[Wittrs] Re: [C] On the Misuse of OLP
- From: Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 16:16:19 -0800 (PST)
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [C] [Wittrs] On the Misuse of OLP
> To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Thursday, February 11, 2010, 6:38 PM
> (Glen)
>
> 1. This point below isn't bad. But the matter of "brain
> script" is dealt with here:
> http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?t=msg&th=1240&start=0&S=f7be91516311c79a95c6924ab2f75637.
> You have yet to understand it.
On the contrary, I have heard, understood, and seen the flaws in tripe like
this ever since the cognitive "revolution." But my point was never about why
such stuff is garbage but, rather, that it is antithetical to Wittgenstein's
position, despite his talk about "rules." I don't see any reason to say
anything further because I'm not interested in convincing you of anything - I
am interested in ridiculing you.
> All it attempts to do is use
> computer notation to illustrate sense. And you also don't
> understand that it represents an intermediate position to
> brute-behaviorism and what is called "cognitivism" -- that
> is, it represents Wittgensteinianism.
Needless to say, I disagree. It is not "intermediate" at all - it is pretty
standard cognitive "science" junk. I posted a paper here a while ago in which
the anti-cognitivism of Skinner was compared to that of Wittgenstein (the paper
actually listed ten major similarities between Skinner and W.), but Sean
refused to read the paper. No surprise there.
And it does so by
> borrowing certain arguments from AI, but using them in ways
> opposite to their liking. It's a creative way to wed
> Wittgenstein to Fodor, I think. (But this last point I am
> not exactly clear on).
It certainly has stuff in common with good-ol'-fashioned-AI...rules in the
brain etc. governing utterances. And that stuff is about as far from later
Wittgenstein as one can get.
>
> 2. The OLP technique you describe is supposed to
> illustrate that the sense of "see" used out of context
> creates the puzzle that falsely employs philosophers.
Out of context? No, that doesn't capture it at all, but the issue is very
complicated. Without getting long-winded, it ultimately shows that the usage I
criticized arises out of a set of philosophical assumptions. As far as ordinary
usage goes, it (the usage I criticized) might just as well have been generated
by the random selection of English words. See, in the Wittgensteinian view, one
looks to usage for meaning. But the usage I criticized comes about because one
starts with philosophical assumptions* about the meaning of "seeing," and from
that, so to speak, one forges a usage. That is exactly what Wittgenstein tried
to curtail.
*But that is only a facon de parler; a real analysis would point to the history
of the culture and the individual speaker as causes rather than pointing to the
mentalistic "assumptions," but such an analysis would not be understood by
anyone here, least of all Sean.
>On
> this much we agree.
No, we don't, as what I have said above shows.
But that doesn't mean that when someone
> uses "see" in colorful ways, that nonsense is made.
It depends on what you mean by "nonsense." Either there is, or there isn't, an
important sense to Wittgenstein's famous "language takes a holiday."
>It only
> means that the sense must be captured. The fallacy here is
> not to realize that ordinary senses of see are themselves
> composed only of portions of other ideas that are: (a)
> assembled for the current vehicle; and (b) can be broken
> down and used partially here or there -- which creates
> senses of "see."
Riggghhhttt....Utterances express "ideas"... You know, I heard that one before.
Where was that...Oh! I know! In all of the philosphies from which Wittgenstein
sought to distance himself.
>
> That's the point. That there are SENSES. To assert that
> only an ordinary sense of "see" could ever be used in
> language, is NOT to do anything remotely close to what
> Wittgenstein espoused.
Really? I have to disagree with you. Much of PI consists of showing how
ordinary locutions are at odds with the way certain philosophical traditions
"cause their adherents to talk." This is, to a great extent, the raison d'etre
of PI. How is it that that has escaped you?
Sean says some stuff below, but it currently seems to me to
be...well...gibberish. But I leave it in. I pick up below, after what I view as
gibberish has ended.
>In fact, for one to say
> that anything out of an ordinary sense of a word would be
> nonsense; or that language only amounts to how the person
> behaves -- neither of these are Wittgensteinian.
>
> I don't know how many quotes I'd have to pull out to show
> you this. I noticed that you responded to my last mail and
> apparently did not read the quotes. What have you to say
> about a Rose with teeth, fat Wednesday, and a yellow "e" --
> AND the assertion by Wittgenstein that these are NOT
> METAPHORICAL??? (Please see quotes in the very last mail).
>
Here is where I think Sean recovers...
> Part of me does not mind your devotion to behaviorism.
Oh! I am so relieved my Lord!
> Another part really does not mind your spirited nature.
Oh yes! I'm prancing about just like a frisky pony!
Anyway...I'l give Sean the last word.
But
> what bothers me is that you seem to think that you have some
> better hold of Wittgenstein than me. And for the life of me,
> all I can see about this matter is that you do not
> understand certain high-end Wittgenstenian notions. Why
> not just say "I don't agree with that part of Wittgenstein."
> Wouldn't that be a better course of action?
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