[lit-ideas] Grice's Secondary Induction
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2013 13:12:09 -0400 (EDT)
This is then Grice on Kneale:
"It may well be that it is
the SUBSTANTIAL introduction of such things as abstract entities" -- not
merely as a mere adjectival 'way of speaking' -- i.e. things like properties
--
that makes possible the application of
what after Kneale I shall calle 'Secondary Induction'
by which he (and I) mean "the very principles at work in (boring) Primary
Induction."
Grice as a secondary inductivist, then.
For Grice, as for Kneale (his tutor in "matters methodological") there is
induction (as per Bacon, Darwin, etc.) and "secondary induction", which
operates on the principles of primary induction.
It's all _pretty_ complicated, but it shows how strong what I call the
"Corpus Christi Logical Movement" in Oxford was.
In a message dated 6/1/2013 8:53:49 A.M. UTC-02, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx
writes:
"JLS' post still doesn't put any edible flesh on the bare bones of the
assertion that Darwin's theory is somehow "inductive""
But it triggers questions like:
'should 'inductive' apply to 'theory' or to a process such as reasoning is?
Grice's example:
"Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore brave".
Grice has this as being uttered by Jill (of "Jack and Jill" fame). Grice
wonders what the basis for Jill's assertion is. He is concerned with the
'therefore', which should not be misused ("If Jill used 'therefore', surely
that is a sign of reasoning -- on her part").
McEvoy:
"The idea that distinguishing what D inferred or implied helps us here is
wrong, it just leads us all up a linguistic cul-de-sac."
Oddly, this analogy is first anatomical. Only applied to 'streets and
alleys' (as meant by McEvoy) early in 1800.
In 1738, 'cul-de-sac' was first used by an Englishman as an anatomical
term, from the French expression "cul-de-sac" (same spelling but different
pronunciation), literally "bottom of a sack," from Latin culus "bottom" (for
second element, see sack (n.1)). Application to streets and alleys is from
1800."
----
One wonders of English specimens of linguistic cul-de-sac other than
Griceian in spirit.
McEvoy:
"'Induction' is a supposed process of reasoning etc."
Indeed, process seems to be the right word. As Judith Baker (a disciple of
Grice) would say, a psi-process.
In symbols:
ψ₁
-----
∴ ψ₂
where "∴" is Grice's symbol for the rather colloquial ("if wrong") English
expression, 'therefore' (as in Grice's example -- statement by Jill: "Jack
is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave."
----
Example of inductive reasoning by Darwin ("Beagle"):
ψ₁
-----
∴ ψ₂
In his Autobiography, Darwin truthfully states that he has
"worked on true Baconian principles…collected facts on a whole-sale
scale."
where 'sale' should be understood metaphorically. Note that strictly,
Darwin collected _observations_ of facts, rather than facts themselves (which
fall outside possible collectibles).
We have "years of observation in which Darwin had no working hypothesis".
i.e.
merely
ψ₁n, ψ₁m, ψ₁o, ψ₁p, ...
i.e. individual beliefs held by Darwin reporting observations made by
Darwin on specific 'facts' ("on a whole-sale scale").
Note that 'no working hypothesis' here can be understood as Darwin never
BELIEVING he would induce anything from those 'reports' -- the "∴ ψ₂"
'inductive' tag that would make his 'action' a piece of 'reasoning', rather
than
mere observation.
Note that Darwin is clear that, as Kneale points out, he is crediting the
biggest author on induction: Bacon (1561-1626).
Oddly, Grice followed the theories of whom he called "Bacon Senior".
INTERLUDE on the "other" Bacon:
Roger Bacon, O.F.M. (c. 1214–1294) (scholastic accolade Doctor Mirabilis,
meaning "wonderful teacher"), was an English philosopher and Franciscan
friar who placed considerable emphasis on the study of nature through
empirical
methods. He is sometimes credited, mainly starting in the 19th century, as
one of the earliest European advocates of the modern scientific method
inspired by Aristotle and later Arabic scholars, such as those of Muslim
scientist Alhazen. However, more recent reevaluations emphasize that he was
essentially a medieval thinker, with much of his "experimental" knowledge
obtained from books, in the scholastic tradition. A survey of the reception of
Bacon's work over centuries found it often reflects the concerns and
controversies central to the receivers. Roger Bacon was born in Ilchester in
Somerset, England, possibly in 1213 or 1214 at the Ilchester Friary.
----
Bacon, like Darwin, Kneale, and Grice, felt that induction should be the
only scientific method scientists
could conscionably use, for it relies on a truly objective analysis of
empirical observations.
In Grice's case, this has to be understood broadly, since introspective
experiences are 'observable' ("at least to myself"), too. Yet it is doubtful
that Darwin would have thought that _THINKING_ about a fact is an observable
experience (as opposed to _seeing_ a fact, if this were possible).
