[Wittrs] Re: What constitutes "Analytic Philosophy"?
- From: kirby urner <kirby.urner@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2011 09:59:22 -0700
On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:48 PM, John Phillip DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> And what reasons have you for defining it as you do?
>
> This might seem to be an invitation to pointless squabbling over
> terminology, but my goal is rather to elicit various perspectives so
> that communication on these matters might be facilitated.
>
Here's some perspective from my angle.
You are correct that the "Analytic Philosophy" meme seems to thrive
in Anglophone waters. There's the appeal of some core logic, a
Principia, a mix of Newton, Darwin and Russell by some reckonings,
in being empirically sophisticated (well versed in statistics) but also
quite aware of the a priori rules of the game, such as there might
be some.
Whereas someone like Hesse wrote *about* a 'Glass Bead Game',
it seemed the Logicians might actually be *playing* one. Yes,
that's a crude dichotomy, but there's this sense in which
Analytic Philosophers are engaged in some calculus, a kind of
coin of the realm. At the moment, a rather small clique seems
to predominate in some circles, but then philosophy is hardly a
"settled discipline" and schools of thought come and go.
The reason W is pushed to "the border" of AnalyticVille, is
cast almost as an outlaw (maybe a Zorro character with a
secret private language identity?), has to do with the widespread
lore that he'd been mistaken for and embraced by Logical
Positivists once the Tractatus hit the stands (a quaint image).
In the journalistic spectrum, Logical Positivism might as well
be Analytic Philosophy what's the difference? What unites
them, in this public eye, is a reliance on some notation of an
extraordinary nature.
What I'm postulating in my own tellings is that the feed forward
through Frege and Russell was in the direction of von Neumann
and Turing, Ada and Grace Hopper. Philosophy was surging
in the direction of computer languages, with computer science
emerging as somewhat proud and profitable. I think behind
that CS mask you'll find some of tomorrow's (and today's) most
celebrated philosophers: Donald Knuth, Richard Stallman,
Seymour Papert, Nicholas Negroponte. These are a cast of
"hands on" philosopher who helped advance the technology,
in software, hardware, and "living machines" (architectural
concepts). That's far from the usual telling however. You don't
join an Anglophone university philosophy department expecting
to read manifestos about GNU, or the book 'BuckyWorks'
(by J. Baldwin). You don't learn that Larry Wall and Guido
van Rossum were among the great Logicians of our world
cultures. That's a whole different set of publishers and
conferences. Yet if there's a logicians guild (like of actors
and screenwriters), I'd say today its a circus of geeks more
than of ivory towerite philosophy nerds who've never heard of
(or developed with) Mercurial.
Anyway, these are just the usual Nietzschean power issues,
issues of "turf", a perpetual focus of ethnography. Lots of stories
to follow, lots of soaps. There's no rush to "fix" anything, as
nature takes its course. Wittgenstein is a help, when it comes
to turning the tide (or describing the tide's turning).
> For example, in some quarters, "Analytic Philosophy" seems to be used
> derisively, even pejoratively, and at any rate as something to be
> contrasted with Wittgensteinian philosophy. I wonder how much this has
> to do with the criticism some self-identified "Analytic Philosophers"
> have of Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian thought.
>
I'd go even further and say the attitude even tends toward the downright
sneering. Some Wittgensteinian's seem to have no problem heaping
scorn right where you'd think they'd be least likely to soil their own
nest. Consider 'Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics' for
crying out loud. How is that not an Analytic work, and I'm talking
"in the Anglophone tradition" not Analytic ala the Francophone Lacan,
some brand of psycho Analysis (more Continental in origin, first spreading
in North America through Adler, and nowadays through even our little
Jungian Society circle right here in Portland).
> It does seem peculiar that the sister group of the "Analytic Philosophy"
> group on Yahoo!, a group known as "Analytic-borders", should have been
> dominated by discussions of Wittgenstein. Is Wittgenstein really on the
> "borders" of Analytic Philosophy? Is he not, rather, a central figure?
