[Wittrs] Indeterminism
- From: Jeremy Bowman <jwbowman@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: CHORA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2011 19:44:50 +0100
I don't think it's a great idea to allow one's views on human
agency/freedom to direct one's interpretation of a scientific
formalism. But it seems to me that something like that lies behind
Bob's insistence on a "metaphysical" sort of indeterminism.
Quantum theory proper does not tell us that the world is
indeterministic. Rather, one interpretation of quantum theory takes
the world to be that way. That interpretation was created by
non-philosophers who were unfamiliar with Hume's analysis of
causation. They reflected little on the often quite tricky
relationship between language (including scientific laws, the wave
function, etc.) and reality. They were rather fond of the aura of
mystery and power that the twentieth-century public felt surrounded
physics. They actively encouraged a mind-bending, time-warping,
"information"-measuring image of physicists as impenetrable men of
mystery. (And power.) Niels Bohr chose the yin-yang symbol to adorn
his coat of arms. Rigorous purveyors of the spiritual! (And the
powerful.) Or so they'd like us to think.
Outside of showbiz, it's remarkably hard to say what determinism
really is. Traditional causal determinism supposes that the future
unfolds like a train running on railway tracks, so that things
"couldn't happen any other way" as a matter of "natural necessity".
But Hume's analysis of causation calls the very idea of "natural
necessity" into question. When we say something "must" happen because
it is caused, all we really mean is that it does happen, and
furthermore it happens according to a pattern that we have managed to
discern -- so we expect it to happen. According to Hume, the "must"
was nothing more than reality agreeing with our expectations. Looked
at from that perspective, determinism is little more than the doctrine
that things happen according to discernible patterns, even though we
might not yet have discerned them.
And from that same perspective, indeterminism is little more than the
doctrine that not everything fits discernible patterns. Which isn't a
very big deal, really, and it has not much bearing on human agency or
human freedom. It might have some bearing on future science, however,
as it seems to set limits on what can reliably be described by laws.
As things stand today, no one can say whether determinism or
indeterminism is true. But we can learn a lesson from history.
Newtonian physics was so successful and impressive that some claimed
it was not only the correct account of reality -- in addition, it
simply could not be wrong! Let us learn from our forbears, not just
that Newtonian physics is incorrect, but that it is a mistake to think
any theory cannot be wrong.
The most recent physics trades in statistical laws, but it does not
follow that we have finally "hit the rock-bottom of reality", so our
current account of reality is the fullest and most complete there can
be. That would be the same arrogance that inspired earlier fools to
say that Newton could not be wrong. Not only can we not claim that
current physics is certain, it is a stretch to claim even that it is
literally true, because we cannot judge-as-true formalisms that we do
not fully understand. And no one fully understands the formalisms of
quantum theory, despite immodest claims made by the occasional
blowhard. There are rival interpretations of the formalisms, and none
of those interpretations are complete.
Bob wrote:
> I find Wittgenstein understands possibility and contingency,
> which is essential to understanding science today, and its
> irreducible probabilistic nature. Before quantum mechanics,
> probability was epistemic - human ignorance, since Heisenberg,
> chance is ontological and real, the stuff of freedom from
> mathematical equations and causal chains.
"Irreducible probabilistic nature"? -- Are we talking about nature
itself here, or a theory that purports to describe nature? If the
former, I wonder what could be "irreducible" about the "probabilistic"
nature of nature itself? -- The word 'irreducible' here seems a bit
like banging one's fist on the table for emphasis. On the other hand,
if we are talking about a theory that purports to describe nature, who
are we to say whether or not current statistical laws will be the
"final word" in physics? Past experience suggests that
as-yet-undreamt-of future theory will eventually reduce it -- and
probably contradict it at the same time, as normally happens.
But in any case, not all current physical laws are statistical. Strict
laws of conservation in conjunction with statistical laws entail
"quantum entanglement". The bafflement often felt in the face of
entanglement can be dissolved, to some extent anyway, not by rejecting
determinism but by embracing a more robust form of determinism (in
which causally isolated, non-classically correlated events are linked
in a larger way than by mere causation, so that the "discernible
patterns" I mentioned above don't just extend from past to future but
vice versa).
Your phrase 'chance is ontological', if I understand it, sounds as if
you are trying to say more than that nature itself reflects the
statistical aspects of the scientific laws that describe it (which
would say nothing, because it would be true of everything). I think
you're trying to say that our current description of nature is
"complete", in the sense that it leaves nothing out.
If so, I think you're wrong, and that your claim here is as arrogant
as the claims of earlier philosophers who said that Newtonian physics
"could not be mistaken".
Best wishes to all -- Jeremy
Messages to the list will be archived at
http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html
Other related posts:
