How CENTCOM Chief McKenzie manufactured an Iran crisis to increase his power
GARETH PORTER.JANUARY 15, 2021 The Grayzone
Seeking prestige and power within the military, CENTCOM chief Gen. Kenneth
McKenzie has deployed a series of bureaucratic and PR moves to drive the
latest episode in US-Iran tensions.
During the final two months of the Trump administration, a series of
provocative U.S. military moves in the Middle East stirred fears that war
against Iran were being hatched. The atmosphere of crisis was not the result
of any threat posed by Iran, but instead, the product of a campaign
manufactured by the commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Gen. Kenneth
F. McKenzie Jr., to advance his interests and those under his command.
In a bid for prestige and power within the military, and the influence over
policymaking that it guarantees, McKenzie has worked to accumulate military
assets. The general's thirst for power has been the driving factor in
driving the latest episode of US-Iran tensions. To advance his self-serving
agenda, McKenzie has deployed a calculated series of political-bureaucratic
moves combined with a PR push in the media.
A four-star general who previously served as director of the Joint Staff at
the Pentagon, as well as in leading positions in the Middle East command,
McKenzie is widely regarded as the most politically astute commander ever to
head at the Middle East command, according to journalist Mark Perry. He has
also shown himself to be exceptionally brazen in scheming to defend his
interests.
Almost immediately after taking command at CENTCOM in March 2019, McKenzie
launched his campaign of political manipulation. By requesting the
additional forces to contain a supposedly urgent Iranian threat, McKenzie
triggered the dispatch of an aircraft carrier strike group and a bomber task
force to the Middle East. A month later, he told reporters he believed the
deployments were "having a very good stabilizing effect," and that he was in
the process of negotiating on a larger long-term U.S. military presence.
As a result of his maneuvering, McKenzie succeeded in acquiring 10,000 to
15,000 more military personnel, bringing the total in his CENTCOM realm to
more than 90,000. The rapid increase in assets under his command was
revealed in a Senate hearing in March 2020.
During the remainder of 2020 some of those troops were shifted to East Asia
or Europe, in line with the new Pentagon priority on major power
competition. McKenzie's determination to resist the loss of military assets
was the crucial factor in artificially manufacturing the recent Iran crisis.
McKenzie has fought to keep the thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq, ostensibly
to fight ISIS, but more fundamentally to maintain a long-term military
presence in the country. But the U.S. military presence has long been
extremely unpopular in Iraq. Last January, following the U.S. assassination
of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iraq's legislature passed a
resolution demanding the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the country.
In the meantime, Iraqi militias aligned with Iran have escalated attacks on
U.S. forces, beginning with a major rocket attack on coalition forces at
Camp Taji in March 2020 that killed two U.S. servicemen. McKenzie exploited
the Camp Taji attack to reclaim some of the assets he had lost, successfully
requesting a second aircraft carrier strike group remain in the region.
McKenzie requested the additional forces, according to the Wall Street
Journal, to "signal to Tehran that it would be held responsible" if the
Iraqi militias continued to attack U.S. forces.
But that ploy was quickly shown to be a failure: Iraqi militia attacks on
bases occupied by U.S. forces soared to 28 between March and August 2020.
McKenzie was thus forced to begin withdrawing from bases in Iraq and turning
them over to Iraqi forces. In September, McKenzie even acknowledged in
announcing the planned reduction of U.S. troops in Iraq from 5,200 to 3,000
that militia attacks were a major reason for the withdrawal.
After Trump's mid-November decision to reduce troop numbers in Afghanistan
and Iraq to 2,500, McKenzie and his allies in Washington constructed the
illusion of a crisis with Iran by promoting the idea that Iran might be
planning attacks on U.S. forces:
The New York Times reported on November 16 that officials were "especially
nervous about the January 3 anniversary of the U.S. strike that killed
Soleimani.." And a Washington Post story the following day cited "people
familiar with the matter" as saying the U.S. intelligence had recently been
"monitoring potential threats by Iran to U.S. forces in the region".
