[C] [Wittrs] Reading Wittgenstein, was Wittgenstein on Religious Belief
- From: J DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2009 23:08:18 -0800 (PST)
SWM
Since you've expressed some confusion as to my position and purpose in
participating on this thread, I thought it might be useful for me to start out
by stating my position clearly (though I've attempted to do so previously),
also specifying some things I am not arguing, before proceeding to reply more
directly to your last post.
So, my position:
It is generally a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as making contentious
assertions when an interpretation that has him saying something that isn't
contentious is readily available.
More specifically, it is generally a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as
making a broader, more general claim when a narrower, less general claim is as
well or better supported by the text.
Finally, it is no ground for rejecting an interpretation of Wittgenstein that
the interpretation would read him as saying something with which no one would
disagree.
I have argued that Michael Martin makes these mistakes and that they are
mistakes. Those are my only concerns in posting on this thread.
Now, some things that I am not arguing:
I am not arguing that Michael Martin's interpretation of Wittgenstein is
incorrect, although I do think that it is. I am only arguing against a
particular form of argument that he uses to support that interpretation because
in that he provides a clear illustration of mistakes that are common in
readings of Wittgenstein.
If I wanted to debate how to interpret Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion,
I'd discuss Kai Nielsen, DZ Phillips, or some other more representative
figures. The only value I see in Martin's reading is as an object lesson in
one mistake that we can make in reading Wittgenstein generally.
For my part, in my various readings on the Wittgenstein and religion topic, the
closest to the views I've come to would be in chapter 5 of Duncan Richter's
_Wittgenstein_At_His_Word_. Frankly, I don't see that I could add much to his
discussion of the topic, save perhaps elaboration on the basic points that he
makes as I understand them.
But for my present purposes, we could even suppose that Martin's interpretation
is largely correct. I would only insist that the form of argument with which
he supports that interpretation is fundamentally flawed. That doesn't rule out
the possibility than other arguments might yet support the interpretation.
Though I happen to doubt it.
Furthermore, I am not interested in debating whether Martin's arguments against
the positions he ascribes to Wittgenstein are correct. They may well be and I
am at least sympathetic with some his points against them. Many of the claims
he thinks Wittgenstein was making are wrong-headed claims. But whether the
positions he's attacking actually are Wittgenstein's positions and whether the
arguments Martin uses in supporting his ascription of those views to
Wittgenstein are valid are separate matters from whether those positions are
wrong-headed and whether Martin is right to find fault with those positions.
Lastly, before I get to responding directly to your last post in this thread, I
want to mention some general arguments that I think fail to address what I am
saying.
It is no argument against my point for you to point out that philosophers do
put forth theses while doing philosophy. If they do, they are simply not
following Wittgenstein's recommendations. Many have never made any claim to do
so. Perhaps they are right not to. Still, it was his recommendation.
It is not even an argument to say that Wittgenstein on occasion puts forth
contentious theses and argues for them. If he does that, he is being
inconsistent. (I think we should be very careful in ascribing such
inconsistency to him but I don't rule out the possibility that he wasn't always
consistent.) But even if he was sometimes inconsistent, that doesn't license
us to favor interpretations that point to further inconsistency when
interpretations that don't inculpate him in further inconsistent are readily
available.
And if you take your examples of contentious theses that Wittgenstein allegedly
advanced from your interpretation of his remarks on religion, you are also
engaging in a petitio principii, because the interpretation of those remarks is
part of what is in dispute.
I also want to let you know that when you ascribe some claim to Wittgenstein
and I ask where he said such a thing, I am asking for a direct quotation, a
source. Telling me that it's a paraphrase without telling me what it is you're
paraphrasing is not helpful and doesn't support your interpretation. And to
instead ask me if I have an alternate paraphrase is simply ridiculous! An
alternate paraphrase of what? Am I supposed to read your mind while digging
through what Wittgenstein has written in hopes of hitting on whatever passage
you may have misread? If you ascribe a position to Wittgenstein, the burden is
on you to support your reading. the burden is not on me to guess how you
arrived at such a reading and show you the alternative.
And whether Wittgenstein could be called "contentious" as a person is quite
separate from whether he though one should try to advance contentious claims in
the course of doing philosophy. One might be quite contentious, in doing
philosophy or in other aspects of one's life, while still refraining from
trying to advance theses while doing philosophy.
