Donald Trump's Iran Humiliation
Donald Trump's Iran Humiliation
Carolyn Kaster / AP
Exactly 17 months have passed since President Donald Trump precipitously
withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, officially known as the Joint
Comprehensive Program of Action, or JCPOA. Two and a half months later, on
July 22, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech to a group
of Iranian expatriates at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, in Simi
Valley, California. "[T]he United States," Pompeo said, "is undertaking a
diplomatic and financial pressure campaign to cut off the funds that the
regime uses to enrich itself and support death and destruction." The crowd
launched into generous applause, after which Pompeo delivered his main
point. "We have an obligation to put maximum pressure on the regime's
ability to generate and move money, and we will do so."
The Trump administration, Pompeo stated, would reimpose sanctions on Iran's
banking and energy sectors. "[O]ur focus," he concluded, "is to work with
countries importing Iranian crude oil to get imports as close to zero as
possible by Nov. 4, [2018]. Zero."
The ostensible purpose of the "maximum pressure" campaign was to get Iran to
withdraw from the JCPOA and return to the negotiating table, where a new,
more restrictive agreement would be crafted that eliminated its nuclear
enrichment program, curtailed its ballistic missile program and reduced its
influence in the Persian Gulf. However, given Pompeo's embrace of the
regime-change mantra of the Iranian expat community-a sentiment he shared
with Trump's then-national security adviser John Bolton-the "maximum
pressure" campaign could only be interpreted as an act of economic warfare
against Iran, as prelude to an eventual military campaign designed to remove
the Shi'a theocracy that has ruled the country since assuming power in 1979.
Bolton himself emphasized this when he stated in November 2018 that "[i]t is
our intention to squeeze them very hard. As the British say: 'Squeeze them
until the pips squeak'."
In April 2019, the U.S. State Department announced it would not be extending
any waivers that it had granted to several of Iran's key oil importers in an
effort to ease the economic burden of being weaned off Iranian oil. "We are
fulfilling our promise to get Iran's oil exports to zero and deny the regime
the revenue it needs to fund terrorism and violent wars abroad," a State
Department fact sheet noted. The State Department was particularly concerned
about Iran's so-called "malign activities" in Lebanon in support of
Hezbollah, in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad, and in Yemen in
support of the Houthi rebels. The "maximum pressure" campaign was designed
to starve these movements of Iranian financial support, thereby hastening
the nation's demise.
For a year following Trump's May 8, 2018, exit from the JCPOA, Iran complied
with its obligations under that agreement, adhering to every restriction
while imploring the agreement's other parties to honor their commitments and
ignore the newly reimposed U.S. economic sanctions. This proved increasingly
difficult as the U.S. treated any nation or company that used the U.S.
banking system to facilitate a transaction with Iran in violation of its
terms. As a result, in May 2019, Iran began suspending its commitments under
the JCPOA, something it (rightfully) claimed was permitted under the terms
of the JCPOA in the case of noncompliance by a party to the agreement. (Iran
claimed, with justification, that the EU was in noncompliance by failing to
permit the unrestricted sale of Iranian oil to EU customers.) The U.S.
responded by dispatching two B-52 bombers and an aircraft carrier
battlegroup to the region, an action Bolton claimed was intended to "send a
clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on
United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with
unrelenting force." By all appearances, it looked as if the U.S. campaign of
"maximum pressure" was about to enter its final phase.
This is where the narrative gets interesting. Rather than retreat in the
face of U.S. military pressure, Iran doubled down. Months before, in
December 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had warned that "America
should know that we are selling our oil and will continue to sell our oil
and they are not able to stop our oil exports. If one day they want to
prevent the export of Iran's oil, then no oil will be exported from the
Persian Gulf." At the time, the Trump administration saw Rouhani's statement
as empty bluster. It wasn't.
On May 12, 2019, four oil tankers, including two belonging to the National
Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia, were attacked off the coast of the United
Arab Emirates, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. While no one claimed
responsibility for the attacks, the U.S. was quick to blame Iran, which
denied all responsibility. Oil prices jumped nearly 3% as a result. On June
13, two additional oil tankers were attacked while transiting the Strait of
Hormuz; the U.S. claimed the vessels were attacked using limpet mines, while
the crews claimed they were struck by projectiles. Again, the U.S. blamed
Iran, and the Iranians denied all responsibility. Oil prices surged.
