The Escalating Crisis Over Irans Nuclear Inspections
June 29, 2020
An IAEA resolution based on questionable Israeli intelligence has sparked a
crisis with Iran that could spin out of control, warns Scott Ritter.
By Scott Ritter
Special to Consortium News
The Iran nuclear deal that the Trump administration pulled out of last year
is on the verge of collapse.
The National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Parliament
last Tuesday ratified a motion that required the Iranian government to cease
its voluntary implementation of its Additional Protocol agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The motion, if turned into law, would represent a death knell to the 2015
Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA), the groundbreaking agreement
between Iran and the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China,
Germany, and the European Union to end the crisis surrounding Irans nuclear
program.
There is still time before the matter could be brought up for a vote;
indeed, the committee is scheduled to hold a hearing on July 6, and has
invited Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif and Nuclear Chief Ali-Akbar
Salehi to testify.
IAEA Resolution
The current crisis over Irans nuclear program was triggered by the IAEA
Board of Governors, which on June 19 passed a resolution expressing its
serious concern over Irans refusal to provide access to the Agency under
the Additional Protocol to two locations. The resolution said that
discussions engaged, for almost a year, to clarify Agency questions related
to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear related activities in
Iran have not led to progress.
The Board of Governors resolution required that Iran shall cooperate fully
and in a timely manner with the IAEA in implementing its Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, including by providing
acces. The resolution reaffirmed that such cooperation and implementation
are essential for the IAEA to reach the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear
material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.
The First Three Years of the Deal
IAEA meeting on proposed Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East.
Vienna, Austria, 21-22 November 2011. (Dean Calma / IAEA)
The Board of Governors June 19 resolution did not occur in a vacuum. For
the first three years of the JCPOAs implementation, Iran was repeatedly
certified as being in full compliance with all of its obligations, including
granting IAEA inspectors access to facilities and locations mandated by the
additional protocol.
The protocol is an expanded set of requirements for information and access
between Iran and the IAEA. It assists IAEA inspectors to confirm that states
are using nuclear material for solely peaceful purposes. The protocol is a
voluntary agreement and is independently constructed between a state and the
IAEA.
Iran negotiated its additional protocol with the IAEA in 2003, which was
signed but never ratified. Nevertheless, Iran implemented the protocol on a
voluntary basis from 2003 to 2006 before ending its cooperation in the face
of allegations that Iran was cheating.
Iran and the IAEA then entered a decade-long confrontation, which was only
resolved with the implementation of the JCPOA nuclear deal, which was
unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 2231 on July
20, 2015. That made the JCPOA binding under both international and U.S.
constitutional law.
The nuclear deal established a road map, framed by mutually binding
commitments, that took Iran from zero tolerance over nuclear enrichment, to
a time when Iran would be able to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes
without restriction, as long as the IAEA confirmed that Irans entire
nuclear program had no military intentions. According to the deal, Iran
would be subjected to stringent safeguards inspections that included the
additional protocol.
Iran Reacts to Trumps Move
Zarif (r.) negotiating nuclear deal with then US Secretary of State John
Kerry in July, 2015.
When the Trump administration, acting on President Trumps belief that the
JCPOA was a bad agreement, withdrew from the JCPOA and began re-imposing
U.S. economic sanctions, which had been lifted under the terms of the deal,
Iran indicated that it would reconsider its participation.
For the time being, Iran continued to abide by its obligations under the
deal, accepting European Union and the other JCPOA nations guarantees that
regardless of what the U.S. did vis-à-vis sanctions, the other nations would
not follow suit, and thereby fulfill their commitments to Iran under the
terms of the JCPOA.
A year after the U.S. withdrawal from the deal, however, Europe collectively
reneged on that commitment, succumbing to the threat of U.S. secondary
sanctions, which threatened any European business that engaged in commerce
with Iran.
In response, Iran invoked Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. Article 26 holds
that if new nuclear-related sanctions are imposed on Iran by any party to
the deal it will constitute grounds (for its authorities) to cease
performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
Article 36 states that if actions by parties to the JCPOA constitute
significant non-performance, then (Iran) could treat the unresolved issue as
grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in
part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue
constitutes significant non-performance.
Iran stressed at the time that its retaliatory measures would be reversible
as soon as Europe ignored the threat of secondary U.S. sanctions and
fulfilled its obligations regarding sanctions-free trade with Iran.
