Stuart writes: "You miss the point -- again. The issue is what does it take to believe that understanding cannot be constituted by a more robust system consisting of the same elements as are found in the CR?" Depends. Is it a S/H system or not? Are you ever going to make this distinction or not? "Searle's claim that "syntax does not constitute and is not sufficient for semantics" depends on a belief that for syntax to do either of those two things, semantics (understanding) MUST be present in any system containing those elements, i.e., in the CR." This is wrong in more than one way. Syntax, to do the job you think it might, must be causally efficacious. Since it adds nothing to a nonS/H system, then it is causally infecund. Patterns don't add any causality, especially if defined functionally. Otoh, if syntax is the upshot of the formality of a comp. program in a S/H system, then the machine by definition is not "machine enough." Anytime you have S/H separability, you can't have the program adding anything causal to the system other than the electricity which carries the program. So the upshot is that it is incoherent to think of syntax as adding anything causal just as it is apparently the case that consciousness according to Jaegwon Kim doesn't add any causality to third person 1st order properties of brains. Searle's nonproperty dualism has it that the causality of mental events is real precisely because they are tied to the brain as a system level feature. I intend to swat the tennis ball and my arm moves. How to explain what is necessary and sufficient for such a nonreductive story will include intentionalistic notions wedded to individualism a la how the brain works. Externalism just doesn't touch this and is why some maintain that meanings just aren't in the head (Putnam). On one level this is just nuts. It depends on how you (an individual) set up your twin earth, though. Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/