[lit-ideas] Re: Geary on the Name/Noun Distinction
- From: "Michael Geary" <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2004 19:35:34 -0500
Jorge-Luis wrote:
> --- Right. Odd that he would write that, when 'religion' is not even a
> _name_, but a _noun_. ("in the noun of" is the correct latinism, as
employed by
> Geary, "Name-Calling and Name-Dropping: The Necessity -- a reply to
Kripke."
True enough. But if you will recall my MIT lecture of last year ("Improper
Nouns: Words Gone Wild"), and my latest book, _Naming Names Is the Name of
the Game_, Belle Books, 2004), and my monograph of last week: ("Apparently
You Are", copies available from The Reed Institute) you will see that I make
allowance for sloppy languaging by advertizers.
Geary, J. M.
Air Conditioning Maven
Memphis
----- Original Message -----
From: <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 12:47 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Geary on the Name/Noun Distinction
> In a message dated 4/30/2004 12:57:14 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> torgfje2@xxxxxxxxxx writes:
> > Still, the Europeans who slaughtered each other in the name of
> > religion during the Thirty-Years War and, again, in the name of
> > nationalist ideologies during WWI and WWII have become a good deal
> > less obsessive in these regards. Ditto for most Japanese.
> "in the name of"?
> --- Right. Odd that he would write that, when 'religion' is not even a
> _name_, but a _noun_. ("in the noun of" is the correct latinism, as
employed by
> Geary, "Name-Calling and Name-Dropping: The Necessity -- a reply to
Kripke."
>
> Cheers,
>
> JL
>
> ---
> From amazon.com for Kripke, Naming and Necessity
>
> In 1970, Saul Kripke gave a series of three lectures at Princeton
University.
> These lectures, subsequently published under the title _Naming and
> Necessity_, were quickly recognized as one of those rare events that turns
the world of
> philosophy on its ear. Amazingly, Kripke was a mere 29 years old at the
time
> and he delivered the lectures without any notes. This book reflects both
the
> advantages and shortcomings of the spoken form: it is clear, engaging, and
often
> witty, but it is also repetitive at times and frustratingly incomplete at
> others.
> It is perhaps fitting that Kripke delivered these lectures the same year
that
> Bertrand Russell passed away, since their main target is the descriptivist
> theory of names associated with Russell. According to Russell - and to the
> reigning philosophical orthodoxy until 1970 - names are best analyzed as
> abbreviated definite descriptions, i.e. as unique sets of properties
possessed by their
> bearers. However, Kripke argues that on this analysis, all such properties
> belong to their possessors necessarily - which is obviously false. For
instance,
> if the name "Billy Strayhorn" just means "The composer of 'Take the "A"
> Train,'" then there is no possible world in which Billy Strayhorn did not
compose
> the song. But this is false: Even if Billy Strayhorn had never written any
> songs, he would obviously still be Billy Strayhorn. What a puzzle!
> In place of descriptivism, Kripke proposes the theory of direct reference,
> according to which a name "rigidly designates" its referent in every
possible
> world in which it exists. That is, a name is just a "tag" attached to its
> referent, with no descriptive content whatsoever. Kripke also proposes an
> alternative theory for how names are transmitted, the causal theory of
names. For
> Kripke, the name I use for Strayhorn is "his" name in virtue of the fact
that it is
> related, by means of some appropriate causal chain, to Strayhorn himself.
> Much of this was anticipated by other philosophers, though this often goes
> unnoticed. But Kripke developed his theory in a highly interesting way and
put
> it to all sorts of surprising uses. His discussion of necessity and
possibility
> almost single-handedly resurrected essentialism and gave a major impetus
to
> contemporary modal metaphysics. He claims that names for natural kinds,
such as
> "gold" and "tiger," rigidly designate their referents and argues that this
> establishes the existence of necessary a posteriori truths. He closes the
book
> by offering an essentialist argument against the mind-body identity
thesis.
> In short, Kripke has given philosophers much to talk about. Indeed,
_Naming
> and Necessity_ has spawned a whole cottage industry of commentary. In my
view,
> Kripke's project is flawed in many (though not all) respects. For
instance,
> his causal theory is too vague to be of much use, and his argument that
natural
> kind terms directly refer seems question-begging. Nonetheless, Kripke's
book
> is extremely provocative, interesting, important, and even fun.
>
>
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