Whether or not Iran was involved, these attacks sent a clear signal to the
oil-consuming world- transit through the Strait of Hormuz, through which
some 18.5 million barrels a day of crude and refined products pass,
representing 20% of all oil produced globally, was not guaranteed. This
point was reinforced when, on June 20, Iran shot down a U.S. Global Hawk
drone it claimed had violated its airspace. The loss of the $130-million
reconnaissance aircraft put the U.S. on war footing, with Bolton advocating
a retaliatory air strike against Iran's air defenses and nuclear
installations. The Pentagon cautioned Trump that any U.S. attack would
likely result in a massive Iranian retaliation that would threaten the oil
production infrastructure of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the
other Gulf Arab states. Trump opted not to attack, avoiding a wider war, but
in doing so left open the question as to the viability of U.S. military
deterrence posture in the Persian Gulf. This turned out to be precisely the
answer Iran was looking for.
Saudi Arabia had always been a major factor in the "maximum pressure"
campaign against Iran. One of the foundational requirements for a successful
U.S. effort targeting Iranian oil sales was for oil markets to remain well
supplied and oil inventory levels to remain consistently strong. "We have
commitments from oil-producing countries," the State Department noted in
April 2019, "including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, to increase oil production to offset reductions in Iranian oil
exports." On June 20, in the midst of the crisis over the downing of the
U.S. drone, the special representative for Iran, Brian Hook, visited Saudi
Arabia to discuss next steps. "We affirmed the Kingdom's support for the
United States maximum pressure campaign on Iran," the Saudi Vice Minister of
Defense, Khalid bin Salman, tweeted after the talks concluded, "which came
as a result of continuing Iranian hostility and terrorism, and discussed the
latest Iranian attacks on the Kingdom. Also discussed with the United States
Special Representative for Iran the dangerous role that the Iranian regime
plays in Yemen, where it neglects the humanitarian needs of the Yemeni
people in favor of using the country as the main launchpad for its regional
terrorism."
The ongoing war between Saudi Arabia and Houthi rebels in Yemen has been a
sore point between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, especially in the aftermath of
the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, by henchmen operating
under the orders of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Sultan. The humanitarian
crisis that has befallen Yemen as a result of the invasion in 2015 has
caught the attention of a U.S. Congress no longer willing to turn a blind
eye to Saudi atrocities. In March 2019, Congress voted to suspend all U.S.
military aid to Saudi Arabia's war effort in Yemen. While the measure was
vetoed by Trump, the vote was a stinging rebuke to the Saudis, who had taken
continuous and unobstructed U.S. military aid as a given.
But rhetoric alone does not win the day. The problem for the United States
has been that its campaign of "maximum pressure" has had zero impact on
Iran's so-called "malign activities" in the region. In July 2019, Iran test
fired a ballistic missile with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers. A
defiant Iranian spokesperson tweeted that "Iran's missiles are absolutely
and under no condition negotiable with anyone or any country, period."
The Iranian missile test came amid a growing crisis between Iran and the
United Kingdom over the tit-for-tat seizure of oil tankers. In early July,
British Royal Marines boarded and took control of the Iranian oil tanker
Grace 1, claiming that its load of oil was destined for Syria in violation
of EU sanctions. Iran responded by boarding and seizing the British oil
tanker, Stena Impero, as it navigated the Strait of Hormuz.
Complicating matters further was Iran's announcement in early July that it
was suspending another JCPOA-imposed limitation on its nuclear program,
breaching the 3.67% cap on the level of uranium enrichment allowed under the
agreement. As the world debated Iran's suspension of JCPOA commitments, its
ongoing tanker war with the U.K., and its testing of ballistic missiles,
another front was opening that would test the U.S. "maximum pressure"
campaign like no other.
The first rumblings of trouble came in May 2019, when the Saudis reported
that Houthi drones operating out of Yemen had struck a strategic oil
pipeline and two oil pumping stations, causing minor damage. "This is a
message to Saudi Arabia: Stop your aggression," a Houthi spokesman declared
afterward. "Our goal is to respond to the crimes they are committing every
day against the Yemeni people."
In August, as if to prove the May attacks were not a fluke, the Houthi
launched an even larger attack against the Shaybah natural gas liquification
facility, some 1,000 kilometers from the border with Yemen, using 10 drones.
The attack, which caused minor damage, was condemned by Saudi Arabia and its
allies, including the U.S. A Houthi spokesman promised "fiercer and larger
attacks" against Saudi Arabia if it continued its aggression in Yemen. Left
unanswered was how the Houthi were able to penetrate Saudi Arabian air
defenses and strike critical oil-related infrastructure.
