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----- Mensaje reenviado ----- De: "Yuji Tamura" <ernad@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Para:
"nep-mig@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <nep-mig@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Enviado: lun., 20 de
ene. de 2020 a la(s) 0:41 Asunto: [nep-mig] 2020-01-20, four papers
nep-mig 2020-01-20 papers
|
| nep-mig | New Economics Papers |
| on Economics of Human Migration |
| Issue of 2020‒01‒20
four papers chosen by
Yuji Tamura
La Trobe University
| |
- Diversity, Immigration, and Redistribution ByAlberto F. Alesina;Stefanie
Stantcheva
- On the Radar: System Embeddedness and Latin AmericanImmigrants' Perceived
Risk of Deportation ByAsad,Asad L.
- Arming opposition: Measuring the effect of arms transfers oninternal
conflict ByQuentinGallea
- The Long Arm of the Arab State ByTsourapas, Gerasimos
- Diversity,Immigration, and Redistribution
| By: | Alberto F. Alesina;Stefanie Stantcheva |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a simple conceptual framework that
captures howdifferentperceptions, attitudes, and biases about immigrants or
minorities can shapepreferences for redistribution. Through the lens of this
framework, we reviewthe empirical literature on the effects of racial diversity
and immigration onsupport for redistribution in the US and Europe. |
| JEL: | H21 H41J15 P16 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26620&r=mig ;|
- On the Radar: SystemEmbeddedness and Latin American Immigrants' Perceived
Risk ofDeportation
| By: | Asad,Asad L. (Cornell University) |
| Abstract: | Scholars suggest the applicability of the system
avoidance concept to theU.S.immigration regime. On this theory, whereas
undocumented immigrants areexpected to be “on the run” from record-keeping
bodies, documentedimmigrantsare expected to feel secure “on the radar.” Yet,
federal policy changessincethe 1980s have made documented and undocumented
immigrants alike vulnerable todeportation. How can researchers better account
for the complex relationshipsbetween system involvement, avoidance, and
deportability? Drawing on in-depth,multi-year interviews with Latin
American-headed households in Dallas, Texas,this article examines how
noncitizens with varying degrees of involvement inthe U.S. immigration regime
perceive the risk of deportation. Undocumentedimmigrants in this study
recognize the precarity of their status, but theysometimes believe themselves
less vulnerable to deportation than documentedimmigrants. Meanwhile, documented
immigrants in this study underscore therelative stability of their status, but
they sometimes view themselves as morevulnerable to deportation than
undocumented immigrants. To explain theseperspectives, the article develops the
concept of “system embeddedness” todenote individuals’ perceived legibility to
institutions that maintain formalrecords (i.e., a state of existing “in the
system”). System embeddedness isone mechanism through which perceived
visibility to the federal immigrationregime entails risk, and perceived
invisibility safety, for some noncitizens.In viewing the U.S. immigration
regime as a source of risk, noncitizens can bechilled out of opportunities for
political, economic, and social mobilitythrough legalization in ways that
likely disadvantage their U.S.-citizenchildren. |
| Date: | 2018–10–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:dcgfw&r=mig ;|
- Arming opposition:Measuring the effect of arms transfers on internal
conflict
| By: | QuentinGallea |
| Abstract: | The main contribution of this paper is to provide the
first causalestimationof the effect of weapons imports on confl icts in the
recipient country for aglobal set of suppliers. The second main contribution is
to suggest a novelapproach to correct the errors with a Shift-Share (Bartik)
instrument usingarbitrary clustering and its implementation in STATA using the
command acreg.Using small arms and light weapons country-year transfers data
from 1992 to2011, I estimate the effect of arms import on the con flict
life-cycle (onset,duration, intensity and termination) and number of refugees
from the recipientcountry. To address endogeneity issues, I am using supply
shortages generatedby suppliers' war involvement outside the recipient
country's continent(Shift-Share instrumental variable) as exogenous negatives
shocks on armsimport. The two-stage least squares estimation shows that arms
importsincrease the onset of internal con flict, the number of internal con
flicts,the percentage of battle-related deaths and the number of refugees
fleeing thecountry. The 2SLS model predicts as well that if Europe would stop
sendingweapons to Africa for a year, it would reduce the number of refugees
by500,000. |
| Keywords: | Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation, Internal Con
ict, Migration,Rebellion, Arms imports |
| JEL: | C26 D74 F22 H56 O10 O19 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.10&r=mig ;|
- The Long Arm of theArab State
| By: | Tsourapas, Gerasimos (University of Birmingham) |
| Abstract: | Under what conditions do authoritarian states exercise
control overpopulations abroad? The securitisation of cross-border mobility has
been acommon theme in examining immigration policies in the Global North.
Thesecuritisation of emigration and diasporas in non-democratic contexts
remainsneglected; this is particularly true with regard to Arab
states’extraterritorial authoritarian practices. This article argues
thatauthoritarian states develop a range of migration policies that are driven
bythe contradictory pressures of economic and political imperatives or,
putdifferently, an "illiberal paradox": if a state does not expect economic
gainsfrom cross-border mobility, it is more likely to securitise its
emigrationpolicy; otherwise, it is more likely to securitise its diaspora
policy. Thearticle illustrates this trade-off via a most-similar comparison of
Algeria,Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. Drawing on Arabic and non-Arabic primary
andsecondary sources, it sketches a novel area of research on migration
andsecurity. |
| Date: | 2019–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:265fg&r=mig ;|
This nep-mig issue is ©2020 by Yuji Tamura. It is providedas is without any
express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed inwhole or in part
for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include thisnotice.General
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