Then came an even more serious move: on November 21, two Air Force
"Stratofortress" B-52 bombers flew directly from the United States to the
Persian Gulf.
The flight was announced in a statement by the spokesman for McKenzie's
Central Command which offered no specific justification. It declared that
the Soleimani assassination in January 2020 precipitated the last deployment
of long-range B-52 flights to the Gulf, creating the sense that the new
flights were linked to a potential military crisis. In fact, the bombers
made a round-trip from their U.S. base to the Gulf and back without
stopping.
On December 7, McKenzie was back on the PR offensive, speaking to a small
group of reporters who were allowed to identify him only as a "senior U.S.
military official with knowledge of the region." As the Associated Press and
NBC News reported, he told commented the risk of miscalculation by Iran "is
higher.right now," because of the U.S. pulling troops out of the region, the
U.S. presidential transition, the COVID pandemic, and the anniversary of
Soleimani killing. He emphasized that military leaders had determined that
the Nimitz must remain in the region "for some time to come," and that an
additional fighter jet squadron might also be needed.
Three days later, another squadron of B-52s flew from the U.S. to the
Persian Gulf, flying provocatively close to Iranian airspace before
returning to their home base. Then, on December 21, the U.S. Navy publicly
announced that the guided-missile submarine USS Georgia, along with two
guided-missile cruisers, had just transited the Strait of Hormuz and
entering the Arabian Gulf. The announcement was highly unusual: the Navy,
normally tightlipped about the movements of its ships, stated publicly that
the Georgia could carry up to 154 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles.
In an interview with ABC News on December 22, McKenzie was asked about the
risk of an Iranian attack on US and allies in the region. "I do believe we
remain in a period of heightened risk," he said, even though he also
suggested that Iran did not want war with the United States.
A third flight of B-52s was dispatched to the Persian Gulf on December 30.
This time, CENTCOM quoted McKenzie directly: his intention was to "make
clear that we are ready and able to respond to any aggression directed at
Americans or our interests."
A "senior military officer" told Associated Press that U.S. intelligence had
supposedly detected "indications that advanced weaponry has been flowing
from Iran into Iraq recently and that Shiite militia leaders in Iraq may
have met with officers of Iran's Quds force." This was said to indicate
plans for possible rocket attacks against U.S. interests in Iraq in
connection with the one-year anniversary of the Soleimani killing. CNN
echoed the Pentagon claims, alleging that Iran had moved short-range
ballistic missiles into Iraq, and that Iraqi militias were planning "complex
attacks."
But a "senior defense official" who had been directly involved in the
discussions of those issues insisted to CNN that officials circulating such
reports were deliberately exaggerating the threat of an attack. The CNN
story strongly implied that acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller's
December 30 decision to bring the Nimitz back home was based on his belief
that McKenzie and his allies were hyping a potential Iranian-sponsored
attack to advance their command's interests.
Neither Associated Press nor CNN explained to readers that the additional
Iranian short-range missiles would have been been necessary precautions to
strengthen deterrence in light of the series of the provocative U.S. shows
of force involving B-52s and missile-carrying U.S. ships. Nor did they
mention explicit statements by Iran that revenge for the Soleimani killing
would be aimed not at U.S. troops but at the officials responsible for his
assassination.
In the end, Miller was forced to reverse his decision and keep the Nimitz in
the Middle East - a significant win for McKenzie. And although the
anniversary of the U.S. assassination of Soleimani came and went without
incident, yet another flight of B-52s was carried out on January 7, a bold
demonstration of McKenzie's bureaucratic victory over Miller.
The political-bureaucratic power struggle that played out in the final weeks
of the Trump administration suggests that McKenzie's power and interests are
likely to be a major influence on the Biden administration's Iran policy.
Still resisting the shift of military assets away from the Middle East,
McKenzie will have a strong motive to oppose and obstruct any effort at
easing tensions with Tehran. To achieve his aims, his ties with the military
services and media will be among the most useful weapons in his arsenal.
