Klagge notes that for Wittgenstein the question of the correspondence between mind and brain is bound up with another theme, that of "seed/plant correspondence". The analogy is broached in Wittgenstein 1980, §903: No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes . . . The case would be like the following -- certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it was produced -- but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it (Quoted on p. 98). He is not so much trying to account for Wittgenstein's ideas from his life, but rather to explain ourdifficulty understanding him from the relation between his life and ours, i.e., as one might put it, the life of the average Western intellectual of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. If there is a shortcoming here, it is to be laid at least as much at our door as at Wittgenstein's. This seems to me to be a central strand of Klagge's argument. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011-04-14 : View this Review Online : View Other NDPR Reviews James C. Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile, MIT Press, 2011, 249pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780262015349. sekhar