[Wittrs] Re: [Wittrs]: Nominalism / Sean
- From: brendan downs <downs_brendan@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 12:03:21 +1200
I havent read much on this subject, but I tend to think the mind is identical
to the brain or that the word "mind" is cross categorial usage of a word to
describe the brain. e.g. an anthropologist might refer to a cat as a feline,
and say a vet it might call it a cat. a prehistoric example but I think it
express my point. I more or less accept sciences thought on the subject. I'm
not to sure on thinking, maybe I could use the same example and as above,
thinking being the process of chemical and electrical activity. sorry it doesnt
help you much, computational process umm...Chomsky might have some ideas for
you, symbolic brain models, fuzzy logic, neural networks and pattern
recognition. I hope that can be of help...naturalising "computational
nominalism" a nominalist would say the mind doesnt exist, it is not a physical
entity. they would go further and say it is a descriptive concept for the
brain.
> Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2009 16:21:26 +0000
> From: jrstern@xxxxxxxxx
> To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Wittrs] Re: [Wittrs]: Nominalism / Sean
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, brendan downs <wittrs@...> wrote:
> >
> > Further more nominalist and realist in ontology don't dispute things such
> > as relations or predicates e.g. from point (a) to point (b) is say 100
> > miles. now this 100 miles has a two part predicate, point(a) and point (b).
> > as in process such as computational I will use the example of
> > photosynthesis. Sun, oxygen, carbon dioxide, water.. whatever has a four
> > part predicate and this applys for computational process. to label
> > something "computational nominalism" is to misunderstand the debate. both
> > nominalists and realists in ontology don't dispute processes e.g. 1+1=2
> > does/doesnt exist doesnt make sense.
>
>
> Brendan,
>
> I pretty much agree with what you say about nominalism, in
> fact that's a very valuable point, that nominalism is not an
> epistemological position at all.
>
> I would not call it a "metaphysical" position as such, at least
> I would prefer to call it a "methodological" position, that's how
> us naturalizing folks like to talk.
>
> The issue of "computational nominalism" is a new debate, but it
> does not change what you say - it is still not an epistemological
> position, and it is even more so a methdological project. Trees
> will still be trees, and 1+1 will still =2, but perhaps we can come
> to understand what the difference is between the computer on my
> desk and the paint on Searle's wall - this would at least help to
> enlighten Searle. And for people like Fodor (and me) who like to
> talk about computational theories of mind (CTM), a better
> understanding of the "computational" part, may finally help to
> shine some light on the "mind" part, or at least on the composition
> CTM. IOW, "computational nominalism" is much more about computation
> than it is about nominalism, it draws on nominalism in order to help
> explain computation.
>
>
> Josh
>
>
>
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