[Wittrs] Pictures, methods, Gettier, and other lingering topics
- From: John Phillip DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2011 13:41:48 -0400
Sean,
It's against my better judgment to engage further with you, at least on
these topics, and it's distracted me from some off-list correspondence
regarding Wittgenstein and historicism. (You might consider, in your
expressions of disappointment about the lack of participation on this
list, whether your own manner has played a role, creating the impression
that this list is a place is a circle-jerk for Wittgenstein worshipers
rather than a place to actually discussing his writings.) But amidst
the rehashed hagiography with which everyone on this list is surely
already familiar, the invidious comparisons, the vague and simplistic
generalities, and the insufferable tone, there were still a few points I
thought needed addressing. Not for your sake (You're quite hopeless
really.) but for anyone following along who might be misled by your
nonsense.
Regarding pictures, you wrote, "this is an existential, introspective
discovery." This is wrong for a number of reasons. First of all, it
suggests that Wittgenstein was engaged in empirical psychology, which,
by his own testimony, he was not. Second, it suggests that he was
putting forward theses, which he - again, by his own testimony - was
not. Third, even worse, it would have him engaged in introspectionist
psychology, something that his discussions of "the inner" and "private
language" are specifically addressed against. Fourth, as you admit in
writing "if true...", it has him making hypothetical claims, has his
entire method (as you would have it) resting on an empirical hypothesis.
I find it bizarre that someone professing such a deep understanding of
Wittgenstein was write such nonsense. But more bizarre, you suggest
that by my writing that "the idea that people form pictures is itself a
picture," I have him putting forward theses. But on the contrary, the
quotes I provided show unambiguously that he would say that a picture
represented a thinker's thoughts only if the thinker acknowledged it as
the right picture. That point, which you've tried to evade, is
important (among other reasons) for just the very reason that, if the
thinker concedes the picture as his own, it is not contentious, not a
thesis. Whether we call the characterization of picturing itself a
picture is immaterial to that point.
(And if anyone should think it clever to point out my own
contentiousness here, let me be clear: we are not addressing a
philosophical question - wherein contentious theses should be eschewed
by a proper Wittgenstein method - but an exegetical one. Questions of
history and interpretation are of course contentious.)
You've compared the role of pictures itself being a picture to an
assertion like, "The fact that I have formed a hypothesis is only,
itself, a hypothesis." (This you called a "language game" but it plays
no role in any language game with which I am acquainted but is rather,
is a move which misfires because it fails to recognize the role
hypotheses play... although I could imagine in, e.g. the Sociology of
Science, an hypothesis about whether an hypothesis had been formed. And
there it makes perfect sense.) But to compare "picture" and
"hypothesis" again betrays a problematic view of pictures, as if there
were some doubt attending to identifying a picture as such, "just a
picture". I've already spelled out elsewhere why stigmatizing a picture
as "just a picture" is mistaken. And if your point is not that
pictures, per se, like hypotheses, are somehow doubtful, I wonder what
it is.
The idea that the characterization of people entertaining pictures as
itself a picture is somehow problematic reminds me of the idea (which
Wittgenstein ridicules) that one needs a discipline called
"meta-orthography" to specify the correct way to write the word
"orthography". No, ordinary orthography (And what else could there be?)
is quite capable of representing the word "orthography".
Your example, "The fact that I have formed a hypothesis is only, itself,
a hypothesis," would seem to misfire if it were to treat a first-person
avowal and an hypothesis, as in, "I believe it looks red to me."
However, if we are speaking in the third person, "I believe that looks
red to him," there is no such problem. Cf. "I am picturing him forming
a picture of..."
However, your example is a poor one for yet other reasons. The
criterion for someone forming an hypothesis is not merely a matter of
their sincere avowal. An hypothesis must also be meaningful, have
testable consequences. So it is perfectly intelligible that, e.g. a
scientist might wonder whether she had actually formed an hypothesis or
whether perhaps she had instead supposed something with no observable
consequences.
You wrote, "If, in fact, it is necessary for people to form 'pictures'
to understand something, being cognizant of this could only be a picture
in a DIFFERENT SENSE." First of all, you haven't supported that claim
and it really doesn't follow. Second, notice you wrote, "If, in
fact..." making this into an hypothesis! Once again, you are having
Wittgenstein put forth hypotheses that would properly belong to
empirical psychology. You accuse others of treating philosophy
according to the methods of science yet you treat what is Wittgenstein's
central insight (to you) as an hypothesis!
"Imagine someone having a breakthrough in psychological counselling.
They realize that they are displacing aggression. They realize that
something, X, is secretly bothering them. To speak of this as a
'picture' is to speak of a different sense of the idea. Cf: a doctor who
says: 'avoiding carbs makes you lose weight.' This presents a picture of
metabolism in the sense we mean."
It is a different picture, certainly. But is it a picture in a
different sense? You really haven't shown that or even made clear what
it is you wish to show.
