[lit-ideas] Re: Ambivalence and Grice
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2013 14:14:47 +0000 (GMT)
>I would think that, rather than 'ambivalence', we have a sort of ambiguity>
Though JLS is correct, may I quibble that we could have both? Of course, it is
not even that ambiguous, as JLS also correctly indicates. So is "ambivalence"
wrong? Well, unless it can be used ambivalently so it may denote ambiguous....
Since I am 'unable' to create new thread headings, may I use this opportunity
to tortuously segue back to "anomalous monism"? What Davidson may be seen as
doing is trying to circumvent the dualism-monism dilemma by way of a causal
analysis that admits 'mental events cause physical events' as per
interactionism but then insists 'all causation is physical causation' as per
eliminative physicalism. There are many reasons the mind-body problem may not
be solved by this kind of analytical legerdemain (which depends partly on
appealing to an idea of 'causation' that has long been superseded).
Consider where matter interacts with a force - say the planet Earth and
gravity. Are we able to prioritise within this interaction so as to say that,
while planets may affect gravity and gravity may affect planets
[interactionism], all causation is nevertheless matter-causation or all
causation is nevertheless force-causation? From what point of view could we
make any such claim? We might be motivated to make such a claim because we wish
to deny the distinct existence of either matter or forces - i.e. maintain
either that forces are simply forms of matter or that matter is forms of
forces: but we cannot claim this motivation is justified by the nature of
causal interaction between forces and matter - rather we are being motivated to
insist on a one-sided nature to that causal interaction to vindicate our
motivation. This is a bad way to argue, for we have provided no independent
argument for our causal analysis and so our causal analysis does not provide
an argument to favour our motivation: rather our causal analysis is a
by-product of a prior (metaphysical) commitment to either matter or force as
leading the way to the analysis of the other.
Analogously, we might ask that if 'mental events cause physical events' [as per
interactionism] on what independent ground can we insist that nevertheless 'all
causation is merely physical causation'?
If this objection is right, we may see why I used the term "dead end" re
"anomalous monism".
D
On Tuesday, 19 November 2013, 9:39, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
wrote:
In a message dated 11/14/2013 4:14:21 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24935048
Unfortunately, don't know how to change thread heading. This moves topic.
The whole thing in many ways both moving and absurd, in other ways
neither, these words perhaps deserve comment:
"Dylan's award was temporarily blocked earlier this year after army
general Jean-Louis Georgelin, the Grand Chancellor of the Legion, voiced
reservations about his use of cannabis and anti-war politics."
Aside from the ambivalence of "his", the Grand Chancellor voiced no
reservations about "his" heroin and cocaine use.
-------
I would think that, rather than 'ambivalence', we have a sort of ambiguity,
indeed:
"Dylan's award was temporarily blocked after Georgelin voiced reservations
about his ["whose?" -- McEvoy] use of cannabis".
Grice indeed has a maxim,
"Avoid ambiguity".
Yet, it would be ultra-ambiguous that Georgelin would voice reservation
about his own use of cannabis. Therefore, the disimplicature is that 'his' can
NOT refer to Georgelin, but to Dylan [not Thomas].
It is best to reject the idea of ambivalence here. Or not.
---- Do not multiply ambivalences beyond ambivalency. Or something
Cheers,
Speranza
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