Initially, Iran increased its enriched uranium stockpile to beyond the 300
kilograms limit set by the JCPOA. When the Europeans continued to balk, Iran
began enriching uranium to purity rates beyond the JCPOA limit of 3.76
percent.
Next, when Europe failed to meet a 60-day deadline to fulfill its
commitments, Iran began to operate advanced centrifuges capable of boosting
its enriched uranium stockpile, as well as activating advanced centrifuges
for research and development purposes.
Lastly, in November 2019, Iran began injecting uranium gas into centrifuges
at its Fordow plant, something which, while prohibited under the JCPOA, was
conducted under IAEA inspection.
Interestingly, the IAEA Board of Governors June 19 resolution did not
address these actions in any depth. Instead, the focus of attention was on
the issue of Irans implementation of the additional protocol.
As noted, Iran had entered into voluntary compliance with the IAEA of an
additional protocol agreed in 2003, but withdrew in 2006 in the face of
allegations derived from intelligence provided to the IAEA by Israel of
Iranian cheating [see: article published today in Consortium News, Israel
Leverages Dubious Nuclear Archives to Re-Enlist IAEA in Campaign Against
Iran.]
Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to implement its additional protocol on a
provisional basis for up to eight years before it became legally binding.
Iran insisted on these terms in order to prevent the kind of scenario that
is, in fact, playing out today, where the United States has re-imposed
sweeping economic sanctions against Iran, and is seeking to trigger
so-called snap-back sanctions that would return Iran to the regimen of
measures previously imposed by the Security Council, but terminated upon the
councils endorsement of the nuclear deal.
Israeli Allegations
Iran nuclear sites. (Wikimedia Commons)
The Board of Governors resolution mentions two sites that are alleged to be
engaged in ongoing, undeclared nuclear activity. Normally, these sites would
be ideal candidates for the kind of inspections envisioned under the
protocol, and indeed Iran has a history of providing similar access to other
sites.
What separates these sites from the others is that Iran claims the
allegations about them are a product of Israeli intelligence, and as such
are deemed to be fabrications designed to provoke Iran. No country, Kazem
Gharibabadi, Irans ambassador told the Board of Governors before its vote
on the June 19 resolution, opens its territory to the inspections only
based on continuous allegations provided by its own enemy, even if it is
evident that the result of which will prove those allegations to be false.
Irans position on the two sites does not appear to be out of fear over what
would be discoveredindeed Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told the United
Nations in September 2019 that, If the U.S. Congress ratifies the JCPOA and
lifts all sanctions permanently, Iran is ready to pursue the immediate
ratification of the Additional Protocol in the Iranian parliament as a
permanent law.
Nothing to Hide
Rather, it is a matter of principle for Iran. Indeed, Foreign Minister Zarif
noted in a tweet that an agreeable solution is possible for the IAEAs
request for access to the two nuclear sites in the countrybut not if Iran
was subjected to pressure in the form of a Board of Governors resolution
predicated on Israeli intelligence.
Weve nothing to hide, Zarif tweeted. More inspections in Iran over last
5 yrs than in IAEA history. An agreeable solution is possible, but Res will
ruin it.
Zarifs warning was of no avail. Shortly after the Board of Governors passed
its resolution, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement
declaring that:
Irans denial of access to IAEA inspectors and refusal to cooperate with
the IAEAs investigation is deeply troubling and raises serious questions
about what Iran is trying to hide. Over the past months, Iran has not only
continued its nuclear escalation and extortion, but it has also stonewalled
the IAEA. These actions are unacceptable and underscore the continued threat
posed by Irans nuclear program to international peace and security.
The battle lines have been drawn. By caving into pressure from the United
States to force a resolution by the Board of Governors, the European nations
who are party to the JCPOA have done great harm to that agreement.
Having forced a showdown with Iran over the issue of access to sites based
upon intelligence of questionable provenance, the IAEA has once again opted
to take the world to the brink of a crisis with Iran which could ultimately
see that nation withdraw not only from the JCPOA, but also the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Not only would such an outcome undermine the issue of global nuclear
nonproliferation, but also more than likely put Iran on a path toward the
kind of decisive military confrontation that would spell ruin for the Middle
East and, by extension, the entire world.
Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps intelligence officer who served in the
former Soviet Union implementing arms control treaties, in the Persian Gulf
during Operation Desert Storm, and in Iraq overseeing the disarmament of
WMD.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and may or may not
reflect those of Consortium News.
