In a message dated 11/17/2004 5:32:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, Robert.Paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes: To say that there are 'non-actualised' dispositions is just to say that the person who allegedly has such a disposition does not do x. (This follows trivially from what it means to say that the disposition is 'non-actualised.') The evidence that such a person has any disposition at all with regard to x must then lie elsewhere. In the case of persons, our conceptually primitive psychology prevents of from saying just what such evidence would be: there is nothing like the molecular structure of fragile things which can be appealed to here. ----- Part of the problem concerns what David Lewis has called a 'fink', dispositions such as they disappear when you most need them. E.g. Patricia may have a disposition to sing, but when pressed, she starts to fell indisposed, etc. Lewis claimed that most dispositions are indeed _finks_ and there's nothing much you can do about them. On the other hand, Lady Hampshire (Nancy Cartwright) thought that Sir Stuart's account of dispositions provides a good framework for the philosophy of science. Oddly, Hampshire's point was about dispositions in persons, while Cartwright's rewrite (available online) is on dispositions in things like the weather. Cheers, JL ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html