[Wittrs] Re: On the Varieties of Dualism: Phenomenological Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2010 19:53:00 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
SWM: So what is all this argument about and why did you
> >even present that claim to me when I was arguing for Dennett's thesis.
>
> I will explain below exactly why I presented this claim to you: you
> invited me to do so.
Many, many times.
> perhaps, then, with our current understand that
> Dennett's account of consciousness can not explain how consciousness can
> collapse a wave function if von Neumann is correct about quantum
> mechanics, we can hit the reset button and restart the discussion from a
> higher level (after having ascended one Wittgensteinian ladder, as it
> were) --- that higher level being the insight that no physicalist
> account of consciousness can be true unless von Neumann is wrong about
> QM.
>
I shall pay close attention.
> but, first I will make some brief comments about various gratuitous
> inaccuracies and distractions in your post.
>
> 1. [your claim that there is no evidence that von Neumann is correct
> about QM]: this is a distraction.
My claim is that there is no evidence for the interpretation of von Neumann you
offer (whether or not he shares it!) that the separation of things that exist
into three categories, one of which includes an "abstract I", implies a
non-physically caused consciousness. THAT is different than any claim about the
role of wave function collapse in quantum observations. He can well be right
about that (indeed, I see no reason to doubt it) without that implying that
consciousness cannot be physically derived. I hope that this time the
distinction I am making is clear to you.
> at the present moment no one can prove
> either than von Neumann is right or that he is wrong;
If you are referring to the implications for consciousness being non-physical
in the causal sense, you're right, there is no evidence. Therefore, claiming
that if he is right then Dennett must be wrong, as you have done, is pointless
since it's a given that if consciousness is not physically derived Dennett is
wrong, whether such a claim is rooted in von Neumann and quantum wave functions
or something else.
But so what? I am not arguing that Dennett is right in the sense that he has
presented a demonstrably true account. I am arguing that he has presented a
credible account and, if so, and absent evidence for dualism, there IS NO
REASON TO ASSUME DUALISM TO EXPLAIN THE OCCURRENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS!
> and, no one can
> prove either than Dennett is right or that he is wrong.
See above.
> but, I have
> shown that the physicalist account of consciousness is incompatible with
> the von Neumann Interpretation; so, any discussion of any physicalist
> account of consciousness proceeds as if the philosopher in question had
> prefaced his or her remarks with a disclaimer: I assume von Neumann is
> wrong about quantum mechanics and I theorize as follows.
>
If Dennett's account is right, LOTS OF DUALIST ACCOUNTS ARE WRONG. So what?
That has NO implication for Dennett's thesis!
> 2. [your claim that Dennett's philosophy of consciousness is not
> dualistic]: your claim is highly questionable. a good case can be made
> that Dennett is a latent dualist; and, you should respond to that case
> if you are going to advocate a Dennett-style philosophy of
> consciousness.
You haven't made it so what's to respond to, an allegation? Make the case that
Dennett is a closet dualist (present your reasons) and I will be glad to
consider and respond to it.
> Dennettism is still incompatible with the von Neumann
> Interpretation because the latter is substance dualistic.
>
Ugh! Will you please look at what I am saying for god's sake!
> 3. [your claim that Dennett accuses Searle of latent substance dualism]:
> I've looked in Consciousness Explained and found Dennett's critique of
> the Chinese Room Argument. his critique is severe; but, I will to others
> to judge its success. my point is that Dennett's conclusion is just that
> Searle is wrong to reject Strong AI on the basis of the CRA.
>
> I did not find any passage in which Dennett concluded that Searle was
> wrong about Strong AI; and, therefore Searle is a latent dualist whether
> Cartesian-style or otherwise.
>
If I find the time I'll go back and look. Perhaps I misrecalled where I have
seen it. Nevertheless, I assure you if you look you will see that Dennett beat
me to this particular punch. But as I also said, it wouldn't matter if no one
else had ever said it. My point needs to be addressed on its merits not on its
lineage.
> would you kindly back up your claim by quoting the passage(s) in which,
> according to you, Dennett makes such an allegation?
>
If I have the time I will ferret out some text for you. Note that I did not say
he makes an explicit allegation of "substance dualism". (I know you like to
stick with formalities!) I said he addresses the issue in the appendix and by
that I meant that it is the crux of his argument against Searle.
> >I just stated that Dennett's thesis adequately accounts for what we
> >mean by consciousness WITHOUT HAVING TO POSIT DUALISM to explain the
> >occurrence of consciousness in the universe! Note that that is not a
> >denial of dualism any more than it is an assertion of the truth of
> >monist phyiscalism. It's just an assertion that we don't need to buy
> >into dualism to explain consciousness.
>
> no. what it is is an assertion that, if we first assume that von
> Neumann is wrong about QM, then its possible that a physicalist account
> of consciousness is correct.
>
No. It is an assertion that we can explain consciousness in terms of physical
description and don't need to presume dualism at all, whether your take on von
Neumann or anyone else's dualism!
> and this leads us back to the question of what I dragged von Neumann
> into the conversation: you asked for it.
>
> if you recall, some time ago you lamented the fact that you could not
> establish any common ground between you and other disputants; notably,
> Bruce. I replied that, if it was common ground that you wanted, you
> might try discussing the issues in non-prejudicial language; meaning,
> specifically, that, if you purported to be open to considering dualism,
> you really ought not to discuss consciousness in language that assumed
> dualism is false.
>
And I responded to you that nothing I said assumed dualism was false. It just
did not presume it needed to be true to explain the occurrence of consciousness
in the world for all the reasons already given.
> you wondered why you'd want to do that; and, I told you why.
>
> Joe
>
Yes, you went on about von Neumann's claim about collapsing the wave function
on the quantum level and how that implied three categories of existence which
you recast into phenomenological terms and which you asserted, on that
recasting, implied dualism. And I explained to you why the I,II,III categories
of von Neumann need not be taken as implying dualism, regardless of your 1,2,3
recasting. I further asked you to tell us just what you meant by an "abstract
I" (the occupant of categories III and 3), which you have thus far failed to
do. In sum, you provided an explanation which takes refuge in inadequately
explicated terms.
That's no kind of answer, not a serious one, anyway.
SWM
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
