[lit-ideas] Concerning Kant
- From: "John McCreery" <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2008 11:36:43 +0900
In our discussion of Kant, I have represented Kant as a rationalist
successor to Descartes, using similar methods. This may be a mistake.
Noting that I have been making assertions based on memories of
material read now nearly four decades ago, I did a Google search for
"Kant" and discovered the following site:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/k/kantmeta.htm#H2
To this layman's eye, this site does a good job of presenting the
outlines of Kant's metaphysics in language accessible to someone like
myself who does not have either the German or the time to read the
original. I have already noted, however, that the historical
positioning of Kant's philosophy differs from the one described above.
Where I have framed the matter as empiricists versus rationalists and
assigned Kant to the rationalist camp, the author of this piece
portrays Kant as dissatisfied with both his empiricist and rationalist
predecessors and, as it were, formulating a third way, in which the
notion of the synthetic a priori and a distinct form of argument, the
transcendental proof, are required to escape the trap created by
envisioning knowledge as composed of only two alternatives, analytic a
priori or synthetic a posteriori propositions.
I would like to see some discussion of whether Kant's project succeeds
(personally, I don't think so). But first, I ask the serious scholars
here whether they would accept the account provided by this site as a
usable representation of Kant's metaphysics.
A paragraph of particular interest to me is the following,
"Synthetic a priori claims, Kant argues, demand an entirely different
kind of proof than those required for analytic, a priori claims or
synthetic, a posteriori claims. Indications for how to proceed, Kant
says, can be found in the examples of synthetic a priori claims in
natural science and mathematics, specifically geometry. Claims like
Newton's, "the quantity of matter is always preserved," and the
geometer's claim, "the angles of a triangle always add up to 180
degrees" are known a priori, but they cannot be known merely from an
analysis of the concepts of matter or triangle. We must "go outside
and beyond the concept. . . joining to it a priori in thought
something which I have not thought in it." (B 18) A synthetic a priori
claim constructs upon and adds to what is contained analytically in a
concept without appealing to experience. So if we are to solve the
problems generated by Empiricism and Rationalism, the central question
of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason reduces to "How are
synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (19) If we can answer that
question, then we can determine the possibility, legitimacy, and range
of all metaphysical claims."
Does this represent Kant's views with sufficient accuracy to ground
further discussion?
John
--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
http://www.wordworks.jp/
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