W. says that the "internal properties" by some object can't really be expressed in a proposition: 4.124 The holding of an internal property of a possible state of things will not be expressed through a proposition, but rather it expresses itself in the proposition that presents the state of things, through an internal property of this proposition. It would be equally senseless to ascribe a formal property to a proposition as to deny it. 4.1241 One cannot distinguish forms from each other by saying that the one has this but the other has that property; because this presupposes that it makes sense to assert either property of either form. 4.125 The existence of an internal relation between possible states of things expresses itself linguistically through an internal relation between the propositions that present them. But note this slightly earlier prop.: 4.123 A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it. (This blue color and that stand in the internal relation of lighter and darker eo ipso. It is unthinkable that this pair of objects not stand in this relation.) (Here the shifting use of the word "object" corresponds to the shifting use of the words "property" and "relation.") Mcginn writes about this, "In the later philosophy, it is clear that W thinks that the colour-wheel is itself a part of the symbolism, in the sense that the ordered colour samples of the colour-wheel constitute an instrument of our language, by means of which the logical order of our colour concepts is presented. However, it is not clear that he held this view at the time of writing the Tractatus, where he sems to suggest that the logical order of colour-space will be revealed through the logical analysis of colour terms." What I wonder is how we can SAY (as W does above) that "This blue color and that stand in the internal relation of lighter and darker." For isn't that just the sort of thing that he immediately thereafter tells us we CAN'T say? Furthermore, it is important to note that unless we construe particular instantiations of colors as objects, it will not be the case that it is unthinkable that THIS (which is darker than THAT) NOT be darker than THAT. That is, though this thing is a darker color than that thing, nobody would claim that it MUST be so, unless this thing is essentially of that color. Note, though, that if we hold that some instantiation of a particular color is itself an object, we will then be debarred from saying that that "thing" is (in the sense of "exemplifies") red. Because, of course, the thing would then instead be, identical to some particular shade of red. If those are the sorts of things that W wants to take as "atomic objects" the range of predicates that can apply to them will thus be quite restricted. I intend to go back to what objects are in my next post, concentrating on Griffin's commentary. Walto