Hi Sean, Individuals do not have ideosyncratic grammars but if they do not have individual grammars your grandmother-scientist example would not be possible. It is not nilly-willy but how would a sensible scientist mix the discourse of grandmother with his own ? The scientist must share at least the 'we-scientist' grammar and the 'grandmom-and-I' grammar. It is not poor thinking -btw that is an unnoted arrogance- for we do not have any proof except the words of you and Wittgenstein that this is the true state of affairs in metaphysical twists and turns. What is the role of language for Wittgensteins grammar itself ? Is it yet another 'verhexung' of language of the mind. Unpuzzeling the puzzle is not a proof that the puzzle did not exist. It can also be perceived as another view of the puzzle. If not then there is the necessity of metaphysics and it becomes quite difficult to follow the path of grammar crossing the barrier of itself when that barrier as such is also 'ein verhexung' of the mind. PI is fascinating as a method but how to avoid metaphysical implications if it was the aim to get rid of the metaphysical questions and puzzles in the first place? What have we gained? Han On 21 June 2011 23:09, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Han: > > It's common to misunderstand the point I make about sense and > grammar. Individuals don't have grammars like they have, say, personal items > (cards, toys). And they don't have a right to what they want them to be. > Accordingly, the position I present isn't willy-nilly. It isn't, "Each > person gets to state whatever position they want." > > Grammar is the way groups of ideas work for a langauage community (what the > ideas do). In poor thinking, grammar can be "knotted;" it can be simplistic > or unrefined. We dismiss people's grammars all the time when they are not > helpful. (See Wittgenstein's reaction to Moore in On Certainty). The job of > anyone who receives a proposition from another is to: (a) catch the sense > and grammar of the person, and not simply superimpose another; and (b) see > whether the same is "knotted" or problematic in some way. > > Let's say one day a scientist has a discussion with his grandmother. The > grandmother says, "the desk is still." The scientists says, "Wrong, the > particles are moving." This would seem like a genuine dispute, but it is > not. The lay sense of "motion" works perfectly fine for grandmother's point. > She isn't "incorrect." And so, we have two sense of "motion" -- two > grammars? -- that talk past one another. > > So it is with "thinking." If you were to say "my toaster thinks," I would > need to know what you mean before I could even engage you. You might be: (a) > crazy; (b) artistic; (c) referring to the fact that you just bought > something in the store called a "smart machine" (an expression that has > already entered our lexicon). So, until I am plugged into your grammar and > sense, I have no basis for saying anything about it. > > I don't know if this is at all helpful. But all I wanted to do was clear up > any misunderstanding that I hold views that say "anything goes." To the > contrary, my views are not like that at all. > > Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. > > [spoiler]Assistant Professor > Wright State University > Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org > SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx > Wittgenstein Discussion: > http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs[/spoiler] > > >