Further, it is also not an argument (and I don't think I should even have to
point this out) to say that we're arguing now. We're not doing philosophy!
Literary exegesis is not philosophy, even if the literature in question is
philosophical. History is not philosophy, even if the historian is writing on
the history of philosophy. Of course, in discussing interpretations of what
Wittgenstein said, we're going to be putting forth theses! But that's not what
we should call "doing philosophy".
Perhaps it's confusing because in the course of doing philosophy, we may also
have occasion to engage in some literary interpretation or history, but
questions of interpretation or historical development are not philosophical
questions, per se. Or rather, the question, "What did Wittgenstein mean?" is
not a philosophical question, though more general questions about
understanding, interpretation, evidence, and the like might be.
It is also not an argument to simply tell me that I should look further" and
"consider" that Wittgenstein is using "theses" in some unusual sense. I've
already considered and rejected that and I presented my reasons for doing so.
Unless you propose something more substantial than a vague and totally
unsupported suggestion that he's using the word differently, unless you specify
what that different usage might be and show some textual basis for reading him
that way, all you're really saying amounts to is, "Maybe we should just ignore
what he said".
Alluding to various elements from Wittgenstein's private life and his personal
religious views and struggles and vaguely insisting that there's some
connection there between that biographical information and the views you or
Martin ascribe to him without actually spelling out what that connection is
supposed to be is engaging in irrelevancy. And adding more biographical
information does not count as "spelling it out". "Spelling it out" would be
making explicit how a given aspect of his life is supposed to make one
interpretation of his ideas more plausible than another and more plausible than
it would be without such biographical information.
Just saying, "How could it not be relevant?" is using some plausible but vague
intuition about his motives as an excuse to engage in gossip. Not that I am
condemning gossip, per se, but it is a distraction if it isn't actually
enriching our understanding of the text in a demonstrable way or providing an
actual argument to support one interpretation or another.
One more thing on that point: even if biographical data did somehow make
Martin's reading more plausible, that would not undermine my main thesis. My
point is that Martin's arguments for his interpretation are mistaken. But if
there are other, better arguments, his interpretation itself might not be
mistaken.
SW has pointed out elsewhere that your remarks about the relationship Blue Book
and the overall development of Wittgenstein's thought are mistaken. I have
nothing to add to that but I will ask this: what was your point? Did you wish
to claim that later, Wittgenstein had decided that "craving for generality" and
"contempt for the particular case" were not in fact impediments to doing
philosophy? Do I really need to marshal quotes from later texts where he
similarly warns us about generality and reminds us to look at particular cases
and attend to differences between them?
Finally, saying "no" and insisting that I misread Martin and should read him
more closely is not an argument. You have to actually support such a claim.
Here again are some quotations from Martin's text illustrating the mistake I've
been talking about, with my own emphasis added:
"Is an interpretation available that does not assume that Wittgenstein is
making general claims about the nature of religion? There are a number but the
more obvious ones are either dubious or NOT VERY INTERESTING."
"For example, it might be suggested that some religious beliefs have the
properties that he specifies. BUT FEW PEOPLE WOULD DENY THIS."
"One might suggest that some Protestant religious beliefs have the properties
that he characterizes. BUT WHO WOULD DENY THAT THIS IS TRUE...?"
"Is there any interpretation that makes Wittgenstein's view NEITHER
NONCONTROVERSIAL nor clearly wrong?"
"WHO WOULD WANT TO DENY the thesis that some religious believers and
nonbelievers talk past one another?"
I would add that these quotes also show that Martin does see ways of reading
Wittgenstein that don't have him saying controversial things. He just rekects
those interpretations. For bad reasons.
Now, responding to some remaining points.
In responding to my questions about the fishy-sounding phrase "implications of
the ordinary", you said some things that seemed to reflect a familiar enough
reading of the concerns of _On_Certainty_. And unfortunately, I had already
made some comments that veer off on a tangent about those ideas. I want to
discourage that
It is helpful to distinguish between what I'll call "truisms" (those familiar
and simple truths with which no one would argue and which could not constitute
"theses", i.e. which are not contentious, but of which we might "assemble
reminders", as per PI 128 and surrounding remarks) and what some call "hinges"
(those beliefs with which _On_Certainty_ is concerned).
