[Wittrs] [C] Re: Proper Names --Wittgenstein, Russell, Kripke

  • From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 00:50:40 -0000

SW,

1. On our agreement or disagreement.

As I believe I indicated before, I am offerring examples and comments in hopes 
of getting clarification as to the distinction you wish to make.  If you inform 
me of where my remarks may be taken to agree or disagree then that would surely 
give me a better handle on what it is you wish to say.

2. On these ideas being in the PI.

Wittgenstein discusses various language games with various permutations.  And 
he points out various distinctions.  But I see no such overarching distinction 
as you seem to be proposing.  Certainly, I don't see anything like a simple 
dichotomy as your talk of "bearer-calls" and "bearer-assignments" seems to 
suggest.

3. On my thinking the bearer's presence is required.

I asked you whether it was and you didn't give me a straightforward answer. I 
also proposed various cases for you to consider in clarifying what you might 
mean. You said things that suggested it was required (in some form) but none 
too clearly.  You now seem to be suggesting otherwise.

4. On "enthymematic"

"Enthymematic" doesn't quite seem appropriate here but I think I have a vague 
idea of the connection you're trying to draw so I won't make an issue of it for 
the moment.  (I can see how one might wish to draw an analogy between a 
background presupposed by the meaningful deployment of a word or expression - 
which seems to be your concern - and the unstated premises or conclusions 
suggested or assumed in the presentation of an argument - what arguments are 
described as "enthymematic".  But that sort of analogy could easily become 
misleading if pushed too hard.)

5. On "Morder" and "Batcave" examples

Assuming that I understand you correctly (something I hesitate to do), it seems 
to me that a far better example would be "Air Force One", which is the call 
sign assigned to whichever airplane is currently carrying the President of the 
United States.  Contrast this with the building at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., "The 
White House".

6. Resorting to the "telephone conversation format" you so loathe...

"You seem to think that a description is a description is a description."

On its face, that would be a tautology.  But whether I would agree to the point 
of such a statement...

"You appear to think that being 'the eldest daughter of' is no different than 
being 'the man who saved the Israelites in the Exodus.'"

Of course they are different.  In various ways.  It is also similar in various 
respects.  But I would think the issue would be whether the similarities or 
differences are relevant.  And relevance here is a matter of a particular 
purpose, a particular distinction one wishes to make.

"This would only be true where the the person became known for that 
description, such that the doing of the thing would warrant the assignment of 
the name."

The assignment of the name by whom?  And to whom?  Under what circumstances?

Are we picking out a putative "Moses" and asking, "is this the man who saved 
the Israelites in the Exodus?"  How are we picking out such an individual?  
What other criteria are we applying for individuating this putative "Moses"?

(Obviously we're not picking people of the street and asking, "is this the man 
who...?"

In a scenario I proposed, we might ask, "Are these the remains of the man who 
saved the Israelites in the Exodus?"  That question makes sense.  And it makes 
sense to say, "When I ask, 'Are these the remains of Moses?' I am asking 
whether these are the remains of the man who..."  That clarification, that 
paraphrase, is intelligible.

(But it also makes sense, on meeting someone, discovering that her name is 
"Sally", but then realizing that this isn't the "Sally" you thought, to say, 
"Oh, when you said you were Sally, I thought that you were the eldest daughter 
of... but you aren't that 'Sally'."  Many are known at various times in their 
lives and in various circles by such descriptions as "the eldest daughter 
of...")

Having accepted the paraphrase of the question about the remains, how might one 
answer the question?  How might one determine whether to assign the name to 
these remains?  Various sorts of evidence might be considered and I mentioned 
some.  But what I would like to emphasize is that they would either emphasize 
that there are signs in the manner in which the remains were interred that 
those who interred them believed some such thing about the main whose remans 
they were or that they the were the remains of "The Giver of the Law" and that 
tradition says that such an individual is also, "The man who saved the 
Israelites in the Exodus."

Now, my example of the putative remains aside, to what bearer would we even be 
assigning the name?

"We both agree it would be difficult to play bearer-call with Moses."

Do we?  At this point, your distinction to me is even less clear to me than I 
previously thought.  But if you say I agree...

"But you might be able to if you had enough historical evidence for (a) the 
existence of the person; and (b) the non-existence of the things that can 
operate as bearer assignments."

I am taking this as something like (a) there is someone satisfying... 
(Satisfying what?  The description?  Which one?) and (b) there are no others 
satisfying...

But then you say...

"Let's say he is born of person X and Y. Let's say we have identified the 
parents. Let's say we have remains with the name. Let's say we also have hard 
evidence that Bob led the Israelites out of Egypt. And let's say we have 
evidence that Bob was shunned in the telling of stories for political reasons. 
Bearer-call: Moses didn't do it. Bearer-assignment: Bob is Moses."

