Here's Anscombe's version of W's argument for solipsism (Introduction at 167): The limits of my language mean the limits of my world; but all languages have one and the same logic, and its limits are those of the world; therefore the limits of my world and of the world are one and the same; therefore the world is my world. --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <calhorn@...> wrote: > > > 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. > > 5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its > limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, > but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were > excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it > would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for > only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. > We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot > say either. > > 5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there > is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it > cannot be said , but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this > is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language > which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. > > 5.621 The world and life are one. > > 5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm). > > 5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains > ideas. If I wrote a book called The World as l found it, I should have > to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were > subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of > isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense > there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book. > > 5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of > the world. > > 5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will > say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. > But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field > allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. > > 5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this. > > 5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is > at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is. > Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a > priori order of things. > > 5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are > followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of > solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the > reality co-ordinated with it. > > 5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about > the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into > philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical > self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with > which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit > of the world--not a part of it. > > > > > I probably couldn't make a terribly good case for this, but I have the > strong sense that it is W's assurance that the form of the world must > match the form of his thinking that produces the sense for him that he > is somehow locked into his private world. Just as Descartes' search for > absolute certainty produces no escape from dreams or evil demons without > the help of a Deity, W's confidence about what is "shown" by the > structure of thought/language lands him in the only sort of world where > certainty can have provenance. > > > > > > IMHO, it takes a willingness to accept fallibalism to escape the danger > of solipsism here (unless we can get a benevolent and omnipotent God to > come to our rescue). It seems to me that that is where the solid (but > maybe not so brilliant?) American philosophers of the period ought to > have been looked at more charitably by the Brits. James, Pierce, R.W. > Sellars, even maybe Santayana were much more comfortable living without > even the sort of mystical rationalism that W was espousing at the time. > And, I think that W eventually came to terms with this himself as he > attacked the notion of private languages with more and more force, > starting in the 30s. > > > I mean, if we can only have gotten the meaning of such terms as "rock" > and "red" from others, while we might be wrong about any particular > attribution, the danger of solipsism seems to fade away. > > > > > Walto >