For Bacon, Darwin, Kneale, and Grice,theories and hypotheses only bias the
mind
towards one direction and thus were not appropriate for true scientific
discovery.
Kneale is clear on this when he coined the brilliant phrase, "secondary
induction" (as in "secondary" school) to manipulate the bias that the 'mind'
imposes on 'primary' (as in "primary" school) induction -- of facts.
ψ₁
-----
∴ ψ₂
From a set of individual specific observations, we arrive, via induction,
to the generalised statement ("This giraffe has long neck; this other
giraffe has also long neck; and this other giraffe, also; therefore, most (or
if
you must, all) giraffes have long neck -- never mind why -- vide "Was
Darwin a teleofunctionalist?").
The correct scientific way to do "science" was to observe the natural world
and explain it axiomatically.
Aristotle, unlike Darwin, was clear about this (vide James Lennox). Yet, as
Palma notes, Darwin was not clear as to what a 'biological axiom' would
look like. So, it is odd to claim that he was working on lines other than
inductivist ones.
The alleged axioms of biology, say, when seen in a holistic manner, can
best explain natural phenomena -- the set of observation statements.
What is then required to follow up from these alleged axioms is a
procedure of exclusion.
In order for an "explanation" (or reasoning) to be generalizable
ψ₁
-----
∴ ψ₂
one has to operate by finding observations that attempt to refute the
theory in order to arrive at the best one.
This is a process of elimination following the collection of a large set
of observations, such as the one that Darwin had (he said he was collection
of facts, rather -- this may be seen as a "Victorian" usage -- We should be
able, when explaining Darwin's inductivism, to re-present his views in the
more updated vocabulary of Kneale and Grice).
Darwin practices "whole-sale" induction.
This can be corroborated by the curiosity and wonder he displayed in his
writings (and which was communicated to his readers) about the voyage on the
HMS Beagle (on the Southern Hemisphere).
What Darwin does is collect what he calls "a large amount" of specimens --
of animals and vegetals --.
Many of these he felt (as expressed in a letter to his wife) he was "not
qualified enough yet to categorize" (in other words, he didn't know what he
was _seeing_ -- understood as a brute fact), and which necessitated the
expertise of John Gould, Richard Owen and the like -- especially "the like".
The collection of Darwin's treasure trove of specimens may lead one to
falsely believe that Darwin was proceeding inductively by filling in the
Baconian tables.
Where 'table' refers to Francis, not Roger Bacon:
The first step Bacon (Francis, not Roger) takes is the surveying of all
known instances where the nature of heat appears to exist.
To this compilation of observational data Bacon (again, Francis, not Roger)
gives the scholastic name
"The Table of Essence and Presence".
-- as when we say, "he was present, although not essentially _there_".
The next table, which Bacon (Francis, not Roger), calls, pompously,
"The Table of Absence in Proximity"
--- as when we say, "he was so close that I could hardly note his presence"
--
is essentially the opposite: a compilation of all the instances in which
the nature of, for example, heat is NOT present.
Because these are so numerous, Bacon enumerates only the most relevant
cases ("It would be otiose to repoort _all_ cases when I felt hot").
Lastly, Bacon (Francis, not Roger) attempts to categorize the instances of
the nature of, e.g., heat into various degrees of intensity.
This he calls
"The Table of Degrees"
-- where 'degree' is used mathematically.
The aim of this, that Bacon calls "the final table" ("for what could
possibly come next?") is to eliminate certain instances of, e.g. heat which
might be said to be the form of, e.g. heat, and thus get closer to an
approximation of the true form of, e.g. heat.
Such elimination occurs through comparison.
For example, the observation that both a fire and boiling water are
instances of heat allows us to exclude light as the true form of heat, because
light is present in the case of the fire but not in the case of the boiling
water.
(Or to use an example by Darwin: to think of man (homo sapiens) and a
chimpanzee as belonging to a common class -- the primate -- origin of species,
vii, 4)
Note that, incidentally, in Darwin's memory, the "Darwinius" was named
(after Darwin): a genus within the infraorder Adapiformes, a group of basal
strepsirrhine primates from the Eocene epoch.
The Darwinius only known species is Darwinius masillae, dated to 47 million
years ago (Lutetian stage) based on dating of the fossil site.
As the discoverer of the "Darwinius" explained,
"We decided to call the genus "Darwinius" in commemoration of the
bicentenary of the birth of Charles Darwin. Other people were born in that
year,
but they somehow looked less relevant -- like William Russell, the 8th Duke of
Bedford."
