[Wittrs] Re: On the Varieties of Dualism: Phenomenological Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 16:52:24 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
<snip>
> > >you,
> >>Dennett and Searle are all trying to be in category 3; but, neither
> >>you nor Dennett can avoid the same latent property dualism of which
> >>you've accused Searle.
>
> >I'll let you demonstrate that with an argument then since I think that
> >is just wrong.
>
> the argument was already included, as follows:
>
> >>physical objects have physical properties that cause measurable
> >>phenomena. some objects also have physical properties that cause
> >>experienceable phenomena.
>
> >All measureable phenomena are experienceable since you cannot measure
> >what cannot be encountered in experience, either directly or
> >indirectly. This distinction is not a distinction at all.
>
> it is a valid distinction that can only be obscured by sloppy and
> unscientific verbiage.
>
> simply put, I experience qualia. I measure quantities.
>
You can measure the duration of a quale by reference to other events (in terms
of other qualia), etc. What you seem to be doing here is confusing categories,
supposing that the qualia we count as part of our objective experience
(observables) is measureable but that the qualia of the experience of measuring
is not. But that is an artificial distinction.
> a quale is a qualitative aspect of experience (an experienceable
> phenomenon). I can experience the quale of, say, redness. scientists can
> measure the wavelength of light reflecting or radiating from a ripe
> tomato and find that the light has a wavelength in the 650 nm range.
>
> however, I do not actually experience '650 nm' when I look at a tomato.
Different things are being measured, that's all. How long were you seeing the
redness of the tomato under conditions X? Don't know? Well we scientists have
clocked it based on your responses, etc., etc. That you were not "seeing" the
wavelengths in terms of the instrumentation tracking them is irrelevant.
None of this supports your claim that Dennett's model implies "property
dualism".
By the way, I do not accuse Searle of "property dualism" as you state above. I
accuse him of being implicitly dualist (in the deep sense, the sense you insist
on calling, somewhat archaically, "substance dualism"). But I am fully aware
that he denies being dualist in that or any sense. That is why my claim is that
he is "implicitly dualist."
> what I experience is the quale of redness generated when an
> electrochemical signal from the retina reaches some group of neurons in
> the visual cortex. I don't actually experience electromagnetic radiation
> at all. that just gets measured.
>
So? We can measure your experience of the redness in other ways. You are
drawing an arbitrary and artificial distinction here, Joe.
<snip
> >>in my opinion, Searle should have said that consciousness has and
> >>irreducibly first-person phenomenology. that would mean only that he
> >>accepts what I call phenomenological dualism -- the irreducible
> >>difference between measurable phenomena and experienceable phenomena.
>
> >So you would recommend he use your vocabulary?
>
> as long as he includes the claim of irreducibility it doesn't matter
> whether he uses my vocabulary (the irreducible difference between
> experienceable phenomena and measurable phenomena) or yours (the
> irreducible difference between first-person phenomena and third-person
> phenomena). experienceable phenomena maps to first-person phenomena and
> measurable phenomena maps to third-person phenomena.
>
He confuses irreducibility in terms of the things we can say or experience with
causal irreducibility (he affirms the first, denies the second, i.e., he argues
FOR causal reducibility to brains, though not to computers but that is a
different argument for now).
Given that your vocabulary seems to be so confused (i.e., the way you
misleadingly focus on "measureability" as though this were a distinguishing
criterion) I suspect your terminology would not make things clearer and would
probably obfuscate things further.
I will reiterate: Qualia are measureable just as observed phenomena are.
However, subjectness is a different level of phenomena and is necessarily
treated as such. However that doesn't imply anything beyond particular
methodogical concerns with regard to an effort to determine how brains work to
cause subjectness in the world.
> >>claiming that there is an irreducible phenomenological dualism is to
> >>stand on dualist ground; but, it is not to stand where Descartes
> >>stands.
>
> >this has NOTHING to do with the causal question ...
