Messages In This Digest (6
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- 1.
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Fri Dec 11, 2009 6:25 am (PST)
In the formal languages used in mathematical logic and computer science, a well-formed formula or simply formula[2] (often abbreviated wff, pronounced "wiff" or "wuff") is an idea, abstraction or concept which is expressed using the symbols and formation rules (also called the formal grammar) of a particular formal language. To say that a string of symbols is a wff with respect to a given formal grammar is equivalent to saying that belongs to the language generated by . A formal language can be identified with the set of its wffs.
Although the term "well-formed formula" is commonly used to refer to the written marks, for instance, on a piece of paper or chalkboard which are being used to express an idea; it is more precisely understood as the idea being expressed and the marks as a token instance of the well formed formula. Two different strings of marks may be tokens of the same well-formed formula. This is to say that there may be many different formulations of the same the idea.
It is not necessary for the existence of a well-formed formula that there be any actual tokens of it. Formal languages may have an infinite number of well-formed formula, regardless of whether there actually exist any token instances of them.
Well-formed formulas are quite often interpreted as propositions (as, for instance, in propositional logic). However wffs are syntactic entities, and as such must be specified in a formal language without regard to any interpretation of them. An interpreted well-formed formula may be the name of something, an adjective, an adverb, a preposition, a phrase, a clause, an imperative sentence, a string of sentences, a string of names, etcetera. A well-formed formula may even turn out to be nonsense, if the symbols of the language are specified so that it does. Furthermore, a well-formed formula need not be given any interpretation.
The set of well-formed formulas of a particular formal language is determined by a fiat of its creator, who simply lays down what things are to be wffs of the language. Usually this is done by specifying a set of symbols, and a set of formation rules.
A key use of wffs is in propositional logic and predicate logics such as first-order logic. In those contexts, a formula is a string of symbols φ for which it makes sense to ask "is φ true?", once any free variables in φ have been instantiated.
Extracted from Wikipedia
That is what the contention of Ludwig Wittgenstein.Without looking to the language spoken and written and thought of philosophizing makes little sense.If one wish to follow merely a religion is more than enough.
thank you sir
sekhar
- 2.
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Fri Dec 11, 2009 6:44 am (PST)
...language refers to the position of the listener and the speaker, that is, to the contingency of their story. To seize by inventory all the contexts of language and all possible positions of interlocutors is a senseless task. Every verbal signification lies at the confluence of countless semantic rivers. Experience, like language, no longer seems to be made of isolated elements lodged somehow in a Euclidean space... [Words] signify from the "world" and from the position of one who is looking.
Extracted from Wikipedia
This world is maya according to Sankara of Non Dualism (maya) myth
This is the contention of Wittgenstein.
Thank you
sekhar
- 3a.
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Fri Dec 11, 2009 10:41 am (PST)
J:
... my take on the matter:
1. On the issue of how certain Wittgensteinians may be perceived, I would say that I am not into politicking ideas. If one were to agree that "planes" exist, to say that they should not be spoken of is only to indulge manners of some kind. Such a concern is, of course, a legitimate ethic. One might want to do this for all sorts of beneficial reasons in a social club. But it is likewise a legitimate ethic to adopt sincerity as the goal, regardless of what the social club does with it (or how it, as a result, discriminate s). Indeed, placing intellectual sincerity above community is one of the most important virtues in the Wittgensteinian outlook. I have not argued for a closed mind, mind you, I have argued only for the virtue in saying what is the case. Humans are at their best when they take the world as it is. Vanity is far more of a vice than arrogance (in this system).
2. As to whether you have presented a more agreeable account, I would say that you have. No one could doubt that. But here is the thing I fear. What I fear is that for one to understand a Cezanne as being concerned with different sorts of problems that require the discovery of a new criteria to comprehend, one has to already have a measure of insight. And for those who are offended by talk of "planes," I fear that your substitute raises two possibilities. One, members of the social club might deny the premise (for failure to understand); or two, they might relegate the idea to say that so-and-so was simply "creative" rather than a beacon or a kind of "hyper-insight" (for want of partial understanding) .
Here is what I want to say. Among those who really know of Wittgenstein, talk of planes is neither false nor offensive. Besides, given what we know of the brain, "planes" do not mean that the prodigy is above people in terms of moral worth or something. (That he is an aristocrat or lord). It simply means that certain cognitive tasks are of genius proportions, and that, to replicate that understanding in plain folk, certain aspects of their own world need shut down or "put aside" to even begin to relate to the beacon. Beacons need to be "seen" before they are understood.
I'm prepping a course on Wittgenstein that I will air on the web. It might be taught next year (but probably the one after). One of the first things my students will be told (amply documented by Ray Monk in more than one of his works), is that one can only ever be given a partial understanding of what Wittgenstein meant ("saw"). And that, the goal of the course is to see as much of him as is possible for each student, not for purposes of asking "do I agree." Indeed, students will be assessed only on the measure, "what did I understand about it?".
The goal is to understand as much as you can (for your limits), and then just walk away. Go on with your life. You don't really have the option of either criticizing it or accepting it, really. Either is a contrivance. Like a sponge, you simply take with you whatever of the new liquid you can. This is the only approach to Wittgenstein that I see is feasible.
