Van Wolferen writes: "If signed and ratified, the trans-Pacific and
trans-Atlantic agreements, which seek to organize business activity under
one gigantic umbrella of new rules, are likely to change our living
environment in ways very different from what elected officials have been
misled to imagine."
Heads of state, who signed the TPP trade deal. (photo: Getty)
The Predators Behind the TPP
By Karel Van Wolferen, The Japan Times
12 February 16
Twelve Pacific Rim countries representing around 40 percent of the global
economy signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade accord on Thursday.
Dutch author Karel van Wolferen examines the corporate ramifications of the
divisive deal
Misnomers that hide what the strong and rich control - and aspire to
control - help promote our world's numerous political ills. "Spreading
democracy" in the Middle East and Africa has been used to excuse much
slaughter, ruin and higher risks of wider war for purposes not remotely
connected with democracy.
The designation "trade" used by politicians and the media when talking about
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) pact and the proposed Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TPIP) agreement is another perfect example
of a misnomer thanks to which a new shadow will be cast over the generally
more fortunate parts of the world.
If signed and ratified, the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic agreements,
which seek to organize business activity under one gigantic umbrella of new
rules, are likely to change our living environment in ways very different
from what elected officials have been misled to imagine.
They have been peddled as trade treaties, and hence as being wonderful for
economic growth, job creation, social well-being and general happiness.
But the TPP agreement, which aims to tie the United States together with
close to a dozen countries in Asia, Oceania and a bit of Latin America, is
not in the first place about trade, and may hardly be significant at all for
stimulating genuine exchanges traditionally labelled that way. The same is
true for its TPIP companion, which is meant to create and foster a new
American-European business environment.
The TPP and TPIP accords are about power, not trade. More specifically, the
agreements are about changed power relations between a collectivity of
politically well-connected large corporations and the sovereign states in
which these entities want to sink new roots. In particular, these treaties
would allow U.S. corporations to engage in conduct unchecked by national
rules of the participating countries. In eyes not fogged over through
neoliberal dogma, such a thing would be recognized as predation.
Corporate clout
Some history will clarify a lot. The first systematic attempt to establish
corporate supremacy over national laws and regulations, begun in 1997 by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, was more honest by
calling itself the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI). Under MAI
rules, foreign businesses would be guaranteed all the advantages enjoyed by
domestic producers and services of the participating countries.
If implemented, the larger foreign investors in these markets could have
easily wiped out smaller domestic players with the superior force they can
muster and would, once and for all, have made the older standard development
methods, known as "import substitution industrialization," impossible.
Potential competitors would become perennial subcontractors. In other words,
the MAI was a blatant move to implement neocolonialism by treaty.
No surprise then that the MAI turned "globalization" into a controversial
proposition as it triggered mass activism of a kind never seen before. This
was the moment that, thanks to the then very young Internet, the world saw a
bundling of international protest against transnational business power.
Anti-MAI events encouraged other antiglobalization protest movements around
the world, which peaked in 1999 in Seattle, and seemed to augur a new kind
of "people power" element in global affairs. It continued until Sept. 11,
2001.
With yet another calamitous misnomer of the "war against terror" - a
political impossibility - the attention of virtually everyone in the world
changed utterly, and the MAI plans as well as the antiglobalization activism
were soon forgotten.
An attempt to reintroduce MAI-like arrangements with the Doha Round of trade
negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization has remained
dead in the water.
Ten years ago, an innocuous enough attempt by Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand
and Chile to enhance trade cooperation through laudable tariff reductions
produced the initiative for a nascent TPP agreement.
Nurturing schemes for regional economic hegemony, Washington jumped in and
captured that initiative. It enticed Australia, Peru, Vietnam and Malaysia
to join as well. Once the U.S. Congress had endorsed related free trade
agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama, the TPP became the most
important component in a scheme for a Pacific-Asian business playground on
which, if Japan could be enticed to join as well, U.S. corporations could be
the bullies.
The most striking aspect of TPP negotiations since then has been their utter
secrecy. Only about 600 "cleared advisers" - most of them linked with the
businesses that stand to gain from the deal - have had access to parts of
subagreements, and critics among them have been sworn to remain silent about
what they consider unacceptable.
