of Anzio? No, of course
>>not.<<
Oh bother! Lawrence, when people say "war solves nothing" what they are saying
is that war doesn't solve the problem of war -- in fact, it abets it. Of all
the evils facing mankind (evil meaning: mankind caused) war is the most evil.
Injustice -- especially as it is often a cause of war -- is a contender for
most evil trophy, but it can't hold a candle to the evil that war is. I don't
know if the slogan "The War To End All Wars" was laughed at in its time, but it
certainly should have been. Only the rejection of all wars can end war. Your
-- and the culture's -- valorization of war and heroism and military honor seem
to me to be guarantors of more war. Get with the program, Lawrence, embrace
peace.
Mike Geary
Memphis
----- Original Message -----
From: Lawrence Helm
To: Lit-Ideas
Sent: Saturday, January 26, 2008 1:10 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] On Copenhagening the German Fleet
While German Generals worried about a two-front war, Wilhelm's favorite
advisor, Tirpitz worried about Britain. Back in August of 2003 I read
Dreadnought, Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War by Robert
Massie. For reasons not entirely practical, Wilhelm II wanted a navy as large
as that of his uncle, Edward VII of England. Tirpiz, the German sea lord
wanted the same thing Wilhelm wanted. Here is Kagan (op cit., p. 140):
"The British fleet, of course, was larger even than the one publicly planned
by Tirpitz. How could the Germans hope to frighten the British with an
inferior fleet? The answer was the 'risk theory' that assumed that the British
could not afford or be able to man a fleet larger than ninety battleships.
Since the common belief was that an attacking fleet needed at least a
three-to-two advantage to win, Tirpitz calculated that the Germans would have a
good chance to win, especially since he believed Germany to have better ships,
better training, and a better command structure. But the British fleet, with
its need to protect the Mediterranean and its imperial responsibilities all
over the globe in any event would not be able to concentrate its forces against
Germany. Even a British victory in such a decisive battle, however, would be
very costly, leaving the British vulnerable to their other naval enemies,
France and Russia. In the face of such a prospect they were bound to seek an
accommodation with Germany or at least stand out of the way of its Weltpolitik.
"If this really was Tirpitz's plan it was full of assumptions whose falseness
would become obvious soon. In case of war a British fleet need not take the
offensive; Britain's geographical position allowed it to blockade Germany at a
distance and keep the German fleet bottle dup without risking an attack. For
the Germans to get any use out of their fleet it was they who must attack and
who would, therefore, need a numerically superior force. Britain, moreover,
was richer than Germany and better able to sustain an arms race at sea,
especially since, as islanders, they managed with only a tiny army while
Germany's much larger one competed for limited resources. The plan also
assumed stability in the international situation, but why should Britain use
its ships to defend far-off colonies instead of bringing them home when
threatened by a dagger aimed at her vitals? And why should Britain not abandon
some of her enmities and make new alliances when confronting such a danger?
"Tirpitz himself saw one possible flaw that worried him greatly. In the
years when the fleet was under construction but not yet strong enough to
withstand an attack, wouldn't the British be tempted to launch a preventive
attack and destroy it in port? That fear focused on a historical precedent.
In 1807, in time of peace during a lull in the Napoleonic wars, a British
admiral seized the neutral Danish fleet in Copenhagen harbor to prevent its
falling into French hands when the war resumed. Tirpitz and many Germans lived
in constant terror of such an attack during the 'period of greatest danger,'
before the German fleet was complete. In 1904, in fact, Sir John Fisher,
Britain's First Sea Lord, suggested to King Edward VII that they 'Copenhagen'
the German fleet before it got too strong. 'My God, Fisher,' the King
responded, 'you must be mad!' and there never was a plan to take such action,
yet 'the belief that 'Fisher was coming' actually caused a panic at Kiel in
1907, and cautious parents kept their children home from school for two days.'
"Most of the other flaws in the risk theory and in Tirpitz's stated plans
seem obvious enough as to raise the question of whether he failed to see them.
If not, he and those who supported his plan must seem not only dangerously
fanatical but also foolish. The alternative is to believe that his true
intention was different, and there is persuasive, though not conclusive
evidence to support the view that Tirpitz planned ultimately to build a fleet
large enough to defeat the Royal Navy in a decisive battle in the North Sea.
Both the Kaiser's mother and Holstein reported that it was William II's
lifetime determination to have a navy larger and stronger than the British, and
others heard Tirpitz proclaim the same goal. 'When it reached the size which
Tirpitz and the Kaiser ideally desired for it, this fleet would be used to
sweep British naval control form the seas.'"
Comment: The guilty flee where no one pursueth. Were Tirpitz in Fisher's
position, he would have recommended the same thing, a preemptive attack, and
if Wilhelm were in Edward's position he probably would have agreed to it, but
Edward said, "My God, Fisher, you must be mad."
Employing one of Niall Ferguson's "counterfactuals" here, what would have
happened if Fisher were allowed to "Copenhagen" the German navy in 1907? It
seems unlikely that Germany would have been inclined to go to the expense of
building a new navy. There would have been hard feelings, but there were
anyway - as a result of the war that followed in 1914. Also, had Britain taken
that preemptive approach, it seems unlikely that the U.S. would have been
interested in supporting Britain later in. The destruction of the German navy
wouldn't have affected its Army and it could have gone ahead with its two front
war just as it eventually did - or would Britain's preemption have put a damper
on that as well. Then Germany would risk a three front war with Britain
blockading German ports while Germany was attacked by France from the West and
Russia from the East. World War One may not have begun if Britain were a wee
bit more bellicose.
On the other hand, if Britain had destroyed the German fleet and World War
One had not occurred, Germany could have been seen as a victim of British
aggression. Some politicians and newsmen say everything that can be said, so
some would be sure to say that. How would that have affected Britain's
future, and what would that have done to German ambitions?
What did occur was that in a long war from 1914 to 1945, about as long as the
Peloponnesian War and with a "peace" in the middle like the Peace of Nicias,
the participants exhausted themselves against each other. After the
Peloponnesian War the barbarian Macedonians easily dominated the region and
much besides. After the World War (1&2 together) the Barbarians with the
abbreviations (U.S. & U.S.S.R.) dominated the region and much besides.
Rather than trot out the trite maxim "wars never solve anything," the
participants, if some European Cassandras were persuasive enough, could have
anticipated that an exhausting general European war would inevitably end Europe
as the dominate world power. They could, with Cassandra's help have counted
the cost, held back and remained as they were. Maybe Dmytryk could have taught
Mitchum to say something like that. . . [just kidding].
Lawrence Helm
San Jacinto
Ps: Before posting this I took a look at my inbox and found a posting from
Geary. He left the title "Problem solving and war," and then wrote on
something entirely different - something he'd rather talk about than the
subject. Can he relate it back to Mitchum's speech at the end of Anzio? No,
of course not.
I have a problem I need to solve, Geary says. I lost my knowledge about wars
and why we fight them.
Where did you lose it?
Over there by those bunkers and trenches.
Then why are you looking here in the list of amusing Memphian sayings?
"Because the light is better."
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