>
> that there is an irreducible phenomenological dualism is the so-called
> 'brute fact' of philosophy of consciousness.
What does it mean to be a "brute fact" in this case? That we cannot deny that
there is subjectness and objectness in the world? Okay. But that doesn't imply
anything for what is needed to explain this double aspect of existence. The
fact that we have minds and bodies doesn't mean that one is not explainable in
terms of the other. Indeed, whether one is or is not explainable in terms of
the other is the question we are looking to answer. The fact of this duality in
the world does not imply a basic duality in the world.
> there is subjective
> (first-person) experience in an otherwise insensate universe of
> measurable objects. just noticing this fact makes no causal claims; but,
> it invites the question of what causes this phenomenological dualism
>
Right and what is at issue is whether we need to posit two co-existing basics
in the universe to explain the occurrence of subjectness and objectness in our
experience. To posit two such basics is dualism so the issue is whether we need
dualism to explain the presence of consciousness.
Dennett's thesis offers a way of understanding consciousness without assuming
either explicit or implicit dualism.
> >even Searle agrees that consciousness is caused by brains.
>
> this is one basis of my claim that Searle, Dennett and even you are all
> latent property dualists.
>
See my comments above and elsewhere on the confusions of "property dualism".
> if the brain causes consciousness; then, the brain has a property that
> consciousness doesn't have; and, hence, by the operation of the Law of
> Indiscernibility of Identicals, the consciousness can not be identical
> to the brain.
>
> Joe
This is the kind of misuse of logic that, I suspect, drives people like Neil to
say that philosophy is hogwash (or some equivalent). Let's look at this
argument of yours more closely:
Causing anything is a property of the causal agent.
Whatever causes something has at least one property which the thing it causes
lacks (i.e., the property of causing it).
The brain causes consciousness therefore it has a property consciousness lacks.
You then assume that Dennett's thesis asserts that consciousness is identical
to the brain. And note that, since brains cause consciousness, consciousness
cannot be identical to the brain because it has at least one property
consciousness lacks, the property of causing consciousness!
Consider first what it means to describe "causing" as a "property". While we
can and do use "property" in this way, there is a significant amibguity here.
Is "property" just some contingent fact or feature of something, or is it to be
construed as part of the description of what the thing is?
A globe has the "property" of being round (spherical) and, indeed, cannot be
otherwise and still be a globe. But a ball can be round or oblong (think of
footballs) and a brain can cause consciousness (be conscious) or not! Indeed,
there are many brains which aren't conscious, even among human beings which are
manifestly creatures whose brains have the capacity to be conscious! So there
is no claim that a brain and consciousness are the same thing. Are wheels the
same as their spin when they are turning? Aren't you really just confusing your
categories here?
Now consider "identity". You have interpreted the claim I have made for Dennett
as a claim that the brain and the mind are the same and therefore you invoke
the issue of "indiscernibility" even though you must know very well that I have
constantly denied THIS kind of "identity" claim. You proceed to argue that
"consciousness can not be identical to the brain" based on your invocation of
the logical "Law of Indiscernibility of Identicals".
But no one is saying that consciousness and brains are identical in that sense
of "identity". The claim is that consciousness is nothing more than brains
doing certain things under certain conditions, that is consciousness IS the
doing of these things, in the same way that the wetness of water is the
behavior of water's atomic level constituents under certain ambient conditions.
If consciousness is just a feature or set of features of certain process-based
systems running on brains then it's no more surprising that a brain could cause
consciousness than that H2O molecules under certain conditions cause water's
wetness or that computers produce answers to calculation questions, run
machines, make decisions, or play chess. Is the computer the game of chess that
it is playing?
In the end it all boils down to whether or not it makes sense to think of
consciousness as a system property or set of system properties (a la Minsky's
usage) or whether we are obliged to think of it in some dualistic way as you
suppose.
SWM
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