In a message dated 12/17/2015 8:22:10 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx quotes:
"The common law rules of natural justice or procedural fairness are
twofold. First, the person affected has the right to prior notice and an
effective opportunity to make representations before a decision is made.
Second,
the person affected has the right to an unbiased tribunal. These two
requirements are conceptually distinct."
And thanks to McEvoy for his other post on Baroness Hale, which I should
re-read, and now this bit about
i. A and B are conceptually distinct.
which I should _also_ re-read.
McEvoy is right that (i) may require an 'analysis' and that not all
'analysis' is 'conceptual'!
Indeed, in the above passage, quoted, the 'conceptually' might well be what
Albritton called 'otiose' (it was his favourite adjective). McEvoy wants
to distinguish between
ii. The concept of A and the concept of B.
if I understand him aright, and the realities behind them. Let "A" and "B"
express propositions; then in the language of the Tractatus, (ii) gets
differentiated from:
iii. The realities (or facts of the matter) behind A and B.
Incidentally, this brings us back to Baroness Hale, because, if she is
being a Humeian, it might well be that 'serious' and 'probable' are in no
'necessary or logical relationship', if those were her words. For Hume,
notably,
'necessity' is in the _mind_ only, and Hale might be endorsing a narrow
account of 'logical and necessay connection' in terms of entailment of
mathematical ideas, and nothing to do with 'generalities' grasped from
inductions.
Why the passage above is controversial. Let's number it:
iv. The common law rules of natural justice or procedural fairness are
two-fold:
----(a) the person affected has the right to prior notice and an effective
opportunity to make representations before a decision is made
----(b) the person affected has the right to an unbiased tribunal.
These two requirements are conceptually distinct.
i.e.
v. (a) and (b) are conceptually distinct.
Here indeed (a) and (b) represent 'matters of fact', or 'realities', and
one wonders if 'conceptually' is the right adjective. For (iv) could just as
well be rephrased:
vi. And (a) and (b) are different FACTS OF THE MATTER.
Or words to that effect.
The word 'distinct' may trigger the wrong implicature. As when Quine said:
"No analytic-synthetic distinction: distinction spurious". And then come
Strawon and Grice saying that
vii. The concept of the analytic and the concept of the synthetic are
distinct.
(implicating that Quine is doing wrong in thinking that the concepts are
NOT distinct).
The choice of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' seems apt, since one of McEvoy's
points is that if not all 'analysis' is conceptual, 'analysis' is opposed to
'synthetis'. In McEvoy's view, analysis is guided by the goal to solve
some problem, i.e. by the goal to provide a solution to a problem. This may
well be Aristotle's use of 'analytic' in the "Prior Analytics" ("not to be
confused with the "Second Analytics," Geary reminds us).
Is 'conceptually' otiose in (iv)?
It seems so. The two requirements are distinct -- and the utterer is just
emphasising that someone might have thought otherwise!
Yolton wrote of Locke's way of words (the title of Grice's book); but Locke
also spoke of a way of ideas (or 'concepts' -- that Hume distinguishes
from 'conceptions' -- object/process -- vide Grice, The ConceptION of value)
and notably Locke also spoke of the way of things.
McEvoy seems to want to go straight to the way of things!
Analytic philosophy of the type Grice practiced may well be concerned with
'analysis' that is more than merely 'conceptual'. And I have pointed out
that if the analytic philosopher does provide an analysis (or refutes one --
as Quine did), what seems to be guiding him is the solution of some problem.
Witters thought otherwise. He thought philosophy consisted of
pseudo-problems -- but I don't think legal philosophy need go there! For that
would
have (v) challenged by something like
viii. And (a) and (b) are NOT distinct, and to think that distinguishing
them solves a problem is spurious, for there is no problem to be solved: only
a pseudo-problem to be DIS-solved.
Or something!
Cheers,
Speranza
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