>
> The Analytic Philosophy group lists as canonical (or at any rate,
> representative) figures in Analytic Philosophy, the following names:
> "Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Austin, and Quine". Such
> a pantheon seems well-justified and most likely familiar to students of
> the subject. How then is Wittgenstein on the "borders", while at the
> same time regarded as a representative figure?
>
Wittgenstein is being pulled forward in various directions. The
inertia behind say the Norman O. Brown stuff is not negligible. We
have a lot of California personalities and institutions, some of whom
I've been writing about for this list.
We've got Wittgenstein biographer Bartely III doing a bio of Erhard,
Kaufmann a positive review, the triangle with Heidegger. Then you
get Wittgenstein's student Donald 'King of Infinite Space' Coxeter,
future geometer (University of Toronto). The latter connects us to
Arthur Loeb, M.C. Escher, and a host of new characters. What
is philosophy without its Polyhedrons, its Platonic Five etc.?
When do we get back to those?
Hey, in some tellings, there was never a divorce. The loyalty to
geometric reasoning and analytic techniques like Fermat's and
Descartes' simply prefigures the kind of thing we got later with
some of those talented Anglos in more northern climes (not
forgetting the Scots or any particular subgroup, the Irish and so
on). The Celtic tradition comes through pretty strongly, including
in American Transcendentalism.
> Of course, anyone who has studied the history of the subject in the last
> half century or so is well-acquainted with the fact that Wittgenstein is
> frequently lauded in the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy, but
> that many of his views - and certainly his methodological strictures -
> are not so favored. So this seemingly contradictory attitude on Yahoo!
> Groups does not reflect any capriciousness among the group owners and
> members: it reflects a much more widespread phenomenon in the world at
> large.
>
Lets just say the so-called West is somewhat schizophrenic about the
guy. We shouldn't over-estimate some average psyche, a statistical norm,
as if it should be some pinnacle of consistency. Wittgenstein made waves,
and many are still uncertain as to how their fortunes may have been
impacted.
Even to this day, there's a lot of attention to "spin control", and to getting
his influence "inside a box" to some degree. The master storytellers are
right in the midst of hammering out a shape and perspective, in part
so we might "just get on with it" as they say in Hollywood. The show
must go on.
> Still, to regard "Analytic Philosophy", per se, as something
> antithetical to Wittgensteinian philosophy, seems odd indeed.
> Certainly, there are particular philosophical approaches that fall under
> that rubric with which Wittgenstein would take issue. And more still
> with which he likely would take no interest at all. (No doubt the
> attitude would be mutual in many cases.) But "Analytic Philosophy" is
> not a monolith. And any history of the subject will feature
> Wittgenstein. Prominently.
>
> Frankly, I think one concedes too much in treating Wittgenstein as the
> antithesis of Analytic Philosophy.
>
Me too, in part because I think the term "Analytic Philosophy" is not
well defined enough to hold its own. Computer science is moving the
discussion in so many dimensions and it's hard to see how the practice
of philosophy can afford to lag so far behind. The ethical front line is in
places like software patents and intellectual property more generally.
These are some of the "grown up " questions that could be benefiting
from more focus from the best minds. If "analytic philosophy" means
"we don't think about such questions", then which is more likely to
fade from relevance, these pressing questions, or that tiny clique of
publishers and educators who foment their specific brew? I appreciate
the positive power of feedback loops, but there's a maximum as well
as minimum to most phenomena.
The anthropology department has been showing some backbone
lately, again over ethical questions. The medical profession is also
funding its ethicists. An alliance between medical science and
engineering may be strong enough to generate its own philosophies
almost ab initio, to the point of shared life styles and business
practices (the sense in which Pragmatisms often appear, though
also Fascisms). Some philosophies (pejoratively called ideologies)
are about making those trains run on time -- which means you need
trains in the first place.
