[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories, Names, and Physicalism
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 16:36:50 -0400 (EDT)
In a message dated 9/1/2013 7:44:56 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx concludes his post on physicalism and names:
"Simply asserting, that, say, ‘we can explain the name-object correlation
as the merely physical correlation of two physical systems’, cannot be
regarded as an adequate counter-argument to Popper’s paper. What we need is
for
someone to specify an explanation that works (for all the infinite physical
variety) in merely physical terms.
So what is that explanation?"
The book I was having in mind in my previous post was Davis, ed. "Causal
Theories". There's also the Stanford entry, at:
Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken, "Causal Theories of Mental Content", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
(ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/content-causal/>.
whose references I append for the record below.
>So what is that explanation?
A causalist, and valid, one.
Cheers,
Speranza
---
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Other Internet Resources
Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning, entry in the
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Teleological Theories of Mental Content, by Ruth Millikan.
Related Entries
consciousness: representational theories of | intentionality | language of
thought hypothesis | meaning, theories of | mental content: externalism
about | mental content: narrow | mental content: nonconceptual | mental
content: teleological theories of
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