Wittgenstein's use of "picture" ("bild") is, incidentally, not so
unusual in a German context. Even "world-picture" ("weltbild"), which
sounds somewhat peculiar and distinctly philosophical in English, is
perfectly ordinary German. (Similarly, "form of life", or "lebensform",
which in English would always appear as an allusion to Wittgenstein, is
ordinary German.) Consider the German tabloid, Bild, hardly a highbrow
publication, and its slogan, "Bild dir deine Meinung!" ("Form your own
opinion!" akin to the Fox News "We report, you decide!" and similarly
disingenuous), which involves a pun, where "bild" ("picture") is the
name of the paper but is also short for "bilden", "to form" or "to
shape", from which the English "build".
The German word for "picture" and its associations with "building" or
"constructing" conjures up more than the English and need neither be
pictorial or even involve visual imagery. A picture can be a specimen
or sample (compare, "He's the picture of health"), a record, a metaphor,
a stereotype, or a conception. (Note, in this regard, that Wittgenstein
often makes reference to a "'visual' picture", which sounds rather
pleonastic in English. But not all pictures are visual! He also
specifies "mental-pictures" and contrasts them with "visual imagery".
When Wittgenstein speaks or writes of "pictures" then, it should be
understood as both more prosaic than it sounds in German and as richer
in its suggestive power. Moreover, even if he had made such a claim as,
"Everyone's thought is based on pictures," (which he did not say, which
would have been an empirical hypothesis and therefore contrary to his
professed methods, and which would be doubtful in any case), then this
would not be a claim such as "Everyone thinks using visual imagery".
Now, you claimed that "Wittgenstein' s use of formalism from
1930-1932...was an attempt to use formality to show that formality was
flawed." But you offered nothing to substantiate this claim. No
matter. I doubt you have the formal acumen to follow some of the
arguments in Philosophical Grammar. In any case, Wittgenstein continued
to use formal methods in dealing with problems in the Philosophy of
Mathematics and Philosophy of Logic (domains where it is far more
applicable), well past 1934. By your lights, it would seem remarkable
either that he used such methods or retained any interest in such
topics. But Wittgenstein's views on the role and relevance of formalism
were far more nuanced than your attitude suggests.
(My suggestion as to your incompetence with formal methods is modeled on
your own assumption that those who use formal methods do so for lack of
insight. It's not entirely fair is it? But your own posts are riddled
with such ad hominems and attempts to justify the same. Which is one
reason I am not hesitant to express my own contempt for your views.
Although, unlike you, I still offer arguments beyond such.)
You also claimed, "I never had any issue with Culture and Value. I think
you are referring to Stuart on that one." Apparently, you forget.
First, you wrote to me, "I think you are going down the wrong path by
quoting from Culture and Value with respect to Wittgenstein's view on
metaphysics and spirituality." Then, in a follow up, you offered the
revision, "This doesn't mean to say that Culture and Value is a bad
source for that stuff; it means to say that that citing any of 'that
stuff' goes down the wrong path." Whatever you may have meant by the
original assertion or by the distinction you seemed to be making (which
was hardly clear), it nevertheless clear that you at least has some
"issue" or other with Culture and Value. In any event, I was not
referring to Stuart.
You also wrote, "You aren't being entirely fair on remembering the
discussion about transitional Wittgenstein. The position I presented was
not 'mine,' it was Ray Monk's. (I'm still good with it)."
On the contrary, while you did present it as Ray Monk's view, the fact
that Monk recounts Wittgenstein's epiphany (which I never sought to
refute), does not entail that Monk advocates reading everything post
1930/1931 as of one piece or denies there still being many ideas in
transition prior to 1934. That was the position you argued for, denying
that Philosophical Grammar and The Big Typescript should be considered
transitional works. I know of no place where Monk has made such a
claim.
Regarding "three voices", it is not a theory but an interpretative
schema. Variations of it can be found in various Wittgenstein exegeses
(I deserve no credit for creativity on that score), but it is clear
enough that, if one does not in some way partition various things that
Wittgenstein writes, one must read him as blatantly contradicting
himself.
My point about the methods deployed at each stage (or by each "voice",
if you will) of Wittgenstein's discussion is not specifically about whom
one may address with Wittgensteinian methods (and certainly not about
permission to be "haughty" - although, despite being guilty of
haughtiness myself, I think such an attitude is never a virtue and that
it is one of the last ways that Wittgenstein would wish to be imitated:
he considered his own vanity "sinful" and most of us have far better
reasons to be humble than he did!) or who "requires" them (whatever that
even means). Again, it is about efficacy and about who will be
receptive to them. Moreover, it is not merely about that, but rather a
dilemma: either one must be willing to use traditional philosophical
methods (akin to those used by the second "voice"), using
counterexamples, contrary theses, skeptical arguments, and so forth, in
order first to unsettle a thinker in their dogmatism, or one must
recognize that certain thinkers simply will not be receptive, because
their views don't (at least as yet) cause them any distress.
