[cryptome] Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Boing Boing pushing an RSA Conference boycott
- From: "taxakis" <taxakis@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: <cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 17:32:29 +0100
https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf
> -----Original Message-----
> From: cryptography [mailto:cryptography-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf
> Of John Young
> Sent: Thursday, January 16, 2014 4:29 PM
> To: cryptography@xxxxxxxxxxxx; cryptography@xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
> cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Boing Boing pushing an RSA
> Conference boycott
>
> Punishing RSA is work for bloodthirsty media and its fans. Public
crypto
> needs much better to offer the public than entertaining evanescent
> revenge.
>
> 3DES is intriguing. Publicizing a list of other well-tested
> ciphersystems would be constructive alternatives to "nothing can be
> done, authority always wins." Public loss of trust in any comsec and
> crypto is ever present.
>
> As a consumer, I want you to give me something useable and reliable
for
> ordinary use not weapons-grade illusion of infallibility. Ban the use
of
> "unbreakable." Stop tinkering with old reliable OTP with digital
> simulacra. Stop blaming users for faulty implementation.
>
> Civil engineers never say a dam is infallible, they say it will fail,
> watch for well-known weak spots, prepare to patch and maintain
> continuously, and never forget the disasters of over-confidence,
limited
> construction budgets, cut backs in maintenance, and water policy
> exploiters.
>
> Earthen dams without sluices, relying upon mass and gravity, outlast
> reinforced concrete "monoliths" perforated with umpteen ways to
monetize
> the water flow, nowadays usually to run more server farms near
> hydropower facilities.
>
> I'd like an earthen dam crypto tool I can watch myself for leaks.
> I got PGP 2.6. Anything better that is not reliant up commercially
> biased assurances?
>
> BTW, why is PGP Inc and IBM Inc not being bashed like RSA Inc?
>
>
> At 01:26 AM 1/16/2014, you wrote:
> >At 12:48 PM 1/15/2014, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> >>What then should we do about all the folk clinging to 3DES? How
about
> >>the people who stuck with MD5? How about the people who have not
> >>junked SHA-1?
> >
> >Ignoring Phill's perfectly reasonable main point, what's wrong with
> 3DES?
> >Sure, it's clunky, takes lots of bit-twiddling, is a good bit slower
> >and larger than AES, and only gives you ~112 bits of security for
your
> >168 bits of keys, but is there anything wrong with it other than
being
> >not as good as some of the alternatives? (Ok, and maybe a bit of
power
> >analysis risk, depending on your
> >implementation.) It's not like MD5 where there are theoretical
attacks
> >that make it much weaker?
> >
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