[Wittrs] Picture the Picture

  • From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2011 20:55:48 -0700 (PDT)

J:

The best way to avoid talking past one another is to do philosophy "on the 
ground" (to use examples, illustrations). If we talk back and forth in 
generalities, or through "systems," it gets tougher for two people to "hook up" 
in what they mean. Many of our discussions have had this problem. It will no 
doubt continue here, as I talk generally about "pictures." To really get at 
this 
stuff, one needs to start throwing out examples or hypos. 

ON PICTURES

Wittgenstein's work is profoundly introspective. It tells us what thinking is 
as 
much as it shows us how to go about it at an extremely insightful level. If you 
gave Wittgenstein's works to people to read, they would need an orientation to 
it, much like Psalms, before one could even begin to properly appreciate it. So 
many analytics have this problem: they treat Wittgenstein as presenting "an 
argument" -- as though, e.g., ordinary minds would simply score it. I want to 
suggest categorically that Wittgenstein is presenting a perspectival account: 
it's one that can only fully be seen from the perspective of Wittgenstein. This 
is why biography is so central. You read Wittgenstein not with your mind, but 
his.

Now, during Wittgenstein's life from about 1930 onward, he had an "epiphany." 
He 
broke through to a new way of understanding. During his excavation of that 
path, 
he had to unearth several new ideas. Central to this was how family resemblance 
worked in language (and meaning is use). Equally central, however, was the idea 
of a "picture."

"Picture" doesn't work as an idea the way that "theory" does. It doesn't mean 
"my vision." "My idea." What it refers to is a cognitive phenomenon: that, to 
understand something, the form of life must generate a picture about it. This 
is 
an existential, introspective discovery. If true, it creates, in essence, a new 
unit of analysis to understand meaning -- really, a meta unit. It suggests that 
if a person could reflect upon his or her picture of events, that this would be 
a deeper thing to see -- to get at the roots of the issue, as Wittgenstein said.

Now, you want to say this: "the idea that people form pictures is itself a 
picture."  This is problematic for several reasons. First, it is admitting the 
"thesis" (dirty word! used quotes!): namely, that a person is forming a 
picture. 
Hence, one wonders what it really says. It would be like putting two mirrors up 
against each other. It reminds me of these sorts of language games: "The fact 
that I have formed a hypothesis is only, itself, a hypothesis." One wants to 
say: it tries to use the language of the beginning before anything starts. (Cf: 
Wittgenstein's view of "the beginning" with his view of the unspeakable." See 
also, Wittgenstein on imponderable evidence. I think that helps). 

So, here's the point. If, in fact, it is necessary for people to form 
"pictures" 
to understand something, being cognizant of this could only be a picture in a 
DIFFERENT SENSE. It would be like saying: "a realization isn't a picture." 
Imagine someone having a breakthrough in psychological counselling. They 
realize 
that they are displacing aggression. They realize that something, X, is 
secretly 
bothering them. To speak of this as a "picture" is to speak of a different 
sense 
of the idea. Cf: a doctor who says: "avoiding carbs makes you lose weight." 
This 
presents a picture of metabolism in the sense we mean.  

So the point is: you can speak this way, so long as you see the sense shift.

ON METHODS

I would generally agree with you that the methods for Wittgensteinian therapy 
can differ. Here is where I stand on analytic methods. Imagine two people who 
wanted to dig a hole. One brought a shovel; the other, a spoon. Analytics tend 
not to doctor at the most efficacious unit of analysis. They tend not to 
understand family resemblance or "meaning is use" or pictures  -- all of which, 
if understood, would render certain of their tools (logic) problematic. In 
fact, 
what analytic philosophy really is, is the confession of philosophers that they 
don't understand what Wittgenstein called, "the new thinking."  

They don't understand that they work on false problems. They don't understand 
that the picture they have of philosophy is often dull ("the science picture"). 
And they think that their methods are used to score Wittgenstein, instead of 
vice versa. And the result is that debates on false problems like "free will" 
perpetuate themselves unto the end of history. 

I'll try to do a bit more later.

Regards and thanks.
SW

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