Several former trade officials and clued-in politicians in the United States
and elsewhere have noted that this treaty would not have the slightest
chance of making it through the legislatures of participating governments if
details were negotiated out in the open. Only the fast-track authority that
Congress gave President Barack Obama last year (allowing the House and
Senate only to vote yes or no, without debating changes or amendments) gives
it an even chance that it will become law in the United States.
We do know a little of what went on behind closed doors. For example, we
have seen that U.S. negotiators have concentrated on controlling labor laws,
environmental legislation and intellectual property rights.
Since traditional tariffs hardly appear to be an obstacle to trade nowadays,
what else could they do? But it does go to show that the TPP is primarily a
political program.
It is political because it aims to change the power relations between
transnational corporations and foreign governments. It is political because
it will create patterns of colonial dependence through agricultural
agreements. It is political because it seeks to place the governments of the
participating countries under a kind of legal discipline that has nothing to
do with the rights of citizens and everything to do with the ability of
powerful corporations to become even stronger.
Many details of the TPP agreement have yet to be divulged, but what we may
take away from the MAI experience is that participating governments can
violate its intended rules only at their own great disadvantage. In effect,
the legal stipulations tied to the MAI would have created a new element of
corporate groups operating internationally beyond any kind of
accountability. The TPP, much like the MAI before it, will not be about
economic development but about wholesale power shifts.
Those who can still make a political difference in Japan ought to study the
reason for and the nature of such shifts. Numerous large, politically
connected U.S. transnational corporations operate in colonizing mode. In the
context of recently evolved methods of profit-making in the current phase of
American late capitalism, and while the domestic U.S. economy remains in the
doldrums, only the rest of the world still offers enticing prospects.
The political class of the Asian participants of the TPP agreement and the
Europeans, who watch from the sidelines with the companion TPIP treaty in
the back of their minds, are still affected by the lines of seduction first
penned some two centuries ago by English political economist David Ricardo
about unfettered trade always being good for everyone.
But Ricardo and his followers were talking about free trade in goods. If
genuine markets in goods were to determine profits, U.S. businesses would
hardly have a chance to play a significant role internationally, since they
no longer manufacture that much at home anymore.
Hence corporate hopes are specifically vested on two areas opened up by the
TPP deal in participating countries: rents and "financial products."
Rather amazingly, Ricardo's cause still serves in our times as a sacred
principle to emulate when questions of any kind of liberalization are raised
- fatefully with regards to the lifting of regulations that kept order in
the world of international financial transactions. This has permitted rent
seekers and financial firms to become top predators. The TPP agreement will
massively expand their hunting territory and give them fierce fangs in the
bargain.
When it was introduced, copyright was meant to provide protection to authors
for an agreed number of years. More recently, it has been applied in a
broader way to works of art in general. This made sense, and was in line
with the thinking behind patents for industrial inventions.
But it has long since become exploitative. Attracted by an opportunity to
make money without producing things, corporations began to claim the rights
of all manner of artistic merchandise after paying off needy creators.
Sometimes, they even claimed the right to something that had theretofore
been free, such as the extraction of a substance with medicinal properties
from plants and trees used in indigenous forms of medicine.
A new category came into general use in the last decade of the 20th century
named "intellectual property" for the purpose of maximizing rent extraction
and the creation of monopolies. Many things can be endowed with the
near-sacred aura of property with this fashionable terminology, not only
tunes and images, but also simple ideas, clever marketing tricks, Indian
Ayurvedic medicine formulas and images of temple paintings in Southeast Asia
- you name it, we are only at the beginning of this.
Public gullibility under neoliberal regimes can be measured by the ease with
which the notion of "piracy" has become widely accepted, along with the
moral construction that imitation constitutes theft. Under ever more
stringent and internationally enforced controls, films that have made their
intended profit many times over in general box-office release, on TV and
with extended DVD editions are set up to be making money forever.
The intellectual property regime of the TPP agreement contains traps of
which the countries seduced to join are unlikely to be aware.