Regards and thanks.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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- 3b.
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Fri Dec 11, 2009 12:42 pm (PST)
Sean,
We are, I take it, largely in agreement. There are just a few points I wanted to clarify, so we better understand each other.
> If one were to agree that "planes" exist, to say
> that they should not be spoken of is only to
> indulge manners of some kind.
For my part, it is less a matter of agreeing that "planes" "exist" (whatever that might mean) than that I can recognize a picture according to which such talk makes sense.
My objection is that such a picture can easily mislead (but any picture can mislead, applied in the wrong way). That one of the ways it can mislead is also impolitic is relevant only to the extent that it can thereby undermine someone's receptivity to other Wittgensteinian insights..
In this forum, I see little reason to worry about politics, per se, and would not have sought to salvage what I could agree to in your remarks, except for the fact that your remarks also contain worthwhile insights and I wondered whether those insights could be expressed in a way that wouldn't undermine someone's receptivity in that way.
Of course, any way of presenting any point can be misunderstood by someone at some time...
What I fear is
> that for one to understand a Cezanne as being concerned
> with different sorts of problems that require the discovery
> of a new criteria to comprehend, one has to already have a
> measure of insight."
Indeed. For any analogy to be helpful as we might like, it would need to compare something less familiar and compare it to something more familiar. Or take something more contentious and compare it to something less so.
But different people will find different things familiar or contentious.
Also, the analogy must be understood as fitting in the appropriate ways, inappropriate extensions of it corrected.
That's why a Wittgensteinian needs a variety of similes, metaphors, pictures, truisms, and so in in her repertoire.
Consider the Cezanne comparison an addition to the arsenal. Not a "final" or even "better" answer but an alternative approach one might take.
And that,
> the goal of the course is to see as much of him as is
> possible for each student, not for purposes of asking "do I
> agree." Indeed, students will be assessed only on the
> measure, "what did I understand about it?".
As it should be.
> The goal is to understand as much as you can (for your
> limits), and then just walk away. Go on with your life. You
> don't really have the option of either criticizing it or
> accepting it, really. Either is a contrivance. Like a
> sponge, you simply take with you whatever of the new liquid
> you can. This is the only approach to Wittgenstein that I
> see is feasible.
I concur.
JPDeMouy
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- 3c.
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Fri Dec 11, 2009 10:13 pm (PST)
>
> As it should be.
>
> > The goal is to understand as much as you can (for your
> > limits), and then just walk away. Go on with your life. You
> > don't really have the option of either criticizing it or
> > accepting it, really. Either is a contrivance. Like a
> > sponge, you simply take with you whatever of the new liquid
> > you can. This is the only approach to Wittgenstein that I
> > see is feasible.
>
> I concur.
>
> JPDeMouy
>
>
> Constructive criticism, or constructive analysis, is a compassionate attitude towards the person qualified for criticism. Having higher experience, gifts, respect, knowledge in specific field and being able to verbally convince at the same time, this person is intending to uplift the other person materially, morally, emotionally or spiritually. For high probability in succeeding compassionate criticism, the critic has to be in some kind of healthy personal relationship with the other one, which is normally a parent to child, friend to friend, teacher to student, spouse to spouse or any kind of recognized authority in specific field. Hence the word constructive is used so that something is created or visible outcome generated rather than the opposite. Participatory learning in pedagogy is based on these principles of constructive criticism, focusing on positive examples to be emulated over precepts to be followed.
There can be tension between friendly support and useful criticism. A critic might usefully help an individual artist to recognize what is poor or slapdash in their body of work, but the critic may appear harsh and judgmental in the process. Useful criticism is a practical part of constructive criticism.
Wikipedia
>
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>
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- 4.
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Fri Dec 11, 2009 9:40 pm (PST)
Analogy is a cognitive process of transferring information from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another particular subject (the target), and a linguistic _expression_ corresponding to such a process. In a narrower sense, analogy is an inference or an argument from one particular to another particular, as opposed to deduction, induction, and abduction, where at least one of the premises or the conclusion is general. The word analogy can also refer to the relation between the source and the target themselves, which is often, though not necessarily, a similarity, as in the biological notion of analogy.
Niels Bohr's model of the atom made an analogy between the atom and the solar system.Analogy plays a significant role in problem solving, decision making, perception, memory, creativity, emotion, explanation and communication. It lies behind basic tasks such as the identification of places, objects and people, for example, in face perception and facial recognition systems. It has been argued that analogy is "the core of cognition".[1] Specific analogical language comprises exemplification, comparisons, metaphors, similes, allegories, and parables, but not metonymy. Phrases like and so on, and the like, as if, and the very word like also rely on an analogical understanding by the receiver of a message including them. Analogy is important not only in ordinary language and common sense, where proverbs and idioms give many examples of its application, but also in science, philosophy and the humanities. The concepts of association, comparison, correspondence, mathematical and morphological homology, homomorphism, iconicity, isomorphism, metaphor, resemblance, and similarity are closely related to analogy. In cognitive linguistics, the notion of conceptual metaphor may be equivalent to that of analogy.
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