The Houthi attacks of the Shaybah facility were lost in a news cycle
increasingly dominated by evidence of the "maximum pressure" campaign's
imminent collapse. The first sign of failure was the decision by the British
to release the Grace 1, despite efforts by the U.S. to execute a warrant for
arrest en rem. The British defiance of the U.S. was part of an overall
posture of resentment on the part of Europe over U.S. sanctions against Iran
and the resulting unraveling of the JCPOA. The growing divide between the
U.S. and Europe was put on full display when French President Emmanuel
Macron invited Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif to attend the G-7
summit in Biarritz, France, despite having recently been singled out for
sanctions by the U.S. government. While no agreement was forthcoming, the
fact that Iran was talking with its European counterparts meant that
negotiation, and not confrontation, was the preferred path for America's EU
partners.
This divide became even more apparent in September when the Iranians
followed through on their promise to continue to withdraw from the terms of
the JCPOA. While stressing that all of its actions were reversible the
moment Europe came into compliance with the deal and started defying U.S.
sanctions, these actions were particularly eye-opening as Iran began
installing advanced centrifuges capable of more efficient uranium
enrichment, closing the one-year "breakout" period that served as the
foundation for the nuclear pact. (The "breakout" period is defined by the
amount of time Iran would need to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for
the production of a single nuclear weapon; if Iran put the new centrifuges
into operation, it would shrink the "breakout window" to a matter of months,
which had previously been a red line for the U.S.)
The Iranian action prompted a heated debate within the Trump administration
as to how best to respond. Trump had always envisioned himself as a
dealmaker and was looking for any opening to bring Iran back to the
negotiating table so he could produce a new nuclear agreement. Iran had made
it clear there could be no negotiations as long as the U.S. maintained its
"maximum pressure" campaign. Macron and the other European leaders were
lobbying Trump to come up with some sort of relief formula that could be
used to bring Iran back into full compliance with the JCPOA. Trump was
leaning toward sanctions relief, believing it might lead to a meeting
between him and Iranian leader Rouhani during the United Nations General
Assembly debate later that month. Bolton strenuously objected. On September
11, Trump fired Bolton on social media, claiming he "disagreed strongly with
many of his suggestions."
Iran had one more card to play. Three days after Bolton's dismissal, the
Houthi followed up on their threat to continue attacking Saudi oil
infrastructure with a bold strike on two Saudi oil processing facilities,
inflicting massive damage that knocked out 50% of Saudi Arabia's oil
production capacity, or some 6% of global oil supplies. Saudi oil production
was the lynchpin to the "maximum pressure" campaign; without it, there was
no means of offsetting the loss of Iranian oil production brought on by
sanctions. Moreover, the ease with which the Houthi had destroyed Saudi oil
production infrastructure highlighted the future of all Gulf Arab oil
production should there be a general war with Iran. In one fell swoop, Iran,
through its Houthi proxies, had laid bare the naked truth about the
U.S-Saudi defense relationship: There was literally nothing the U.S. could
do, despite investing hundreds of billions of dollars into the Saudi
military, and deploying hundreds of billions of dollars more in terms of
U.S. military forces into the region, to protect the life's blood of the
Saudi Kingdom-oil. The U.S. decision to deploy a single Patriot
surface-to-air missile battery and three air defense radars to protect Saudi
oil fields from further attack was nothing more than a face-saving measure;
while both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for the attack, no one
could pinpoint where the attack originated from, meaning they had no idea
how to defend themselves against any future incursion.
The Houthi drone attack proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the
U.S. "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran. Saudi Arabia, recognizing the
precarious position it has found itself in, has greenlighted talks with Iran
to resolve their regional differences. Despite an abortive effort to finesse
a meeting between Trump and Rouhani at the U.N. General Assembly, both the
U.S. and Iran appear prepared to engage in negotiations once Iran's
conditions regarding the lifting of sanctions are met, something the EU
strongly supports. If Trump's goal in implementing the "maximum pressure"
campaign was to eventually bring Iran to the negotiating table, then he may
very well have succeeded. But history will show that it was Iran that set
the conditions that brought the U.S. onboard, and not the other way around.
In May 2018, the myth of American military deterrence in defense of Saudi
Arabia was still alive; today it lies shattered amidst the ruins of the
destroyed Saudi oil facilities. Seen in this light, the collapse of the U.S.
campaign of "maximum pressure" can only be interpreted as a strategic
victory for Iran, and a decisive defeat for the United States.
Scott Ritter
Contributor
Scott Ritter spent more than a dozen years in the intelligence field,
beginning in 1985 as a ground intelligence officer with the US Marine Corps,
where he served with the Marine Corps component of the Rapid.
