[Wittrs] Neil's meta-comments and Fodor
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2010 01:04:57 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
>
> I'll make a few meta-comments to give some perspective.
>
> There are problems that a cognitive agent needs to solve. AI
> methods don't solve them. They don't even attempt to solve them.
> In fact AI proponents are blissfully unaware that the problems
> even exist.
I'm rereading some 1980/1990 Fodor, "RePresentations" and
"A Theory of Content". Both are collections of papers.
"RePresentations" contains his "Methodological Solipsism as a
Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology".
He makes the point repeatedly, that AI (well, computation per se)
only addresses "formal", computational issues, while "semantics"
that explain behaviors, are something other, which Fodor
generally subsumes under the term "representational".
He asks, "If physicists have numbers to play with, why can't
psychologists have propositional attitudes?"
Among his other labels, Fodor is happy as an "intentional realist",
which he tries (and tries) to square with computational theories
of mind.
Fodor's real project, in his 1975 LOT and all of the subsequent
work, is to explain how these are dual aspects all the way down.
I'm don't think he quite succeeds, many other people don't think
he quite succeeds, and even Fodor himself expresses some doubts that
he ever succeeds. What he says is basically that he's sure he's
working in the right area, and welcomes further progress.
(it's amazing what you can find in old books, when you go back with
a very specific theory in mind!)
Josh
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