The verbal expression of a "hinge" may have the appearance of a "truism" but it
may also be nonsense outside of very special circumstances. A "truism" is not
nonsense. A "truism" may seem beyond question but "your mileage may vary", as
they say.
For example, if I point out that the game of poker incorporates an element of
randomness and an element of concealment, while the game of chess involves
neither, those are "truisms". But they are not "hinges". Doubting such things
would not need to throw much else into doubt. They are not a "bedrock".
PI 128 is not making a logical point, a la OC, about what it makes sense to
question or claim to know. It is making a methodological recommendation about
the sorts of assertions that have a place in the practice of (his style of)
philosophy.
The example "truisms" provides a nice segue to another point. I may assemble
various truisms like those above in hopes that you would arrive at the
conclusion, "So, despite what I thought, maybe there is no one element shared
by all and only those activities we call 'games'!" and perhaps even, "So, many
of the words we use may not have all their uses united by a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions!"
This process of assembling reminders might be compared to an argument.
Nevertheless, I might not insist on the conclusion. And in fact, no such
assembling of reminders would actually prove that someone really clever
couldn't somehow come up with a "perfect" definition of "game".
At most, between such truisms and the simile about "family resemblances"
(showing how such definitions may be quite unnecessary after all) my
interlocutor might be persuaded to look at things differently. But if she
insists, "Still, they must have something in common!" I may have to relent.
Insisting she arrive at the conclusion I wish would constitute advancing a
thesis.
Calling this method "argument" could be misleading. And, while a collection of
reminders (and e.g. similes, imaginary cases, et al) might be compared to an
argument when taken as a whole, the individual parts should not be contentious.
That is, if we are following Wittgenstein's recommendations.
Regarding the comments about "theories" in relation to "theses", I take
"theories" to be related, but with further connotations of "conjecture" or of
an analogy with scientific theories, i.e. as revealing some hidden underlying
structure, e.g. to propositions,as in Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions
or the nature of predication, e.g. Russell's Theory of Types. I choose these
examples because no one would accuse Russell of trying to do natural science in
putting forth these theories. Wittgenstein's concern is wider than the the
pretensions and wild speculations of the armchair "scientist" or the
traditional metaphysician. Most philosophers in the classic period of analytic
philosophy would take issue with their kind. But Wittgenstein fought against
the temptation to "theorize" even in the way that Russell theorized, though
most analytic philosophers would deem that sort of theorizing perfectly
appropriate.
Finally, at the risk of losing focus even more, I wanted to comment on your
remarks about your experiences with Zen Buddhism
> Buddhism is a little trickier. The kind I was involved in,
> Zen, eschews all doctrine and yet it involves its
> practitioners dutifully sitting in meditation in order to
> liberate themselves from the karmic cycle of death and
> rebirth. If one doesn't believe in rebirth after death, then
> what is the point of pursuing a practice to free yourself
> from it?
Are you asking rhetorically?
Answers to your question can be found within Zen tradition itself, in the "Five
Ways of Zen":
Bonpu zazen is practiced solely for mental relaxation and physical health.
Gedo zazen is practiced for self-control toward moral improvement (even if
one's morality is, e.g. Confucian), or toward improvement of skills such as
martial or fine arts, or the cultivation of magical powers. Sojo zazen is
practiced to personally escape the cycle of rebirth (the Arhat ideal), Daijo
zazen is practiced to achieve enlightenment toward the liberation of all
sentient beings (the Bodhisattva ideal), and Saijojo zazen is to realize the
buddha-nature in all appearances in the here and now. All of these are
explicitly recognized as legitimate forms of the practice by Zen Buddhists,
though the order in which I named them roughly corresponds to the esteem in
which they are held by orthodox Buddhists.
In explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of these other forms of practice, are
they no longer the "serious religionists" you'd spoken of?
>
> I actually sat for a number of years like that and then I
> got up, having decided that just sitting was pointless if I
> wasn't concerned about the goal. Was I sincere while I was
> doing it? I believe I was, but I was also confused so being
> sincere was easy. Once it was clearer to me, there was no
> longer any reason to continue the practice.
I found this remark interesting, given Dogen Zenji's the ideal of shikantaza or
"just sitting" - setting aside all ulterior motives or goals to the practice.
Still, if you saw no value in it, perhaps for the best...
JPDeMouy
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