J: The best way to avoid talking past one another is to do philosophy "on the ground" (to use examples, illustrations). If we talk back and forth in generalities, or through "systems," it gets tougher for two people to "hook up" in what they mean. Many of our discussions have had this problem. It will no doubt continue here, as I talk generally about "pictures." To really get at this stuff, one needs to start throwing out examples or hypos. ON PICTURES Wittgenstein's work is profoundly introspective. It tells us what thinking is as much as it shows us how to go about it at an extremely insightful level. If you gave Wittgenstein's works to people to read, they would need an orientation to it, much like Psalms, before one could even begin to properly appreciate it. So many analytics have this problem: they treat Wittgenstein as presenting "an argument" -- as though, e.g., ordinary minds would simply score it. I want to suggest categorically that Wittgenstein is presenting a perspectival account: it's one that can only fully be seen from the perspective of Wittgenstein. This is why biography is so central. You read Wittgenstein not with your mind, but his. Now, during Wittgenstein's life from about 1930 onward, he had an "epiphany." He broke through to a new way of understanding. During his excavation of that path, he had to unearth several new ideas. Central to this was how family resemblance worked in language (and meaning is use). Equally central, however, was the idea of a "picture." "Picture" doesn't work as an idea the way that "theory" does. It doesn't mean "my vision." "My idea." What it refers to is a cognitive phenomenon: that, to understand something, the form of life must generate a picture about it. This is an existential, introspective discovery. If true, it creates, in essence, a new unit of analysis to understand meaning -- really, a meta unit. It suggests that if a person could reflect upon his or her picture of events, that this would be a deeper thing to see -- to get at the roots of the issue, as Wittgenstein said. Now, you want to say this: "the idea that people form pictures is itself a picture." This is problematic for several reasons. First, it is admitting the "thesis" (dirty word! used quotes!): namely, that a person is forming a picture. Hence, one wonders what it really says. It would be like putting two mirrors up against each other. It reminds me of these sorts of language games: "The fact that I have formed a hypothesis is only, itself, a hypothesis." One wants to say: it tries to use the language of the beginning before anything starts. (Cf: Wittgenstein's view of "the beginning" with his view of the unspeakable." See also, Wittgenstein on imponderable evidence. I think that helps). So, here's the point. If, in fact, it is necessary for people to form "pictures" to understand something, being cognizant of this could only be a picture in a DIFFERENT SENSE. It would be like saying: "a realization isn't a picture." Imagine someone having a breakthrough in psychological counselling. They realize that they are displacing aggression. They realize that something, X, is secretly bothering them. To speak of this as a "picture" is to speak of a different sense of the idea. Cf: a doctor who says: "avoiding carbs makes you lose weight." This presents a picture of metabolism in the sense we mean. So the point is: you can speak this way, so long as you see the sense shift. ON METHODS I would generally agree with you that the methods for Wittgensteinian therapy can differ. Here is where I stand on analytic methods. Imagine two people who wanted to dig a hole. One brought a shovel; the other, a spoon. Analytics tend not to doctor at the most efficacious unit of analysis. They tend not to understand family resemblance or "meaning is use" or pictures -- all of which, if understood, would render certain of their tools (logic) problematic. In fact, what analytic philosophy really is, is the confession of philosophers that they don't understand what Wittgenstein called, "the new thinking." They don't understand that they work on false problems. They don't understand that the picture they have of philosophy is often dull ("the science picture"). And they think that their methods are used to score Wittgenstein, instead of vice versa. And the result is that debates on false problems like "free will" perpetuate themselves unto the end of history. I'll try to do a bit more later. Regards and thanks. SW