> If I were discussing philosophy with someone familiar with the subject,
> but not knowing their particular interests and background, my starting
> assumption would be that "Analytic Philosophy" meant something like,
> "contemporary Anglo-American or Anglophone philosophy", "Philosophy
> taking its lead from the tradition started by Russell and Moore - or
> perhaps Frege - and including Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language
> Philosophy", or something of that sort. More to the point, I would be
> guided by context: were they drawing a contrast with "Continental"
> philosophy? With the ancient Greeks? With modern figures like
> Descartes, Locke, Hume, or Kant?
>
Hey, they might not know what they're talking about in that much
detail. They're familiar with the subject, they read the New Yorker,
they can hold their own in high society banter. You're right to
mention Logical Positivism (this hasn't been about some disagreement
we might have had), and Ordinary Language philosophy.
However, I think a lot of the geography has changed. We had
Thomas Kuhn and 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'. We
had Anglophone philosophy in parody and in plays. Wittgenstein
might associate with Monty Python more than with someone like
Kant. Walter Kaufmann liked Woody Allen movies. We had
'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance'. What Analytic
Philosophers did is studiously *not* write about their ethnographic
context all that much. Rorty did, acknowledged (and defended)
ethnocentrism. Some philosophers were helping us get ready
for more of the "globalization" that's been so traumatic.
"Internationalization" seemed easy by comparison.
> In any case, that's the sort of rough and ready usage I would start
> from. And in many cases, that would be perfectly adequate. Still, I am
> interested in knowing what further expectations and assumptions attend
> to the label "Analytic Philosophy" among various readers of these
> boards.
>
I'm not expecting much wonderful to some from Analytic Philosophy.
I think Anglophone philosophy is dangerously anemic and needs
infusions, perhaps of nettles, folk lore, not sure what all. The diet
has been weakening and the resulting behavior has been somewhat
out of control. Existentialism has made a come back, through movies
like 'Jarhead' and 'Hurt Locker' (both war movies set in the Persian
Gulf region). Philosophies that deal with recent history have the edge.
Kripke talks about Nixon a lot, so maybe there's a bridge there.
> When one looks at the wide range of views among philosophers identified
> as "Analytic", the term starts to seem quite vague. Not much seems to
> unite them. The descriptive use elaborated above accommodates all of
> that but at times I am inclined to use the term more prescriptively.
>
What I'd like to see is how the Analytic Philosophers plan to jump
start their campaign to regain relevance and credibility. I'm not talking
about Wittgenstein or Russell. Their relevance seems secure, thanks
to publications such as 'Logicomix' among others. Bold stances on
ethical issues get focus.
Sure, one can sniff these guys are "grandstanding" or "posturing" or
"self promoting". Like TV and radio pundits? Meaning we should leave
the media to our betters? Why be so patronizing?
As I've been clear about: I'm into campaigning and I believe philosophies
have the right, nay the duty, to engage in same, without apology if need
be, though I'm not saying to be needlessly impolite. I'd like our network
of schools to host many a workshop for diplomats (a kind of anthropologist,
and easier if you're philanthropic, not a misanthrope). Lots of
details already
in the storyboards, right down to the electric ATVs and sensor monitoring
responsibilities (eco-monitoring is big business these days, given all the
radiotoxins, other poisons you need to know about).
> By my reckoning, Analytic Philosophy is a response both to Kantianism
> and the autonomy of the sciences, with the problematizing of metaphysics
> and suspicion of the existence of such a thing as "philosophical
> knowledge" and to the excesses of the Idealism which followed. This
> response regards philosophy as engaged, not in the discovery of truths
> (empirical matters referred to the various sciences), but in
> clarification, in the analysis and explication of concepts and their
> relationships. The idea of conceptual analysis, interpreted and applied
> variously, unites those reckoned to be "Analytic Philosophers" in the
> first half of the last century.
