If the Brutal War in Yemen Finally at Hand?
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A girl eats boiled leaves to stave off starvation in the district of Aslam,
Hajjah, Yemen. (Hammadi Issa / AP)
When the new Congress convenes Jan. 3, it is expected to pass a House
resolution upholding congressional war powers and ending all direct U.S.
involvement in the Saudi coalition's war in Yemen. But hopes remain high
that H. Con. Res. 138 will help to end the Yemen war itself. Congressional
strategists and activists who have been working on the issue believe passage
of the war powers measure will force Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
to the negotiating table.
Together, they are challenging the position of some former Obama
administration officials who have warned the war powers resolution alone
cannot bring the conflict to a close. Those former officials, led by
Brookings Institution fellow Bruce Riedel, say that cutting off the Saudi
pipeline of spare parts is the only way to prevent further airstrikes, which
have been central to the Saudi war strategy.
Proponents of the war powers resolution, sponsored by Democratic Rep. Ro
Khanna of California, argue the Saudis will not be able to continue the war
without the political-diplomatic support of the United States, and the Yemen
resolution will make dramatically clear the Saudis can no longer count on
U.S. support. How the Senate came to pass a version of the Yemen resolution,
co-sponsored by Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., and
Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah, and ratified in December by a vote of 56 to 41, would
appear to lend support to their argument.
The Khashoggi Effect
Until 2018, the Obama and Trump administrations had successfully avoided any
congressional move to block U.S. support of the Saudi-Emirati bombing of
civilian targets in Yemen, or the country's air and naval blockade. That
success was possible, at least in part, because the U.S. media largely
ignored the mass starvation of the Yemeni people and unprecedented cholera
epidemic these acts of aggression had wrought.
The media also failed to report on the United States' direct role in that
conflict. From mid-2017 to mid-2018, MSNBC ran only a single story that
mentioned the United States' in-flight refueling of Saudi planes and its
provision of intelligence for Yemeni bombing targets.
Nevertheless, some key members of Congress were well informed about the
United States' complicity in the Saudi coalition's crimes. As early as March
2018, when Sens. Sanders and Lee first introduced the Yemen war powers
resolution, a head count by the office of co-sponsor Chris Murphy indicated
it would pass the Senate with a narrow majority.
Several of those votes were lost in May to legislation by Sen. Todd Young,
R-Ind., and Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., which required the secretary of
state to "certify" that Saudi Arabia was making efforts to end the war,
increase access to humanitarian goods and "reduce harm to civilians."
But this fall, a tragic event and dramatic revelations created new impetus
for a Yemen war powers resolution: Washington Post journalist Jamal
Khashoggi was killed and hard evidence emerged that Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman and the Saudi government had ordered his murder and dismemberment
over his critical coverage. The political impact of that story can hardly be
exaggerated. Whereas before the media had been reluctant to report on the
war, they were suddenly eager to document its myriad atrocities, including
the ongoing starvation of Yemeni children.
The pressure on President Donald Trump to abandon his unflinching support of
the Saudi regime intensified. Administration officials knew full well the
Saudi coalition was already planning to capture the key Yemeni port of
Hodeida-the country's lifeline for food imports and humanitarian goods. That
assault was scheduled to begin on Nov. 3, and it would have further weakened
the administration's case against a war powers resolution if one were
brought to the Senate floor. The administration also knew by late October
that Democrats likely would be taking control of the House of
Representatives, where Republican leadership had successfully employed
legislative tactics to prevent even a congressional debate on the Saudi-led
war efforts.
The Administration Adjusts Its Yemen Policy
Between Kushner's personal ties to Crown Prince Mohammed and the lure of
tens of billions of dollars in arms sales, the Trump administration remained
wedded to the Saudi regime. But it was now forced to make adjustments in its
policy to try to shore up the collapsing congressional support for the war.
So Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
issued a call on Oct. 30 for a cease-fire in Yemen and peace negotiations
within 30 days.
A careful reading of Pompeo's statement, however, reveals two key giveaways
to the Saudi regime: It did not require the Saudis to halt their bombing
until after the Houthis had halted missile strikes on Saudi and United Arab
Emirates targets, and the Saudi coalition was only required to cease bombing
"populated areas," evidently leaving it free to hit targets outside urban
concentrations.
