> WALTER: And conversely. If a maxim is not > universalizable, then the > intention to universalize it is an intention that > seeks an impossibility. *I don't think that this is true. I guess that by "a universalizable maxim," Walter means something like a maxim that can be logically demonstrated to be universally valid. (I'm not sure what he means by "the intention to universalize," but if he means no more than the people can't want to universalize what they don't want to universalize, then this is trivially true.) But there is no practical reason that a maxim that cannot be demonstrated to be universally valid should not nevertheless become universally accepted. Most great moral teachers did not think that they needed to logically demonstrate that their maxims were universally valid. A problem that I have with the Kantian precept that one should only act on a maxim that one would intend to become a general law, i.e. to be universalized, is that it supposes rational and benevolent moral agents at the outset. I doubt that a hardened thief would be impressed by the argument that he should not steal because it would be bad for the society if everyone were to do so. The answer might well be in the lines: "So what ?" The precept might have value to ethical philosophers in their search for the 'good', but for the purposes of practical moral teaching it is little use I suspect. (I realize that this might be deemed an empirical, and thus not a properly philosophical issue.) O.K. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html