Much of the discussion among critics has revolved around the obviously
questionable closed-door tribunals to arbitrate investor-state disputes. But
other legal entanglements awaiting those who sign have as yet been
overlooked.
The rules demanded by the United States will create conditions for an even
greater American popular culture hegemony. Local producers of popular
culture products are likely to find themselves pressed to the margins in
their own countries, and bankrupted by costly litigation in which U.S.
corporations are masters.
An army of lawyers may be expected to become a parasitical growth on the
culture of the participating countries, with a new category of "ambulance
chasers" inspired by the existing U.S. industry of lawyers who, on their
own, ferret out possible cases of copyright infringement by unsuspecting
parties and then threaten those people with litigation unless they pay a
settlement fee.
Power plays
The expected intellectual property stipulations of the TPP accord related to
medicine have drawn much attention, as these will enlarge the oligopoly
power of pharmaceutical companies.
Global public health is likely to suffer from this because, from what is
already known, the new rules will lengthen the period before the use of
generic drugs is permitted, and these are the only affordable medicine for
patients in poorer countries.
Nongovernmental organization Doctors Without Borders has concluded in a July
2015 press release that "the TPP agreement is on track to become the most
harmful trade pact ever for access to medicines in developing countries."
Then there is an even bigger beneficiary in the shape of the 21st-century
global casino of speculating banks, which make untold multiples of capital
with their money while bypassing the complication of investing in
production. For them, the TPP deal is a dream come true, which is why they
rewarded two executives from Bank of America and Citigroup with millions in
bonuses before these moved to work on the TPP.
The executive from Citigroup was appointed to lead the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, the agency in charge of TPP negotiations.
From what we know, the TPP agreement would ban capital controls, prohibit
any kind of future taxes on Wall Street speculation and block any move to
separate investment from retail banking. It would also block efforts to ban
toxic derivatives that created the credit crisis of 2008.
As with the manufacturers of controversial products, the financial industry
will be given the means to demand compensation for regulations and policies
that in their assessment may undermine their expected future profits.
It is not difficult to understand that TPP participants who have not guessed
the consequences of what they will be signing will bring social misery upon
themselves. It is also not difficult to understand how the TPP agreement
fits in with Washington's "Asian pivot" moves as part of its full-spectrum
dominance campaign.
Japan's participation in the TPP, which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is eager
to bring about, would be a big clincher for America's containment of China's
tactics. It would push Japan deeper into an embrace with the United States
over which it has little control.
After intense concentration on export-led developments, the Chinese economy
is evolving into a consumer-oriented system and its huge middle class has
lots of money to spend. Of all the world's countries, Japan is in the best
position to benefit from this switch, which is one of several reasons why it
ought to treasure every opportunity for improving relations with its
neighbor. The TPP would hinder that process, as has precisely been
Washington's intention.
All this is easily understood. But it still leaves us with the puzzle of why
Asians as well as Europeans, whose EU trade commissioners have been mouthing
the same job creating nonsense around the TPIP that accompanies the TPP
rhetoric, appear unable to tackle intellectually the dominant power aspects
of these treaties.
Perhaps this is because the world in which they exist is politically
sterilized by current economic suppositions. More generally, the concept of
power (not influence with which it is often confused) receives a
"stepmotherly" treatment in popular as well as serious writing, and the
social science denizens of academia are entirely at sea over it.
Mainstream economics is ahistorical by design and hence has no room for
power, which has helped continue the fateful division of political and
economic affairs into separate realms for discussion that has long served
the interests of power elites.
Since the political dimension to economic arrangements in the United States
remains hidden in most discourse because political and economic reality are
routinely treated as separate realms of life, few notice that what is
justified in the United States by reference to "market forces" is frequently
the result of heavy political negotiation, interference and favors.
Politically well-connected U.S. corporations, paying for the election
expenses of Congress members who help create their business environment,
need not fear market forces.
If the banks responsible for the credit crisis of 2008 and the subsequent
global recession that is still with us had not been lifted out of "the
market" by the state, they would no longer exist.
Powerful corporations have been allowed to swallow the state; they have, as
economist James Galbraith explains, created a "predator state," which they
naturally exploit for their own expansion. There is no frame of reference
with which we can more convincingly define the TPP.
