I keep hearing Donald Trump shouting that Fake News is a threat to our
American Way of Life. But how can it be Fake News when the reports
are being withheld from the Media?
Carl Jarvis
On 11/8/18, Miriam Vieni <miriamvieni@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From Truthdig
Has Iraq Become Another 'Lesson Lost' Like Vietnam?
The U.S. Army / Flickr
This piece originally appeared on The American Conservative.
According to reports, the Army has delayed the publication of a 1,300-page
internal Iraq war study commissioned by General Ray Odierno in 2013. The
volume, which few in the public were even aware of, was an admirable
project. After all, the U.S. military famously ignored and jettisoned any
lessons after its defeat in Vietnam. Most of us would agree that simply
can't happen again.
So why the delay? Some fear the Army might be hesitant to publish a study
that takes its leadership to task for decisions critical to the execution,
and perhaps outcome, of the war. (Basically, while the Army says it wants
to
learn its lessons, it doesn't necessarily want to see them in black and
white.) One chief Army historian claimed it would "air" too much
institutional "dirty laundry."
Indeed, retired Colonel Frank Sobchack, a study team director, expressed
concern about the delay in the report's release, asserting "that the Army
was paralyzed with apprehension for the past two years over publishing it
leaves me disappointed with the institution to which I dedicated my adult
life."
Of course, there has been skepticism about the report itself, given the
commissioner of the project and the composition of the study team. Some
fear
the conclusions will skew towards a one-sided lionization of the 2007
"surge"-which General Odierno and his closest subordinates oversaw. In
fact,
reporting in The Wall Street Journal suggests that the report credits
Odierno and General Petraeus, who commanded all U.S. and coalition forces
in
Iraq at the time, for turning the war around by shifting to a theater-wide
counterinsurgency strategy (COIN).
These are all legitimate concerns. Indeed, this author has long sought to
debunk the flawed notion that Petraeus's famed "surge" achieved anything
more than a temporary pause in violence and political instability. Still,
the real problem with this report is that it completely ignores the utterly
flawed grand strategy that brought the U.S. military into Iraq in the first
place in favor of focusing on more minor tactical mistakes.
Let us review, then, some of the reported conclusions in the study and how
they're disjointed from the larger, strategic failures inherent to the
entire American military adventure in Iraq.
The report admits to the following shortfalls:
.More troops were needed to occupy the country and fight an expansive
insurgency. This was undoubtedly the case, but it fails to consider whether
America even had such troops available in its volunteer force, and whether
an all-hands-on-deck effort to pacify Iraq was the best strategic use of
its
limited military machine.
.The failure to deter Iran and Syria, which gave sanctuary and support to
Shiite and Sunni militants, respectively. True enough, but how
exactly-short
of an expanded regional war-could the U.S. have hoped to stop this? Iraq is
in Syria's and Iran's neighborhood, just as the Caribbean is in ours. How
could Washington not expect Syria and Iran to meddle so close to home?
.Coalition warfare wasn't successful: the deployment of allied troops had
political value but was "largely unsuccessful" because the allies didn't
send enough troops. This ignores the reasons why so few countries sent
substantial troops to our aid in Iraq. It was because they considered such
an invasion ill-advised, illegal, and, in many cases, immoral. Perhaps the
U.S. should have listened carefully to its long-standing friends.
.The failure to develop self-reliant Iraqi forces. Well, of course. But if
eight years (2003 to 2011) of training and funding a new Iraqi army wasn't
enough to make them self-sufficient, and if 17 years hasn't been enough to
do the same in Afghanistan, might not the entire theory of America's
ongoing
"advise & assist" missions need to be rethought?
.An ineffective detainee policy: the U.S. decided at the outset not to
treat
captured insurgents and militia fighters as prisoners of war and many Sunni
insurgents were returned to the battlefield. This ignores Guantanamo, and,
most likely, the national-level global detainee policy of the U.S. Perhaps
indefinite detention of suspected insurgents or "terrorists," without any
recourse to due-process, created more enemies than it imprisoned. Think Abu
Ghraib.
.Democracy doesn't necessarily bring stability: U.S. commanders believed
the
2005 Iraqi elections would have a "calming effect," but instead they
exacerbated ethnic and sectarian tensions. A more holistic analysis would
question the very capacity of a foreign military occupation force to impose
democracy in an ancient locale at war with itself.
There's also a personal connection here. The leader of the study team was
Colonel Joel Rayburn. At first glance, no one is more qualified. Rayburn is
brilliant and someone I hold in high esteem. He taught me British History
at
West Point, performed quite well on a popular TV trivia show, and wrote an
interesting book on Iraq. Then again, Colonel Rayburn was deeply involved
in
the planning and execution of the famed "surge," and is rather likely to
glorify a military campaign (one this author fought in) that ultimately
failed in its purpose-to stifle violence long enough to stabilize and form
an inclusive Iraqi government.
.In Search of the 'Short, Serious War' Unicorn
.15 Years in Iraq: A Shameful Anniversary
Sure, violence drastically, if temporarily, decreased, but that was mainly
due to a short-term alliance with former Sunni insurgents (many of whom had
American blood on their hands). In the end, all that the roughly 1,300 U.S.
troops killed during the surge achieved was the long-term entrenchment of a
Shiite chauvinist prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. His corrupt government
in
Baghdad alienated the very Sunnis once on America's payroll and caused a
new
outbreak of sectarian violence. Many of those Sunnis later allied with or
joined ISIS, seeing the group as their best protection. Looking back,
that's
far from an encouraging outcome for a "surge" in which so many American
servicemen were killed.
A truly expansive history (or study) of the Iraq war (perhaps best
commissioned by a government agency besides the military) would admit to
the
much broader failures of the U.S. adventure in Iraq. It would certainly
discuss the tactical and operational failures included in the current
report, but it would also focus on the scarcity of American grand strategy.
Such a study would question whether external military intervention is even
capable of reordering and stabilizing ancient societies. It would include
an
honest cost-benefit analysis and ask whether the proverbial juice was worth
the squeeze in Iraq. Did that war make America safer? Unlikely. Was it
necessary? Undoubtedly not. These are the true takeaways from what will
someday be remembered as one of America's great foreign policy debacles.
The safe bet is that little to none of this will be in the report, when-or
if-it ever sees the light of day. We shall see, of course, but this much is
certain: an entire generation of American troops dedicated the greater part
of the last 15 years of their lives to the war in Iraq. I left four
soldiers
and the remnants of my emotional health in Baghdad. Others suffered far
worse-notably average Iraqis. We deserve a comprehensive, honest, and
critical analysis of that debacle.
Whether we ever get one remains to be seen.
Maj. Danny Sjursen
Maj. Danny Sjursen is a U.S. Army officer and former history instructor at
West Point. He served tours with reconnaissance units in Iraq and
Afghanistan...
Maj. Danny Sjursen