>
I think ethnographers are better trained for this work, for the most
part. However, thanks to Wittgenstein, the bridge from philosophy
to anthropology is pretty strong.
Between his birth and death days, I inherited like 45 Wittgenstein
books for my collection. I have this art deco set of shelves... Here,
let me link to some pictures:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/5668211717/in/photostream/
(Alex bringing W books)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/5668782312/in/photostream/
(box of W books)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4015630210/in/photostream/
(the shelves, now holding books, unlike in this picture)
> Where some now call "Post-Analytic" those philosophers who have sought a
> rapprochement and dialog with the "Continental" philosophers, I am
> revisionist in that I would regard as "Post-Analytic" much of Anglophone
> philosophy since Quine. The naturalistic turn is a clear departure from
> the idea that philosophy and science are quite distinct. Further
> developments, including the revival of metaphysics in Kripke, Lewis, and
> others, further depart from (classical) Analytic Philosophy.
>
Out here on the Pacific Rim, we're more Asiatic. All that Anglo-Continental
jazz sounds kinda East Coast, which out here sounds kinda "has been". Like,
we're so over that already (valley girl smile).
> This is a minority view, albeit one shared by some Wittgenstein
> scholars, such as Peter Hacker and (sometime contributor to Internet
> discussions of Wittgenstein) TP Uschanov, and I would not insist upon it
> if it got in the way of more substantive issues. At present, the
> current usage is fairly entrenched anyway. But this revisionist view
> does point to what is similar among the diverse figures of (early)
> Analytic Philosophy and how different (Post-)Analytic Philosophy has
> become.
>
> Where my own revisionism runs even deeper is in going further back. I
> see Analytic Philosophy's true father as Bolzano. His work was so
> thoroughly modern in its approach and anticipated so many concerns that
> would become central to Analytic Philosophy, that I think it difficult
> to underestimate his genius.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Bolzano
>
I've been crossing paths with him remotely in recent postings here regarding
gestalt psychology. Brentano and Bolzano are very different people, but
Gilbert Ryle, among others, connected them, as Austrian Realists.
http://ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9780511524110&cid=CBO9780511524110A012
> Peirce to is an important precursor, but Pragmatism has long been seen
> as closely connected with Analytic Philosophy.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce
>
Not necessarily completely on board though. Dr. Susan Haack was through
here recently, expressing some skepticism that Analytic Philosophy would
be taking us anywhere. She didn't seem defensive, as if its demise would
somehow put her out of a job. Others, it might.
> Finally, though Phenomenology (and the thought of those influenced by
> Brentano) has long been regarded as decisively on the other side of the
> "Analytic"/"Continental" dichotomy, I think the similarities between
> much of Phenomenology and early Analytic Philosophy are too easily
> overlooked. (What Heidegger and others did with Phenomenology no doubt
> played a decisive role in this divorce.)
>
Back to my Asiatic perch, I'm not sure we all need to wait around for
these Europhiles to put their Humpty Dumpty back together again. There's
work that needs doing and it's not a given that every cast of self-appointed
will get to ride the crest of a next wave. Not that I have anything against
Europe. I just think we might want to get out of the rut of just these
few narratives. Too much history is being bypassed, leaving too many
resource-starved. Academic philosophy in general has been rather
ungenerous lately, to put it mildly. Too narrowing (or "converging" maybe,
but to what of relevance? Is philosophy ending any wars? At least that's
a good question to be asking.).
> Frege's exchanges with the early Husserl and the fact that Husserl went
> on from those debates to oppose Logicism with arguments similar to
> Frege's and with some of his own should be noted. Brentano's influence
> on Meinong and the role of Meinong in Russell's "On Denoting" should be
> remembered. So too should Ryle's interest in the Phenomenologists. And
> Wittgenstein's interest in Phenomenology, most notably during his
> transitional period of the early 1930s but even in remarks written near
> the end of his life, concerning color concepts.