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
Heads of state, who signed the TPP trade deal. (photo: Getty)
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/06/business/economy-business/predat
ors-behind-tpp/ -
.Vry260tH1FIhttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/06/business/economy-bus
iness/predators-behind-tpp/ - .Vry260tH1FI
The Predators Behind the TPP
By Karel Van Wolferen, The Japan Times
12 February 16
Twelve Pacific Rim countries representing around 40 percent of the global
economy signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade accord on Thursday.
Dutch author Karel van Wolferen examines the corporate ramifications of the
divisive deal
isnomers that hide what the strong and rich control - and aspire to control
- help promote our world's numerous political ills. "Spreading democracy" in
the Middle East and Africa has been used to excuse much slaughter, ruin and
higher risks of wider war for purposes not remotely connected with
democracy.
The designation "trade" used by politicians and the media when talking about
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) pact and the proposed Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TPIP) agreement is another perfect example
of a misnomer thanks to which a new shadow will be cast over the generally
more fortunate parts of the world.
If signed and ratified, the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic agreements,
which seek to organize business activity under one gigantic umbrella of new
rules, are likely to change our living environment in ways very different
from what elected officials have been misled to imagine.
They have been peddled as trade treaties, and hence as being wonderful for
economic growth, job creation, social well-being and general happiness.
But the TPP agreement, which aims to tie the United States together with
close to a dozen countries in Asia, Oceania and a bit of Latin America, is
not in the first place about trade, and may hardly be significant at all for
stimulating genuine exchanges traditionally labelled that way. The same is
true for its TPIP companion, which is meant to create and foster a new
American-European business environment.
The TPP and TPIP accords are about power, not trade. More specifically, the
agreements are about changed power relations between a collectivity of
politically well-connected large corporations and the sovereign states in
which these entities want to sink new roots. In particular, these treaties
would allow U.S. corporations to engage in conduct unchecked by national
rules of the participating countries. In eyes not fogged over through
neoliberal dogma, such a thing would be recognized as predation.
Corporate clout
Some history will clarify a lot. The first systematic attempt to establish
corporate supremacy over national laws and regulations, begun in 1997 by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, was more honest by
calling itself the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI). Under MAI
rules, foreign businesses would be guaranteed all the advantages enjoyed by
domestic producers and services of the participating countries.
If implemented, the larger foreign investors in these markets could have
easily wiped out smaller domestic players with the superior force they can
muster and would, once and for all, have made the older standard development
methods, known as "import substitution industrialization," impossible.
Potential competitors would become perennial subcontractors. In other words,
the MAI was a blatant move to implement neocolonialism by treaty.
No surprise then that the MAI turned "globalization" into a controversial
proposition as it triggered mass activism of a kind never seen before. This
was the moment that, thanks to the then very young Internet, the world saw a
bundling of international protest against transnational business power.
Anti-MAI events encouraged other antiglobalization protest movements around
the world, which peaked in 1999 in Seattle, and seemed to augur a new kind
of "people power" element in global affairs. It continued until Sept. 11,
2001.
With yet another calamitous misnomer of the "war against terror" - a
political impossibility - the attention of virtually everyone in the world
changed utterly, and the MAI plans as well as the antiglobalization activism
were soon forgotten.
An attempt to reintroduce MAI-like arrangements with the Doha Round of trade
negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization has remained
dead in the water.
Ten years ago, an innocuous enough attempt by Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand
and Chile to enhance trade cooperation through laudable tariff reductions
produced the initiative for a nascent TPP agreement.
Nurturing schemes for regional economic hegemony, Washington jumped in and
captured that initiative. It enticed Australia, Peru, Vietnam and Malaysia
to join as well. Once the U.S. Congress had endorsed related free trade
agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama, the TPP became the most
important component in a scheme for a Pacific-Asian business playground on
which, if Japan could be enticed to join as well, U.S. corporations could be
the bullies.
The most striking aspect of TPP negotiations since then has been their utter
secrecy. Only about 600 "cleared advisers" - most of them linked with the
businesses that stand to gain from the deal - have had access to parts of
subagreements, and critics among them have been sworn to remain silent about
what they consider unacceptable.
