[C] [Wittrs] On Time
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2009 20:07:15 -0000
The following text has been copied from "Lectures on Philosophy" (LW 1932-33):
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/at/wittgens.htm
12 [...] In general the sentences we are tempted to utter occur in practical
situations. But then there is a different way we are tempted to utter
sentences. This is when we look at language, consciously direct our attention
on it. And then we make up sentences of which we say that they also ought to
make sense. A sentence of this sort might not have any particular use, but
because it sounds English we consider it sensible. Thus, for example, we talk
of the flow of time and consider it sensible to talk of its flow, after the
analogy of rivers.
13 If we look at a river in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe
events on land with reference to these, e.g., "When the 105th log passed, I ate
dinner". Suppose the log makes a bang on passing me. We can say these bangs are
separated by equal, or unequal, intervals. We could also say one set of bangs
was twice as fast as another set. But the equality or inequality of intervals
so measured is entirely different from that measured by a clock. The phrase
"length of interval" has its sense in virtue of the way we determine it, and
differs according to the method of measurement. Hence the criteria for equality
of intervals between passing logs and for equality of intervals measured by a
clock are different. We cannot say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only
in degree from those an hour apart, for we have no feeling of rhythm if the
interval is an hour long. And to say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than
another is different from saying that the interval between these two bangs
passed much more slowly than the interval between another pair.
Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal distances apart. We have an
experience of what might be called the velocity of these (though not what is
measured by a clock). Let us say the river moves uniformly in this sense. But
if we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and 100 than between logs 100
and 200, this is only an analogy; really nothing has passed more quickly. To
say time passes more quickly, or that time flows, is to imagine something
flowing. We then extend the simile and talk about the direction of time. When
people talk of the direction of time, precisely the analogy of a river is
before them. Of course a river can change its direction of flow, but one has a
feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed. The reason is that
the notion of flowing, of something, and of the direction of the flow is
embodied in our language.
Suppose that at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that
someone said time was circular. Would this be right or wrong? Neither. It would
only be another way of expression, and we could just as well talk of a circular
time. However, the picture of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one
that suggests itself very vigorously.
Suppose someone said that the river on which the logs float had a beginning and
will have an end, that there will be 100 more logs and that will be the end. It
might be said that there is an experience which would verify these statements.
Compare this with saying that time ceases. What is the criterion for its
ceasing or for its going on? You might say that time ceases when "Time River"
ceases. Suppose we had no substantive "time", that we talked only of the
passing of logs. Then we could have a measurement of time without any
substantive "time". Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the
logs came to an end. We could in this sense talk of time coming to an end.
Can time go on apart from events? What is the criterion for time involved in
"Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago"? Has time been
created, or was the world created in time? These questions are asked after the
analogy of "Has this chair been made?", and are like asking whether order has
been created (a "before" and "after"). "Time" as a substantive is terribly
misleading. We have got to make the rules of the game before we play it.
Discussion of "the flow of time" shows how philosophical problems arise.
Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by
extending it on looking at it. We form sentences and then wonder what they can
mean. Once conscious of "time" as a substantive, we ask then about the creation
of time.
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