There would be more to come. After discussions with the Trump
administration, the Saudi government officially requested on Nov. 9 that the
U.S. end the refueling of the coalition's aircraft for its Yemen operations.
The Saudi statement said the coalition had "increased its capability to
independently conduct in-flight refueling in Yemen," and had therefore
requested, "in consultation with the United States," the "cessation of
in-flight refueling support."
Experts maintained the Trump administration had compelled the Saudis and
their UAE allies to accept less capability-especially as it pertained to
longer-range strikes by UAE aircraft-for domestic U.S. political reasons.
Former National Security Council official Riedel, for one, commented that
giving up U.S. refueling would make it harder for the Saudi coalition to
"carry out strikes deep into Yemeni territory."
All that elaborate maneuvering with the Saudis failed to influence the
Senate, which voted, 63-37, in November to advance the Yemen war powers
joint resolution. Prior to that vote, Pompeo and Mattis had briefed the
Senate in an attempt to tamp down anger over the Khashoggi murder,
attempting to sell the idea that American interests required U.S. support
for the Saudi coalition's war in Yemen. But senators who attended the
briefing told reporters their arguments-especially regarding the crown
prince and Khashoggi-had not been credible. If anything, Pompeo and Mattis
had strengthened their determination to support the resolution.
In December, seven Republicans joined 49 Democrats in approving the
Sanders-Lee resolution, 56-41, in a major rebuff to the entire foreign
policy establishment. That vote was followed moments later with the
unanimous approval of a separate resolution condemning the Saudi crown
prince by name for Khashoggi's grisly murder.
In a clear indication the Trump administration aimed to hold the line
against a Yemen resolution, the Saudi coalition abruptly halted the Hodeida
offensive it had begun 12 days earlier, almost certainly under U.S.
pressure. The Saudis also agreed to participate in U.N.-brokered
"consultation" that began in Sweden on Dec. 6 led by the United Nations
special envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths.
Even before the conference had officially begun, Griffiths negotiated a swap
of 2,000 to 3,000 prisoners held by the two sides. And on Dec. 13, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen agreed to a cease-fire in Hodeida, where the fighting had
been concentrated, although it soon broke down with mutual recriminations.
The Key to Yemen Peace?
The Trump administration's official position, based on the notion that
"limited support to member countries of the Emirati and Saudi-led coalition,
including intelligence sharing, logistics, and, until recently, aerial
refueling" did not constitute being "engaged in hostilities," was that the
resolution had no legal effect. But the activists and congressional staff
who worked on the resolution are convinced that the administration's frantic
efforts to prevent its passage reveal just how powerful it will prove.
One Democratic congressional strategist involved in promoting the resolution
acknowledged as much in an interview with Truthdig. "At the same time the
Pentagon and the Trump administration were saying it would have no impact,
they were scrambling to change the facts on the ground by unilaterally
suspending air refueling," the strategist said.
The strategist also admitted this "first assertion of war authorities by
Congress" would "force the administration to retreat, and when the U.S. is
no longer the steadfast patron of the Saudi coalition campaign, the Saudi
coalition will be compelled to seek an urgent and immediate peace
settlement."
Robert Naiman, policy director at Just Foreign Policy, an activist
membership organization that has been working to support the eventual
passage of the Yemen resolution in both houses of Congress, agrees the
resolution is bound to push the Saudis toward ending the war. "I've always
believed any kind of congressional vote that says no in a toothy way like
the war powers resolution would be enough to force the administration and
the Saudis to change policy," he told Truthdig.
Naiman called the administration's gambit to head off passage of the
resolution "a political signal the whole world sees." He said he believes
"the political-diplomatic signal is even more important than direct military
participation."
The war's swift conclusion appears all but inevitable. While Crown Prince
Mohammed may be committed to final victory, the Saudi regime remains heavily
dependent on U.S. political-diplomatic cover, as it has since the beginning
of the bombing campaign in Yemen. Ironically, that political reality could
now tip the balance toward peace.
Gareth Porter
Gareth Porter is an independent investigative journalist, historian and
author who has covered U.S. wars and interventions in Iraq, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen and Syria since 2004 and was the 2012.