Several former trade officials and clued-in politicians in the United States
and elsewhere have noted that this treaty would not have the slightest
chance of making it through the legislatures of participating governments if
details were negotiated out in the open. Only the fast-track authority that
Congress gave President Barack Obama last year (allowing the House and
Senate only to vote yes or no, without debating changes or amendments) gives
it an even chance that it will become law in the United States.
We do know a little of what went on behind closed doors. For example, we
have seen that U.S. negotiators have concentrated on controlling labor laws,
environmental legislation and intellectual property rights.
Since traditional tariffs hardly appear to be an obstacle to trade nowadays,
what else could they do? But it does go to show that the TPP is primarily a
political program.
It is political because it aims to change the power relations between
transnational corporations and foreign governments. It is political because
it will create patterns of colonial dependence through agricultural
agreements. It is political because it seeks to place the governments of the
participating countries under a kind of legal discipline that has nothing to
do with the rights of citizens and everything to do with the ability of
powerful corporations to become even stronger.
Many details of the TPP agreement have yet to be divulged, but what we may
take away from the MAI experience is that participating governments can
violate its intended rules only at their own great disadvantage. In effect,
the legal stipulations tied to the MAI would have created a new element of
corporate groups operating internationally beyond any kind of
accountability. The TPP, much like the MAI before it, will not be about
economic development but about wholesale power shifts.
Those who can still make a political difference in Japan ought to study the
reason for and the nature of such shifts. Numerous large, politically
connected U.S. transnational corporations operate in colonizing mode. In the
context of recently evolved methods of profit-making in the current phase of
American late capitalism, and while the domestic U.S. economy remains in the
doldrums, only the rest of the world still offers enticing prospects.
The political class of the Asian participants of the TPP agreement and the
Europeans, who watch from the sidelines with the companion TPIP treaty in
the back of their minds, are still affected by the lines of seduction first
penned some two centuries ago by English political economist David Ricardo
about unfettered trade always being good for everyone.
But Ricardo and his followers were talking about free trade in goods. If
genuine markets in goods were to determine profits, U.S. businesses would
hardly have a chance to play a significant role internationally, since they
no longer manufacture that much at home anymore.
Hence corporate hopes are specifically vested on two areas opened up by the
TPP deal in participating countries: rents and "financial products."
Rather amazingly, Ricardo's cause still serves in our times as a sacred
principle to emulate when questions of any kind of liberalization are raised
- fatefully with regards to the lifting of regulations that kept order in
the world of international financial transactions. This has permitted rent
seekers and financial firms to become top predators. The TPP agreement will
massively expand their hunting territory and give them fierce fangs in the
bargain.
When it was introduced, copyright was meant to provide protection to authors
for an agreed number of years. More recently, it has been applied in a
broader way to works of art in general. This made sense, and was in line
with the thinking behind patents for industrial inventions.
But it has long since become exploitative. Attracted by an opportunity to
make money without producing things, corporations began to claim the rights
of all manner of artistic merchandise after paying off needy creators.
Sometimes, they even claimed the right to something that had theretofore
been free, such as the extraction of a substance with medicinal properties
from plants and trees used in indigenous forms of medicine.
A new category came into general use in the last decade of the 20th century
named "intellectual property" for the purpose of maximizing rent extraction
and the creation of monopolies. Many things can be endowed with the
near-sacred aura of property with this fashionable terminology, not only
tunes and images, but also simple ideas, clever marketing tricks, Indian
Ayurvedic medicine formulas and images of temple paintings in Southeast Asia
- you name it, we are only at the beginning of this.
Public gullibility under neoliberal regimes can be measured by the ease with
which the notion of "piracy" has become widely accepted, along with the
moral construction that imitation constitutes theft. Under ever more
stringent and internationally enforced controls, films that have made their
intended profit many times over in general box-office release, on TV and
with extended DVD editions are set up to be making money forever.
The intellectual property regime of the TPP agreement contains traps of
which the countries seduced to join are unlikely to be aware.
Much of the discussion among critics has revolved around the obviously
questionable closed-door tribunals to arbitrate investor-state disputes. But
other legal entanglements awaiting those who sign have as yet been
overlooked.
