You know, you're a smart dude. This will work on "creative" rules to internal TS in the absence of TSG as well... Rock on. t > -----Original Message----- > From: isapros-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:isapros- > bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Thomas W Shinder > Sent: Friday, July 13, 2007 10:49 AM > To: isapros@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: [isapros] Re: OT: Requiring client-side certs for RDP > > User cert auth at the ISA firewall will solve this problem - for TSG > that is. > > Send via Windows Mobile though ISA Firewall protected Exchange Servers > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Thor (Hammer of God)"<thor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Sent: 7/13/07 11:40:57 AM > To: "isapros@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"<isapros@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Subject: [isapros] Re: OT: Requiring client-side certs for RDP > > While dude's article is clearly wrong, the MSFT KB's should be amended > as well. Saying "the client must trust the root certificate authority" > is simply incorrect and misleading. > > But, more to the core question, since the ts gateway is not the place > to > enforce this, are there plans in place for longhorn terminal services > to > support client certificate requirements like IIS does? > > t > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: isapros-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:isapros- > > bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Jim Harrison > > Sent: Friday, July 13, 2007 10:26 AM > > To: isapros@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Subject: [isapros] Re: OT: Requiring client-side certs for RDP > > > > I just love it when "tribal knowledge" becomes "documented fact". > > It's clear from the "article" that the author never tested any of the > > configuration or application statements he makes. > > Even the dialog for his "attempt authentication" screenshot clearly > > states "Authentication will confirm the identity of the remote > computer > > to which you connect" - NOT "Authentication will confirm the identity > > of > > the user/machine **from which you connect**". > > > > In theory you *could* require user cert auth, but I don't know if > the > > TSG client will respond appropriately. Since TSG is "just" RPC/HTTP, > > it's rpcrt4.dll that handles the translation between RPC and HTTP and > > AFAIK, it only handles Basic and NTLM. > > > > Because TSG is RPC/HTTP, you can configure the /RPC vroot to require > > user certs and thus impose this requirement on your connecting > clients > > to test this theory. Of course, if you also share this vroot with > > Exchange RPC/HTTP you'll break OL connections, since they can't > handle > > cert auth. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: isapros-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:isapros- > > bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] > > On Behalf Of Thor (Hammer of God) > > Sent: Friday, July 13, 2007 9:29 AM > > To: isapros@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Subject: [isapros] OT: Requiring client-side certs for RDP > > > > Greets: > > > > > > > > Windows Server 2003 SP1 allows one to configure server-authentication > > via certificate for RDP over TLS/SSL. The MSFT articles say things > > like "the client must trust the certificate" etc in their > > client-configuration notes, and other articles specify that you can > > control access to RDP by issuing self signed certs and controlling > > distribution. > > > > > > > > This presents the illusion that one can limit connections to RDP on a > > Win2k3 server via this method. See: > > > > http://support.microsoft.com/kb/895433 > > > > http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver/en/Library/a92d8eb9-f53d- > > 4e8 > > 6-ac9b-29fd6146977b1033.mspx > > > > http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Secure-remote-desktop- > > connections > > -TLS-SSL-based-authentication.html > > > > > > > > Win2k3 Terminal Services allows one to require security levels, but > > only > > provides "server" authentication - it does not allow you to require a > > particular certification to be requested of the client (as IIS does). > > > > > > > > Snips from the windowsecurity article compound this perception: > > > > <snip> > > The threat becomes even bigger, when the server running Microsoft > > Windows Terminal Services is accessible from the Internet through an > > RDP > > connection on port 3389, even though you have an advanced firewall > such > > as ISA Server in front of it. A scenario that is common especially > for > > Microsoft Small Business Server users. > > > > The good news however, is that you can prevent these attacks. The > > solution is certificate based computer authentication. If the > computer > > cannot authenticate itself by presenting a valid certificate to the > > terminal server it is trying to connect to, then the RDP connection > > will > > be dropped before the user has a chance to attempt to log on. > > > > </snip> > > > > > > > > This is simply untrue. The client does not "present a valid > > certificate" at all. It either trusts the server or not, and it is > up > > to the client to make that decision. While RDP clients 6 and below > > only > > allow "No auth, attempt, or require" which do provide the expected > > behavior, updated or alternate clients (like Vista) allow you to > > connect > > anyway. > > > > > > > > This being said, does anyone know if the current longhorn/ts gateway > > features will actually allow enforcement of client certificates such > a > > requiring client certs that are signed by particular authorities? > > > > > > > > Sorry for all the detail, but I wanted to avoid people saying "Sure, > > just require TLS for RDP". > > > > > > > > t > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > All mail to and from this domain is GFI-scanned. > > > > >