[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories, Names, and Physicalism

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 16:36:50 -0400 (EDT)

In a message dated 9/1/2013 7:44:56 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx concludes his post on physicalism and  names:

"Simply asserting, that, say, ‘we can explain the name-object  correlation 
as the merely physical correlation of two physical systems’, cannot  be 
regarded as an adequate counter-argument to Popper’s paper. What we need is  
someone to specify an explanation that works (for all the infinite physical 
 variety) in merely physical terms. 
So what is that  explanation?"
The book I was having in mind in my previous post was Davis, ed. "Causal  
Theories". There's also the Stanford entry, at:
Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken, "Causal Theories of Mental Content", The  
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta  
(ed.), URL = 
whose references I append for the record below.

>So what is that explanation?

A causalist, and valid,  one.

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Other Internet Resources
Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory  of Meaning, entry in the 
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Teleological  Theories of Mental Content, by Ruth Millikan. 

Related Entries
consciousness: representational theories of |  intentionality | language of 
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