So, "Moses didn't do it" is, under these assumptions a "bearer-call" because we 
have some independent criteria for identifying Moses, i.e. because Moses isn't 
just the putative description, "the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt".  
Do I have that right?  Now, which of these descriptions is relevant: that he 
was the child of so and so?  Or that he is the person who left such and such 
remains?  Must both obtain?  Either?

How are the parents individuated?  What are our criteria in using their names?  
Again, you push the problem back a step and it's a pointless shuffle.  ("Sally 
is the eldest daughter of..." is useful to someone who knows, or knows of, her 
parents, or to distinguish her from a "Sally" with different parents, but just 
having the name "Sally" and the names of her two parents tells me next to 
nothing.)

And what sort of "hard evidence" might we have that Bob did it and was shunned? 
 How is Bob identified apart from these?  Have we his remains as well? His 
parents?  Is this relevant?  So far your example makes no sense to me, though I 
might imagine various ways of fleshing it out into something intelligible.

Now, I take it that "Bob is Moses" is a "bearer-assignment" because we are in 
that case treating it as a rule of grammar that "Moses" is whoever led the 
Israelites out of Egypt.  Do I have that right?

And is this like saying "Bacon is Shakespeare" where we discover that Bacon 
composed the plays and sonnets and treat it as a rule of grammar that whoever 
composed those works should be called "Shakespeare", regardless of whether we 
know other things about the life of an actor who was (ex hypothesi) wrongly 
credited with those works?  So then, "Shakespeare didn't write the plays" would 
be a "bearer-call", while "Bacon is Shakespeare" would be a "bearer-assignment"?

Am I getting your distinction?  And is the point to call those cases where we 
treat a description as definitive, come what may, i.e. as a rule of grammar for 
the use of the name, we are engaged in "bearer-assignment"?  And a 
"bearer-call"?  Apart from not treating any one description as definitive, what 
are the criteria for speaking of a usage as a "bearer-call"?

I also want some clarification on this (and it relates to my insistence that 
"tautology" not be assigned to individual words in isolation but to, e.g. 
propositions or definitions): do these terms ("bearer-call" and 
"bearer-assignment") apply to names?  To sentences, statement, or propositions? 
 To rules?  To occasions of usage?  What?

For example, you write...

"Planets. All examples are bearer-calls. (Per Wittgenstein, Shipment amendable 
after delivery)"

Now, presumably, the planets themselves are not "bearer-calls".  Their names?  
The rules governing their names?  On all occasions?  Before and after relevant 
discoveries?

All examples?  Including "Vulcan"?  The fictional homeworld of Mr. Spock as 
well as the discarded astronomical hypothesis?

I am now as confused as ever, because given the understanding I was coming to 
just above, "Vulcan" (of Le Verrier's hypothesis) would have seemed to me to be 
a perfect candidate for "bearer assignment".  According to the hypothesis, 
"Vulcan" would have been whatever planet occupied such a position as to explain 
Mercury's perihelion precession within Newtonian mechanics.  Anything that fit 
that description would have been counted as "Vulcan".

Likewise, prior to its observation, "Neptune" would have been whatever planet 
satisfied what was required to explain the motion of Uranus.  Would that not 
have been a case of "bearer-assignment" according to your usage?  (Presumably, 
uses of "Neptune" subsequent to the observation would be "bearer-calls".  Or 
would they?)

"Police and name tags. Let's assume you are at a party. Let's assume the name 
tag of one person says 'Jack the Ripper' (JR)."

(Wow!  Great example.  Very plausible.)

"And another person is named 'Bob.'  Let's assume that Bob is the one who 
actually killed the people, not JR. Who are the police looking for? This is a 
trick question."

(And an oh so clever one.)

"If they are looking for the person who killed, they are always looking for the 
X of N, even though that could be used for a bearer assignment. This is just 
like the Sauron example BEFORE HE MOVES. So, they are looking for the X who 
killed so and so. They'd therefore be looking for Bob. But if people come to 
say 'Bob is Jack the Ripper,' they are speaking in the sense of a 
bearer-assignment."

I think I understand why you're calling this "bearer-assignment".  It is being 
treated as a rule that whoever committed the murders shall be called "Jack the 
Ripper".  And why not?  Of course a name like "Jack the Ripper" would be used 
that way, which is why your example of someone with a "Jack the Ripper" name 
tag is so completely and utterly stupid.

A distinction you fail to note is that, while a larger investigation may be 
rightly described as "a search for the killer", actual police officers putting 
in the leg work are looking for suspects and persons of interest, and these are 
sought out and recognized as fitting some description or by a name (or alias), 
on the assumption that the individuals sought either committed the crime or can 
provide further information about the crime.  "Look for the killer" is 
meaningless without some such context for the search.  (OJ Simpson apparently 
was proceeding in such a fashion and thought the "real killer" might be found 
on various golf courses or in strip clubs.  And apparently, he thought he'd 
recognize them on sight.  But I think we can count him as exceptional.)

"Meaning is use! (God love our hero)"

(Even if his admirers misquote him and butcher his circumspect remarks to turn 
them into slogans.)

JPDeMouy



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