If one just wishes to assume a haughty attitude, rather than to actually
help people, then I suppose that's fine. I mean, it may be problematic
in terms of ethics, etiquette, or prudence, but it's neither here nor
there in terms of Wittgensteinian methods. But if one wishes to
actually be effective, one ought to seriously consider these issues.
Gettier's work, on my reading, is an example of choosing the first horn
of the dilemma. With questionable results. You've questioned his
Wittgenstein bona fides on the assumption that philosophers at the time
did not understand Wittgenstein anyway. First of all, I find that again
to be arrogant presumption on your part. Second, while there were many
misunderstandings then as now, there were also some superb Wittgenstein
scholars writing at that time. Third, given that he'd studied under Max
Black and Norman Malcolm, both of whom studied directly under
Wittgenstein himself, I'd hesitate to cast aspersions on his
understanding without having good reason to do so. Finally, given the
popularity of Wittgenstein at the time, I think he had reason to suppose
(though he was mistaken and could not have anticipated the subsequent
turn to Quine and Naturalism that was to follow) that the
Wittgensteinian point of his brief article would be understood.
To wit: "knowledge", the definition of which, since Theaetetus and Meno,
has been a paradigmatic example of definitions in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions, is in fact not amenable to such treatment.
Demonstrating this is no less Wittgensteinian than demonstrating,
through various counterexamples, that the various uses of the word
"game" are not governed by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
either, that the proceedings we count as "games" are united by "family
resemblances. The point is the same and the target, Essentialism, is
the same.
The difference is that Gettier hit the Essentialists closer to home.
Essentialists weren't too troubled with whether "game" (or even "art")
might not be amenable to their analyses. But "knowledge"! Oh, that got
them going!
Deriding the Gettier-inspired industry for missing the point is entirely
appropriate. But Gettier himself was making a perfectly legitimate
point, perfectly consistent with Wittgenstein's methods.
The case of Gettier's paper provides a valuable object lesson for
Wittgensteinians though, as per the dilemma I presented: if one takes
the approach of using traditional philosophical methods to unsettle
people in their assumptions, in hopes of making them more receptive to
Wittgensteinian insights, one risks instead sending them down false
paths, clinging even more tenaciously to traditional approaches, as
happened with the subsequent literature surrounding "justified true
belief".
(I am reminded of the Buddhist concept of upaya kusala, or "skilful
means".
http://www.dhammawiki.com/index.php?title=Skilful_means
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upaya
http://www.buddhanet.net/skilful-means.htm )
Now, as I'd mentioned elsewhere, the pedagogical and therapeutic
contexts are different. Not least of all, because a teacher has a
"captive audience", as it were. But also, one can exert influence that
demands a certain receptivity, though a conscientious teacher must be
wary of grading students' understanding on the basis of their agreement,
turning education into indoctrination, as too many in the academy are
now wont to do. Still, even there, I think it is important to deploy
methods that instill genuine doubt, genuine anxiety, genuine concern in
students. If students are merely reassured, comforted that
philosophical problems are only so much nonsense, without ever genuinely
grappling with them (as Wittgenstein did until the end of his life),
they become the worst sorts of philistines, embracing the sort of
dismissive "sophistication" that is already all too prevalent in our
Scientistic, Capitalistic, consumerist, faux "multicultural" society.
Recall the simile Anna Boncampagni shared with us from a professor of
hers, of philosophy being like a vaccine, thus having the character of
both disease and cure. There is value then in exposing oneself to
various conceptual confusions.
Also, consider this, from Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology:
641. In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It
must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important.
There again, traditional methods become extremely useful.
Anyway, I don't expect you to concede any of these points. I
anticipate, on the contrary, being "booted". Before you do that though,
may I suggest you consider something you wrote a couple of years ago,
regarding the "booting" of Stuart from Analytic?
"... moderation is a terrible idea. Usually, the way this works is the
marketplace handles it. In other lists that I am on, if a person
believes that another's posts do not merit consideration, they don't
reply to it. Natural elites therefore emerge. (I'm not saying anyone
posts fall into any category either, because I haven't been reading
anything. So this is purely hypothetical).
"Here's what I am trying to say: isn't a post officially 'worthy' if the
other dogs in analytic keep barking? I've always wondered why it is that
the supposed "good" posters in here are the ones who give a two line
zinger to something that they should be mature enough to ignore. Or the
ones whose reply is to the middle portion of the conversation, and it is
only a terse remark that you would have to search for, even if you
wanted. At the end of the day, who is it that really leads to a poor
discussion environment -- the terrier that won't let go of the one end
of the rope or the terrier on the other end?
"Look, here is what I am saying. You have to decide whether you want
only to have a conversation with yourselves (like minded people). If all
you want is people who hold the same views as you to say things within
your desired parameters, by all means, create such a social club. But if
you actually want a discussion list, the main of you who feel this
neurotic need to 'correct' every post they see are the ones who need to
learn to quit. The way to quiet something is to not respond.
"Once again, I didn't read anything specific so my comments are purely
hypothetical."
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/analytic/message/23635
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