The central argument logically following from such a framing as Darwin uses
relies on the fact that the method of induction relies (if I may repeat
myself) on the collection of vast banks of data (the many giraffes Darwin
would have seen had he ever venture to visit Africa).
Only when the bank is "complete" (or "quasi-complete", as Grice prefers)
can one theorize on observations.
We view Darwin‘s method as *selectively* (or secondarily) inductive i.e. he
collected some facts without any prior idea of what those facts (or the
propositions expressing them) might entail (where "entail" is a technicism
as used by G. E. Moore) -- vide Grice, "Entailment and Implicature" -- two
of the most brilliant coinages of 20th-century analytic philosophy)
"On the Origin of Species" is primarily the result of] Darwin‘s
"extrapolation" (of this or that sort -- falling as a Knealean 'secondary
induction')
following a great deal of first-order primarily inductive oriented
objective observation.
Thus, Darwin‘s methodology is widely touted to be inductive due to the
voracious intensity of Darwin‘s specimen-collecting aboard the HMS Beagle
which led to the publication of the 1839 Journal of Researches – the
collection of course being an instance of the objectivity with which Darwin
viewed
his samples.
He never allowed "one gram of subjectivity" to enter his 'report of facts'
("Theory-laden" casual remarks like, "I like that" are totally foreign to
his prose).
The Beagle voyage is the benchmark of Darwin‘s inductivism.
Little (if any) evidence of any transmutationist reflections of Darwin‘s
recorded before March of 1838 exists.
Granted, Darwin could not possibly have proceeded inductively in a PURELY
Baconian fashion. But there are other fashions.
McEvoy continues:
"The question is whether Darwin's theory depends on such a process - either
in its context of discovery or its context of justification - that is, in
how it was arrived at or in how it is shown to be true."
Well, Kneale notes that 'truth' is exaggerated -- or rather, that the use
of 'true' tends to be abusive. Grice preferred "alethic", since he
contrasted 'alethic validity' with other types of validity.
McEvoy:
"Nothing in JLS' post even begins to explain how Darwin's theory depends
on such a process - in either of the ways mentioned, or in any other way at
all. Instead JLS rests his case on something so flimsy - a kind of appeal
to self-evidence and his own ability to discern the manifest truth as to how
propositions are "reached" - it would be whimsical in a fairy-tale account
of the history of science as written by a philosopher whose understanding
of science is merely that of an analyst of language who has never fully
confronted his own philosophical make-believe that there is such a thing as a
process of 'induction' and that we need 'induction' to explain science and
how science works."
Vide, "Induction and Its Enemies" -- it all rather stated with Popper.
Although perhaps we should give credit to Palma (why wouldn't we?)
Palma:
"Aside from the somewhat laughable idea of the "Hume's onslaught" (there
is none such) on "induction", one may well consider how a path-dependent
view (Darwin is one, so are any history-component views, Smolins' e.g.)
depend on something that is -I think abductive- but it is not deductive."
For Palma, the blame is on Hume, not Popper.
Palma goes on: "A deduction, or to be finnicky a valid deduction, is a set
of statements that have a logical consequence, otherwise famous as a
conclusion. No more and no less. The reliability of some such can be garnered
by
different approaches. in Hilbert's style a deduction is a valid argument
from a set of axioms (see his foundations of geometry for the simplest
exposition of it) via a provably valid inferential schematic form, plus a
universal replacement function. Famously, in Hilbert Ackermann's theory, there
is
one such scheme (the celebrated "modus ponendo ponens"), it follows that
any deduction is a set of MP-applicatons.
Darwin has none such."
Indeed. And this is odd. Darwin never concluded via "modus ponendo ponens".
Oddly, too, he rarely used the particle (so favoured by Grice),
"therefore". This renders it rather problematic to judge what he thought he
was
inferring and what he actually _was_.
As in Lewis Carroll's famous quip against Darwin:
He [sc. Darwin?] thought he saw a Argument
That proved he was the Pope.
He looked again, and found it was
A Bar of Mottled Soap.
----
Palma: No such thing in Darwin as a deductive approach to science. "And
this for excellent reasons (to this day nobody has a clue as to what is an
axiom in biology) the collaborator of Tejtelbaum (J. H Woodger) proposed
some such in 1962, to no great impact."
The fact that 1962 was the year of "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Forum" by Stephen Sondheim -- not to mention (then why do it?) the first
London production of "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes But Marry Brunettes)" --
may account, in part, for the lack of impact of Tejtelbaum's collaborator's
remark.
Palma ends his note as usual on an irreverent (if I may repeat myself)
note:
"The rest is the traditional babbling of people who prefer not to study,
but rather blather on problems that fail to exist, and allow thereby an
infinity of solutions, all of whom are solutions in search of a problem."
Etc.
Cheers,
Speranza
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