---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Andreas Elpidorou <andreaselpidorou@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:52 AM
Subject: Final Reminder: CFP: The Character of Physicalism (TOPOI)
To: PHILOS-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, PHILOSOP@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
** Apologies for cross-listing **
*CALL FOR PAPERS*
*“The Character of Physicalism”*
*Special Issue of Topoi*
*Guest Editor*
Andreas Elpidorou
Department of Philosophy
University of Louisville
andreas.elpidorou@louisville
Not many issues in philosophy can be said to match, let alone to
rival, physicalism’s importance, persistent influence, and
divisiveness. Physicalism is typically understood to be an *a posteriori*,
contingent, metaphysical thesis about the nature of our world. The
acceptance of physicalism commits one to the acceptance of a monistic
worldview. Despite how different or variegated existing entities or
properties might appear to be, everything that exists in our world,
according to physicalism, is physical. Physicalism also settles our place
in nature. *Qua* physical beings, we are of the same kind as everything
else. Whatever we might consider to be unique about us, is, or reduces to
the,physical. The monistic and perhaps austere picture
that physicalism offers does not meet universal acceptance. Given the scope
and importance of physicalism, that much is to be expected.
Yet the debate surrounding the veracity of physicaism is not the only
debate that concerns physicalism. A related and equally important debate
concerns the nature and character of physicalism. Precisely what is the
thesis of physicalism? How should it be defined? What are its commitments?
What needs to be true in order for physicalism to be true? All of the
aforementioned questions are questions that need to be answered. Perhaps
they need to be answered even before one can ask whether physicalism is
true. Yet no consensus has been reached on any of these questions. The
question ‘What is physicalism?’ is in need of an answer just as much as the
question ‘Is physicalism true?’
The aim of this special issue is to provide a forum in which a number of
original essays can come together in order to contribute to our
understanding of the nature and character of physicalism.
Three questions will be of particular importance to the special issue.
First, physicalism holds that all that exists in our world is physical. But
what exactly does ‘physical’ mean? How can one provide a definition of the
term ‘physical’ that captures the spirit of physicalism?
Second, physicalism is more than just a thesis about what type of
properties or entities actually exist. Physicalism is also committed to the
view that one set of properties (i.e., physical properties) determines all
others. Thus, in order to explicate the nature of physicalism, one needs to
specify the nature of this determination. Finally, what sort of commitments
does physicalism have? For instance, does physicalism entail the truth of
*micro*physicalism? Does physicalism entail that all truths can be *a
priori *deduced from physical truths? Making explicit the commitments
of physicalism matters, for only by making such commitments explicit can
one clearly understand physicalism’s scope and strength.
*Other suggested topics for the special issue include, but are not limited
to the following:*
· An examination of realization physicalism and its commitments
· The relationship between supervenience and explanation
· The *via negativa *approach to physicalism
· The merits and demerits of theory definitions of ‘physical’
· Other less traditional approaches in defining ‘physical’
· The relationship between microphysicalism and physicalism
· The role of Hume’s dictum in physicalism
· Grounding and physicalism
· The relationship between physicalism and scientific findings or
practices
*Please note*: The special issue is *not* interested in publishing articles
that examine arguments for or against physicalism. The focus of the special
issue is not on whether physicalism is true but rather on how to properly
explicate the thesis and commitments of physicalism.
**Submission information**
*Word limit*: 7000 words
*Deadline for submissions*: *October 15, 2015*
*Confirmed Invited Contributors*
*Andrew Melnyk* (University of Missouri); *Barbara Montero* (Graduate
Center, CUNY); *Jessica Wilson* (University of Toronto); *Gene Witmer*
(University
of Florida)
*Peer review*: all submissions will be subject to a double anonymous
peer-review process. Please prepare your submission for anonymous reviewing.
Submissions should be made directly to the journal’s online submission
website (http://www.editorialmanager.com/topo) indicating special issue
“The Character of Physicalism.”
For further details, please check the website of *Topoi. An International
Review of Philosophy*: http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245
For any further questions regarding the special issue please contact
Andreas Elpidorou at andreas.elpidorou@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx