--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > --- On Fri, 4/30/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > >> Read the third axiom at face value. You'll notice > >> nothing there about consciousness or its causes! > >> > > > > The third premise plays a role in the argument, the CRA. > > The question here concerns the claim of the third axiom, not the claim of the > CRA as a whole. I see no "non-causality claim" in the 3rd. But I do. "Insufficient for" means (in the context of the third premise) "insufficient to cause." And "does not constitute" I take to mean something like nonidentical in the context, the context being one of two independent clauses, one an apparent non-identity claim and the other a noncausality claim. What gives? >I see only a simple claim about syntax and semantics: a claim that the former >neither constitutes nor suffices for the latter. I see nothing more than that, >and the truth of this axiom seems to me pretty darned obvious. "neither constitutes nor suffices [to cause--Budd]" > > Every time I bring this up, you reply by looking outside the 3rd axiom for > evidence to support your contention that the 3rd really means or could mean > something other than what it plainly states. It plainly makes both a nonidentity claim and a noncausality claim. Stuart's problem is that he is blind to the first premise when trying to suck a noncausality claim out of the independent clause having to do with nonidentity in the third premise. Stuart, in short, is wondering how one justifies the independent clause having to do with noncausality--and his first attempt to do so was to try to justify it in the only way available to Searle FROM WITHIN THE THIRD PREMISE ALONE. I like to think of this as a joke. But it may be essential retardation. Think I don't know that you both are doing slapstick? Or that one of you is retarded? ;-) > > Apparently you don't understand the role that axioms and premises play in > formal arguments, or your thinking is hopelessly muddled, or both! > > -gts Let's not forget who's on first, what's on second, and I don't know is on third. Gordon, what was your motivation for your LR again? Was it because Searle mucked up his own thought experiment by having it? Note: Once one can (is able) to distinguish systems that have software/hardware separability form those, like brains, which have no similar separability, then one immediately can see that the software is adding nothing intrinsically causal to the hardware that can handle any amount of software. One might as well give the S/H system a head start and a wild goose such that one puts in an already intelligent humunculus only to find out graphically what one already knew given the distinction. That's why it can be said that there is no need for the CRA in Searle's words. Syntax, the formality of software, (Or Information) simply doesn't name a natural kind--we are perfectly okay with saying otherwise because it is a perfectly acceptable idiom. "A garage door opens." Fine. "The nothin' nuths." Not as fine. The digital computer is conscious given more computing power than a hand-held calculator." This doesn't rise to the level of making sense, since "computing power" trades on 2nd order properties; otherwise, we would be in the habit of saying that computing power names nothing essentially different from raw brute power without a computational description. But everything can be given a computational description..... Hence, the thesis of strong AI is one of the following: 1. Incoherent. 2. An empirical whore (unfalsifiable). 3. Strongly dualistic. 4. A species of absolute idealism (all is computation, i.e., mind). 5. A product of behaviorism. 6. So much a whore that it, with enough conflation of concepts, can be alternately fleshed as Searle's very position, just with a different candy wrapper. Want some candy anybody? Three cheers to the wonderful schtick of BOTH Gordon and Stuart. Somebody tell Georges Metanumbnuts I called. (Maybe an inside joke) Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/