>
This is more of that Bolzano - Brentano connection, which branches off
into gestalt psychology and 'Philosophical Investigations' Part 2 especially.
But woven throughout.
The notion of meaning cannot be separated from these sudden flips or
gradual recastings of a sensory vista. One learns how to read those
X-rays and MRIs, how to really listen to this or that music (or other
rhythmic encoding of stored knowledge).
> In fact, a good deal of Wittgensteinian philosophical psychology,
> particularly on the subject of Intentionality, can be profitably read as
> being addressed to the Phenomenologists.
>
Or could be read as having arisen from this tradition, with psychology
having more staying power than "phenomenology" could manage (too
close to "phrenology" in the public mind?). Even "ontology" is doing
better.
In W's case, his writings often seem addressed to an audience that
hadn't emerged at the time of his writing. He's one of those alienated
thinkers, in solitary confinement in one sense, but with freedom to
roam in another.
> As well, the influence of Brentano on Twardowski and the Warsaw-Lvov
> school of Polish logicians (fellow travellers of the Vienna Circle, and
> the background of such important figures as Tarski) should be noted.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_Brentano
>
OK, you're making a lot of the same connections, as I was doing here:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/WittrsAMR/message/4247
(see Notes -- yeah, I spelled Brentano wrong)
> The "rough and ready" approach to defining "Analytic Philosophy" -
> especially when the contrast is being made with "Continental" philosophy
> - will tend to emphasize its Anglophone or Anglo-American character.
> But this neglects the extent to which so much of the origins are in
> Central Europe. Wittgenstein, though he taught at Cambridge, still
> sepnt much of his life in Austria. Many of the great Analytics fled
> Hitler and settled at schools in the US and Britain, but the
> intellectual milieu in which they developed was decidedly European. And
> the concerns of the Phenomenologists, the Gestalt psychologists, and
> others influenced by Brentano were widely discussed among them.
>
> Influences aside, it is noteworthy as well that Phenomenology is also a
> form of conceptual analysis, also suspicious of metaphysics, also
> troubled by the role of philosophy vis-a-vis modern science. In fact,
> when one sets aside some of the methodological pretenses, one discovers
> in many of the Phenomenologists some superb examples of concept analysis
> that might just as well have been the outcome of close examination of
> meaning and use.
>
> Thomasson does an admirable job (though I disagree on some points) in
> drawing out many of the connections between Phenomenology and Anlytic
> Philosophy.
>
> http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBoQFjAA&url=http%
> 3A%2F%2Fconsciousness.anu.edu.au%2Fthomasson%2FPhenomenology%2520and%
> 2520Analytic%2520Philosophy.doc&rct=j&q=thomasson%
> 20phenomenology&ei=Qxa6TenDNcK2tweaubzeBA&usg=AFQjCNFSWXH97P2v_GhO9Wi7SA6RoIKGAA&cad=rja
>
> It is my suspicion that future historians of philosophy, no longer tied
> to the contrasts of "Analytic" and "Continental" philosophy, will come
> to see these trends as more similar than dissimilar and as rooted in
> shared concerns and similar answers to the status of philosophy as a
> field of genuine inquiry.
>
I think overspecialization was not sufficiently appreciated as a
threat to wholistic thought. Restoring more comprehensiveness was a
late 20th century focus of thinkers newly equipped with new
architectures plus the Internet, as well as television. James Burke
comes to mind (the Day the Universe Changed) and Kenneth Clark.
> Anyway, rather than trying to advocate for my own, admittedly
> revisionist view, my main purpose here is to provoke thought and inspire
> others to share their own conceptions of Philosophy generally and of
> Analytic Philosophy in particular.
>
Philosophy is a much bigger ocean than the Analytic tide pools, with
still a few creatures of interest as you suggest, at least where the
latest leak or spill didn't get to 'em (they were mostly Anglophone,
like BP).
Kirby
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