The rules demanded by the United States will create conditions for an even
greater American popular culture hegemony. Local producers of popular
culture products are likely to find themselves pressed to the margins in
their own countries, and bankrupted by costly litigation in which U.S.
corporations are masters.
An army of lawyers may be expected to become a parasitical growth on the
culture of the participating countries, with a new category of "ambulance
chasers" inspired by the existing U.S. industry of lawyers who, on their
own, ferret out possible cases of copyright infringement by unsuspecting
parties and then threaten those people with litigation unless they pay a
settlement fee.
Power plays
The expected intellectual property stipulations of the TPP accord related to
medicine have drawn much attention, as these will enlarge the oligopoly
power of pharmaceutical companies.
Global public health is likely to suffer from this because, from what is
already known, the new rules will lengthen the period before the use of
generic drugs is permitted, and these are the only affordable medicine for
patients in poorer countries.
Nongovernmental organization Doctors Without Borders has concluded in a July
2015 press release that "the TPP agreement is on track to become the most
harmful trade pact ever for access to medicines in developing countries."
Then there is an even bigger beneficiary in the shape of the 21st-century
global casino of speculating banks, which make untold multiples of capital
with their money while bypassing the complication of investing in
production. For them, the TPP deal is a dream come true, which is why they
rewarded two executives from Bank of America and Citigroup with millions in
bonuses before these moved to work on the TPP.
The executive from Citigroup was appointed to lead the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, the agency in charge of TPP negotiations.
From what we know, the TPP agreement would ban capital controls, prohibit
any kind of future taxes on Wall Street speculation and block any move to
separate investment from retail banking. It would also block efforts to ban
toxic derivatives that created the credit crisis of 2008.
As with the manufacturers of controversial products, the financial industry
will be given the means to demand compensation for regulations and policies
that in their assessment may undermine their expected future profits.
It is not difficult to understand that TPP participants who have not guessed
the consequences of what they will be signing will bring social misery upon
themselves. It is also not difficult to understand how the TPP agreement
fits in with Washington's "Asian pivot" moves as part of its full-spectrum
dominance campaign.
Japan's participation in the TPP, which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is eager
to bring about, would be a big clincher for America's containment of China's
tactics. It would push Japan deeper into an embrace with the United States
over which it has little control.
After intense concentration on export-led developments, the Chinese economy
is evolving into a consumer-oriented system and its huge middle class has
lots of money to spend. Of all the world's countries, Japan is in the best
position to benefit from this switch, which is one of several reasons why it
ought to treasure every opportunity for improving relations with its
neighbor. The TPP would hinder that process, as has precisely been
Washington's intention.
All this is easily understood. But it still leaves us with the puzzle of why
Asians as well as Europeans, whose EU trade commissioners have been mouthing
the same job creating nonsense around the TPIP that accompanies the TPP
rhetoric, appear unable to tackle intellectually the dominant power aspects
of these treaties.
Perhaps this is because the world in which they exist is politically
sterilized by current economic suppositions. More generally, the concept of
power (not influence with which it is often confused) receives a
"stepmotherly" treatment in popular as well as serious writing, and the
social science denizens of academia are entirely at sea over it.
Mainstream economics is ahistorical by design and hence has no room for
power, which has helped continue the fateful division of political and
economic affairs into separate realms for discussion that has long served
the interests of power elites.
Since the political dimension to economic arrangements in the United States
remains hidden in most discourse because political and economic reality are
routinely treated as separate realms of life, few notice that what is
justified in the United States by reference to "market forces" is frequently
the result of heavy political negotiation, interference and favors.
Politically well-connected U.S. corporations, paying for the election
expenses of Congress members who help create their business environment,
need not fear market forces.
If the banks responsible for the credit crisis of 2008 and the subsequent
global recession that is still with us had not been lifted out of "the
market" by the state, they would no longer exist.
Powerful corporations have been allowed to swallow the state; they have, as
economist James Galbraith explains, created a "predator state," which they
naturally exploit for their own expansion. There is no frame of reference
with which we can more convincingly define the TPP.
http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize
http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize
